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 Th e last 20 years have seen signifi cant trade liberalisation across the world, and it is widely 
 held that this has been benefi cial for development, as suggested by large successful economies in 
Asia, including China, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam. Th ese countries also have an impressive 
record in poverty reduction, though it is less clear to what extent this was a consequence of trade 
liberalisation. 
Signifi cant policy changes such as trade liberalisation will almost invariably have distributional 
consequences, with some gaining while others lose out, with probably diff erences in the short 
and longer term. Th e question of the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty was the subject 
of a review article in the Journal of Economic Literature, co-authored by Alan Winters, Neil 
McCulloch and myself. At that time empirical evidence on the question was very limited, with 
many of the articles we reviewed only covering specifi c aspects of it. Some more empirical 
evidence has accumulated over the subsequent eight years, though not so much for Africa.
Th is new study of Ghana, all chapters authored or co-authored by leading and emerging 
Ghanaian researchers, is a really welcome and valuable contribution to the literature. In depth 
country studies which look at diff erent aspects of trade liberalisation are likely to be the most 
informative approach. And Ghana is an ideal focus. It has been one of the most successful 
African economies, which has achieved sustained growth over the past more than 25 years. Trade 
liberalisation and resulting export growth have been an important part of the story. Ghana also 
has had a very good record of poverty reduction, but to date there has been very little evidence 
as to whether trade liberalisation has been an important contributor to this. 
Th e results presented in this study indeed confi rm that trade liberalisation has had both 
positive and negative medium term impacts on diff erent categories of households. Th ose engaged 
in exporting activities as well as skilled workers have benefi ted, but some poor and unskilled 
workers appear to have suff ered, at least in the short to medium term. Trade liberalisation may 
therefore be a partial explanation for the increase in inequality Ghana has experienced in recent 
years. Th at said though the overall impact of trade liberalisation appears to have been positive in 
Ghana and to have contributed to poverty reduction over the longer term. But clearly appropriate 
complementary policies combined with institutional reforms are necessary to enable the benefi ts 
of trade liberalisation to be more widely shared than has been the case to date. Th ese issues are 
likely to become all the more important as Ghana starts to extract its recently discovered oil.
Andy McKay
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Introduction and Overview
Charles Ackah and Ernest Aryeetey 
1. Introduction
Th e persistence of poverty in many developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), in the face of increased globalisation and rapid trade liberalisation during the past two 
decades has inspired considerable debate on the impact of globalisation, in general, and trade 
liberalisation, in particular, on poverty. Th e standard argument, based on the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, is that global trade liberalisation would lead to a rise in the incomes of unskilled labour 
in developing countries. In other words, since developing countries are more likely to have a 
comparative advantage in producing unskilled labour-intensive goods, one would expect trade 
reforms in these countries to be inherently pro-poor (Krueger, 1983; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
2002; Bhagwati, 2004; Harrison, 2005). However, the experiences of many developing countries, 
particularly in SSA, have been disappointing and in many cases poverty has increased following 
trade liberalisation (Easterly, 2001). It is estimated that more than 1 billion people still live in 
extreme poverty (based on the US$1 per day poverty line), and half the world’s population lives 
on less than US$2 a day. 
In Ghana, as in many other SSA countries, poverty remains the fundamental problem 
confronting policy makers in the new millennium as highlighted in the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (Government of Ghana, 2003) and Vision 2020: Th e First Medium-Term 
Development Plan (National Development Planning Commission,1977). Yet, between 1991 
and 2006, the headcount index of poverty fell by 23.2 percentage points with the proportion of 
the population living below the national poverty line falling from 51.7% in 1991/92 to 28.5% in 
2005/06. Poverty had fallen in the countryside as well as in the towns, though progress had been 
more rapid in rural areas. Research at ISSER (2006), suggests that this positive trend is likely to 
continue if Ghana maintains the average growth rates of the last few years making it likely that a 
number of targets contained in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS2) will be 
achieved. Th is optimism is, however, tempered by the fact that while poverty declined, inequality 
increased signifi cantly during the same period. Th e Gini index for consumption per equivalent 
adult increased from 0.353 in 1991/92 to 0.378 in 1998/99 and fi nally 0.394 in 2005/06. Th e 
evidence shows that the northern savannah area has been left behind in the national reduction 
in poverty, Large reductions in the incidence of poverty have occurred among private sector 





export farmers have experienced the largest reduction in consumption poverty. Poverty reduction 
among the large numbers of food crop farmers, on the other hand, has been modest. Reductions 
in the incidence of poverty over the period have been smaller also for the non-farm self employed 
and informal sector wage employees. A recent publication by the World Bank suggests that had 
there been no change in inequality, the reduction in poverty would have reached 27.5 percentage 
points, so that Ghana would have achieved the Millenium Development Goal (MDG) target of 
reducing poverty by half in relation to its level of 1991/92. 
Th ese statistics have stimulated some concern about whether the poor gain from trade 
liberalisation, and under what circumstances it may actually hurt them. Th is is largely in view of 
the fact that most of the changes in the poverty data are associated with household involvement 
in international trade and also migration. It is not surprising that the impact of global integration 
on the welfare of the poor has become an important subject of ongoing interest to researchers 
and policy makers alike. While numerous studies have been conducted to examine the openness-
growth-inequality-poverty linkages, little empirical evidence at the household level has been 
produced so far (McCulloch et al., 2001; Winters et al., 2004; Harrison, 2005). 
In the last decade, in particular, considerable attempts have been made to measure the eff ects 
of both trade and trade policy on poverty. Winters et al. (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), 
and Ravallion (2004) have provided excellent surveys of the evidence on the relationship between 
globalization and poverty. While the authors of these surveys acknowledge that there is mainly 
only indirect evidence regarding the linkages between globalization and poverty, the available 
evidence (Harrison, 2005) suggest that globalization produces both winners and losers and that 
the poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization when there are complementary 
policies in place. Some studies ( Dollar and Kraay 2000 and 2001) conclude that the poor benefi t 
from trade since it stimulates economic growth without worsening income distribution whereas 
other studies argue that the poor may not be well placed to take advantage of the potential gains 
from globalization. 
Th us, according to the latter studies, the benefi ts from globalization may accrue to those who 
are not particularly poor. A few other studies have actually reported adverse eff ects on poverty. 
However, empirical evidence is mixed and the globalization-poverty debate continues today. 
Accordingly, the issue of the impact of trade policy on poverty in developing countries has 
become the focus of recent research during which several methodological approaches have been 
deployed in the empirical literature. 
In general, studies on the impact of trade liberalization on growth and/or poverty follow 
at least one of two broad methodological approaches cross-country and country-specifi c 
studies. It is worth noting that the cross-country studies almost all consider trade (policy) and 
growth, perhaps with inferences for impact on poverty predicated on an assumed link between 
growth to poverty reduction. Studies specifi cally looking at eff ects of trade (policy) on poverty/
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welfare, on the other hand, are almost all country-specifi c. In spite of the numerous critiques 
of cross-country studies, they still have become, over the last decade, a major research tool for 
understanding the links between trade, growth and poverty. Most of the cross-country empirical 
literature seems to support the view that trade liberalisation (or openness) leads to more rapid 
growth and that economic growth results in poverty reduction, as exemplifi ed in the infl uential 
papers by Jeff rey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) and David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2000 
and 2001). However, these specifi c studies, or the general empirical approach, have come under 
severe criticism following the seminal work by Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (2001). 
A number of methodological and econometric problems and the use of largely unsatisfactory 
trade policy measures have been identifi ed as being responsible for the lack of robustness of these 
studies. In view of the major concerns over the methodologies deployed to study the impact of 
trade reforms, even some prominent proponents of free trade such as Srinivasan and Bhagwati 
(1999) have rejected cross-country regressions in favour of more in-depth case studies. Ravallion 
(2001:1813) quoted in Jenkins (2004:3) also points to the need for “more microeconomic and 
country-specifi c research on the factors determining why some poor people are able to take up 
the opportunities aff orded by an expanding economy (…) while others are not.” However, in 
spite of this call, empirical research on how trade policy reforms aff ect poverty at the household 
level is relatively scanty. 
In the case of Ghana, for example, despite the general concerns expressed in many quarters, 
relatively little is known about the actual impact of trade liberalisation on the livelihoods of the 
poor. While some progress has been made in identifying the linkages between globalization and 
poverty outcomes in Ghana (Ocran et al. 2005; Oduro and Osei-Akoto, 2006; Aryeetey 2005; 
Aryeetey and McKay 2007), there is much that we do not know. We know very little about 
who gains and who loses as the Ghanaian economy becomes increasingly integrated into the 
world economy. In relation to gender impact, there is a general lack of empirical evidence to 
support or contest the apprehension that trade liberalisation may have increased the barriers to 
women’s participation in the labour force. Th e lack of recent studies on the poverty impact of 
trade liberalisation (and globalisation, more generally) in Ghana is puzzling given its economic 
relevance, the availability of surveys and the fact that Ghana was ‘adjustment’s star pupil’ 
(Alderman, 1994). Hence, any eff orts directed at improving our understanding of the linkages 
between trade liberalisation and poverty in Ghana should be welcome.
Th is volume is one response to the challenge posed by the paucity of recent empirical evidence 
on the poverty and distributional impacts of trade policy reform in Ghana. Th e main objective 
of this volume is to contribute to our understanding of the poverty and distributional impact 
of trade policy reform in Ghana by analyzing how trade liberalisation aff ects the well-being of 
households and in particular, if the outcome it generates is pro-poor, with particular interest in 
the gender-diff erentiated impact. Th e volume attempts to answer the following questions:
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Who gains and who loses as the Ghanaian economy is opened to trade?• 
In particular, what happens to poor households as Ghana becomes increasingly integrated • 
into the global economy? 
Is there a close relationship between trade liberalisation and economic performance and • 
have poor households benefi ted from trade related economic growth?
Has the structure of protection and trade policy reforms in the last decade and a half been • 
pro-poor?
Has trade liberalisation in Ghana reduced or increased the barriers to women’s participation • 
in the labour force and have the trade net eff ects on poverty been positive?
2. Overview of the Volume
Th is volume combines both theory and quantitative econometric analysis to ascertain linkages 
between globalisation, trade and poverty in Ghana. Th e volume is divided into 11 chapters. Th e 
present chapter is prepared with the objective of serving as the introduction of the volume and 
overview of the subsequent chapters. 
In Chapter 2, ‘An overview of trade policies and development in Ghana’, Laryea and 
Akuoni provide a background to the various transformations that Ghana’s trade policy 
has undergone in the past up to the current export-led industrialisation strategy. Th ey fi nd 
that the outward-oriented policies adopted have helped integrate Ghana into the world 
economy, thereby providing a platform for the country to compete both domestically and 
in international markets. Th ese policies have helped increase domestic competition and 
also improved opportunities for exporters. It is expected that Ghana will benefi t greatly 
from the trade policies it has adopted. 
In Chapter 3, ‘Trends in growth, employment and poverty in Ghana’, Ackah and Boateng 
fi nd that Ghana has experienced impressive growth since the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1983. However, the benefi ts of this impressive growth have not been translated 
into the generation of quality employment. Th ey fi nd that the economy is still dominated 
by agriculture, vulnerable employment and poverty. Since 1991, a consistent decline of 
poverty has been noted. However, poverty is still endemic amongst food crop farmers 
who are excluded from minimum wage policies and government schemes for farmers. To 
curtail this problem they suggest that the participation of the poor should be taken into 
consideration when making policies. 
In Chapter 4, ‘Manufacturing employment and wage eff ects of trade liberalization’, Ackah, 
Aryeetey and Opoku explore the impact of trade policy on wages and employment, paying 
particular attention to diff erences across key sectors, skills and overtime. Th ey explore a 
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potential match between the trends in trade liberalization and the trends in wages and 
employment. Th ey fi nd strong evidence that the growth of employment in the manufacturing 
sector in Ghana was signifi cantly negatively impacted by the trade policy reforms of the 
1990s and early 2000s, as high job losses occurred in sectors with the largest tariff  cuts. Th e 
evidence suggests that trade protection creates more employment for unskilled labour than 
skilled labour in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, they fi nd that trade liberalization in the 
manufacturing sector led to a fall in the average wage paid by manufacturing fi rms in Ghana, 
suggesting that workers employed in industries that were more exposed to liberalization 
experienced lower wages. Th ey also fi nd that greater openness is likely to be associated with 
signifi cantly lower wages in fi rms which employ workers with low levels of education (the 
unskilled). Th is suggests that high trade protection that shields manufacturing fi rms from 
outside competition also protects the wages of unskilled workers. 
In Chapter 5, ‘Trade liberalization and the return to education in Ghana’, Ackah, Morrissey 
and Opoku examine how income protection levels diff er across households characterized 
by diff erent skill levels. Th e positive eff ect of protection was disproportionately greater for 
low skilled labour households, suggesting that trade liberalization has an eroding eff ect on 
the welfare of unskilled labour households. In the short-run, all households regardless of 
skill type lose out from trade liberalization, but the poor unskilled households (because 
they are sector-specifi c and less mobile) would lose disproportionately, suggesting that 
within the same sector, a trade reform may lead to diff ering impacts on households with 
similar attributes but diff erent skills. Education was found to be a fundamental household 
characteristic determining the probability that a household experiences poverty, ceteris 
paribus. From a policy standpoint, they concluded that contemplating trade liberalization 
without recognizing the complementary role of human capital investment may be a sub-
optimal policy for the poor, at least in the short-run.
In Chapter 6, ‘Trade liberalization and manufacturing fi rm productivity’, Ackah, Aryeetey 
and Morrissey empirically investigate the eff ects of trade liberalization on fi rm-level 
productivity in Ghana. Controlling for observed and unobserved fi rm characteristics and 
industry heterogeneity, their fi ndings show a strong negative impact of nominal tariff s on 
fi rm productivity. Th ey also fi nd large positive eff ects of tariff  reductions on total factor 
productivity (TFP). Th ese eff ects are consistent with the hypothesis that trade liberalization 
increases productivity in the domestic market, indicating that fi rms that are over-protected, 
as illustrated by high import tariff s pertaining to the industries in which they operate, have 
a lower level of TFP than fi rms that are exposed to competition. Additionally, strong eff ects 
of export intensity on productivity were found both on its own and in conjunction with 
lower tariff s. Exporters appeared to take greater advantage of foreign competition than 
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non-exporters and were more sensitive to tariff s. Th e negative impact of trade protection 
on productivity is stronger for exporting fi rms (or fi rms that export larger shares of their 
output) relative to non-exporting fi rms.
In Chapter 7, ‘Th e impact of elimination of trade taxes on poverty and income distribution 
in Ghana’, Bhasin shows that elimination of trade-related import and export tariff s on 
agricultural goods and import tariff s on industrial goods in isolation or combined with 
foreign capital infl ows and value-added tax reduces the incidence, depth, and severity of 
poverty of all categories of households, with the exception of the incidence of poverty 
of public sector employees and non-working people when import tariff s on industrial 
goods were eliminated in isolation. Regressive tax (VAT) as a revenue replacement made 
poor people better off  due to neoclassical assumptions and transfers of VAT revenue to 
households. Th e impact of trade-related fi scal reforms on poverty and income diff ered across 
households. Mean incomes of private sector employees and non-working people improved 
to a large extent when trade liberalization in isolation was considered. Furthermore, a 
combination of foreign capital infl ows and value-added tax improved the mean incomes of 
agricultural households to a large extent. It was suggested that the Government of Ghana 
should try to fi nance its unilateral trade liberalization through domestic resources instead 
of foreign resources in order to have greater impact on poverty reduction and improvement 
in the incomes of households.
In Chapter 8, ‘Food prices, tax reforms and consumer welfare in Ghana during the 1990s’, 
Ackah and Appleton analyse the eff ect of food price changes on household consumption 
in Ghana during the 1990s and assess the extent to which changes can be explained by 
trade and agricultural policy reforms. Demand for most food commodities in Ghana was 
found to be price sensitive, suggesting that Ghanaian household consumption did respond 
to relative price and real income changes. Th e burden of higher consumer food prices 
fell largely on the urban poor households. Trade liberalisation may not (for consumers) 
have been responsible for the welfare losses. Th e role of other factors and policies, such as 
the removal of fertilizer subsidies and exchange rate depreciation, could be decisive. Th e 
simulation exercise suggests that further tariff  liberalisation would tend to off set the welfare 
losses of higher food prices for all household groups, although it is the poor and rural 
consumers that stand to gain the most. In sum, the results suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
that although trade liberalisation may have a positive impact on welfare, at least from a 
consumption perspective, other factors may off set this, at least in the case of Ghana.
In Chapter 9, ‘Eff ects of import liberalization on tariff  revenue in Ghana’, Insaidoo and 
Obeng examine the quantitative eff ect of import liberalization on import tariff  yield in 
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Ghana. During the liberalisation period (post 1983), Ghana improved the generation of 
revenue from taxing imports although tariff  revenue became less responsive to growth 
in imports in this period. Th eir fi ndings suggested that import liberalization in Ghana is 
fi scally compatible although the impact of average offi  cial tariff  rate reductions has been 
marginal. Ineffi  ciencies in import tax administration, a clear identifi cation of major sources 
of revenue leakage, the need for a review of the rationale for duty exemption programmes 
and a reduction of the range of items exempt from duty payments are some of the challenges 
of improving tariff  revenue from taxing imports. Replacing of import tariff  with the value-
added tax and maintaining a liberal exchange rate regime are expected to enhance revenue 
generation from taxing imports. However, this can only be achieved through further 
improvements in customs administration and duty-collection mechanisms.
In Chapter 10, ‘Cash cropping, gender and household welfare: evidence from Ghana’, 
Ackah and Aryeetey examine how participation in cash cropping diff ers among women 
and men, and the ensuing implications for household welfare and food security among 
farm households in Ghana. Th ey suggest that gender-related diff erences in the adoption 
of cocoa result from gender bias in access to complementary inputs such as land. Using 
propensity score matching techniques, the impact of cocoa adoption on farm household 
income and food security was examined. Th eir fi ndings suggest that cocoa participation 
has a positive and statistically signifi cant eff ect on household income and food security 
status. Commercial farming matters for poverty reduction in Ghana. Farmers that are 
able to adopt high-yield export crops such as cocoa are on average better off  than farmers 
more oriented towards subsistence activities. Encouraging commercialization of farming 
in rural areas will help facilitate exports and reduce poverty. Gender bias in access to 
land, the most productive resource needed for participation in cash cropping in Ghana, 
appear to be the single most important constraint to female participation in cash cropping. 
Improvements in female access to land is seen to be cardinal to female-headed cocoa-
farming households responding as well to the market incentives in export crop adoption 
as their male counterparts. Th ey challenge policy makers to increase women’s access to the 
key resources through land reforms which must have the objective of promoting increased 
acquisition of land by women. 
In Chapter 11, ‘Global integration, price transmission and household welfare in Ghana’, 
Ackah, Osei and Botchie investigate the nature of price transmission from the world markets 
to the Ghanaian market for three main food crops, namely, rice, maize, and groundnuts, 
looking further into the welfare implications for households aff ected by price changes in 
the aforementioned food crops. Th e degree of openness determines the degree of price 
transmission from the world to a given economy, with the eff ect of world prices on domestic 
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prices being signifi cant and positive. Th e welfare simulations in the chapter demonstrate 
that a substantial number of households in Ghana are vulnerable to food price shocks and 
have likely suff ered signifi cant welfare losses from rising food prices. At the national level, 
the commodity that had the highest impact on poverty as a result of increases of its prices 
on the international market is rice. Although food price increases had diff erential eff ects on 
the population, for the vast majority of urban and female-headed households, the higher 
food prices brought severe hardship. Since the poor include both net consumers and net 
sellers of food commodities, a change in their price in either direction will inevitably hurt 
some of the poor and benefi t some of the poor at the same time. It is therefore imperative 
for developing country governments and their development partners to be seen to be 
making eff orts to improve smallholder productivity in the rural areas, even if they produce 
for home consumption mainly. Suffi  cient attention should be paid to maintaining or even 
improving the levels of social protection and poverty reduction expenditures.
Th is volume was carried out with the objective of improving our understanding of the poverty 
and distributional impact of trade policy reform in Ghana. Overall, the messages of this volume 
are clear in that trade liberalisation generated positive and negative eff ects for the Ghanaian 
population. It has improved Ghana’s competitiveness in the domestic market and provided better 
opportunities for exporters in international markets. Th e country has seen tremendous economic 
growth through liberalisation though dearths of quality employment opportunities exist. Th is is 
partly explained by the fact that liberalisation has had a negative impact on wages in the Ghanaian 
manufacturing sector, particularly, for unskilled workers although simultaneously it has benefi ted 
workers in exporting fi rms. Th e benefi t of liberalisation seems centred on exporting fi rms, skilled 
workers, households with higher incomes and male farmers involved in cocoa production while 
it hurts some of the poor and exhibits traces of female discrimination, particularly in access to 
land. To include the poor in the benefi ts of trade liberalisation, government should ensure the 
existence of policies that maintain or improve levels of social protection and poverty reduction 
expenditures. Gender discrimination should be reduced by improving women’s access to land 
as this would help increase their participation in export markets, reduce poverty, and increase 
household income and food security. Overall, trade liberalisation need not be stopped because 
of the potential negative eff ects it has on the poor because the overall benefi ts through income 
growth in the economy compensate for these eff ects. Nevertheless, the fi ndings presented in this 
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An Overview of  Trade Policies and 
Developments in Ghana
Albert Laryea and Sarah Akuoni
1. Introduction
Prior to gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Ghana, a small country whose 
main exports were primary products, operated a liberal payments regime. Th is was followed 
after independence by the pursuit of an import substitution industrialisation policy, as the then 
president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, embarked on an ambitious industrialisation plan. However, 
diffi  culties with the strategy emerged by the 1960s and 1970s as the balance of payments was 
put under severe strain. Th is resulted in the introduction of quantity and exchange rate controls 
in an attempt to sustain the external sector. Th ese measures did not solve the problem and the 
resulting economic decline experienced in the Ghanaian economy as a whole fi nally compelled 
the government to embark on a World Bank/IMF prescribed economic recovery programme 
from the early to mid -1980s. Th ese reforms, which were aimed at removing distortions in the 
economy, included trade and exchange rate liberalisation. Subsequently, further steps were taken 
to promote the export sector with a particular emphasis on the development of non-traditional 
exports.
Currently, Ghana pursues an export-led industrialisation strategy, which aims at improving 
the competitiveness of Ghanaian exports by providing a supportive liberalised environment in 
which exporters can successfully compete both in the domestic and international market. Th is is 
indicated in Ghana’s most recent development plan, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS II).
It is clear that in the fi ve decades of Ghana’s existence, her trade policy has evolved from 
a fairly liberal one in the 1950s through a signifi cantly controlled regime in the 1970s after 
which the economy underwent major trade and economic reforms in the 1980s to give rise to 
the liberalised trade policy currently in existence. Th is policy is largely guided by developments 
which have taken place in the arena of international trade under the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariff s (GATT) and World Trade Organisation ( WTO), trade agreements between 
Ghana and major trading partners as well as the country’s own economic development policy. 
Ghana’s trade policy has also been infl uenced, especially in the 1980s and 1990s by the Bretton 
Woods institutions.
Th is chapter provides an overview of Ghana’s trade policy over the fi ve decades since 
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Th e ways in which the external sector has changed will also be examined. Particular attention 
will be paid to the trade reforms that started in 1983 and their aftermath. In the process, policies 
over the years will be compared and more successful ones in terms of performance will be 
highlighted to serve as a guide for future policy. Th e rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
the next section provides a historical overview from independence to the onset of the economic 
reforms in 1983. Th is is followed by Section 3 which reviews trade policy during and after the 
reforms and touches on tariff  and quota reforms, reforms in the exchange rate, related reforms in 
trade policy, sector-specifi c reforms and recent developments in Ghana’s trade policy. In Section 
4, developments in Ghana’s relations with multilateral partners and institutions are discussed. 
Section 5 presents some evidence of developments in exports, imports and direction of trade. Th e 
chapter concludes with Section 6.
2. Ghana’s Trade Policies Between 1957 and 1983
During the 1950s there was debate regarding relevant trade policies for developing countries 
(Todaro, 1992). Th is debate was largely between free market ideology and trade protectionism. 
While the proponents of free market supported an outward-oriented, export-led trade regime, 
trade protectionists advocated inward-oriented, import-substitution trade policies.
Ghana’s general economic policies after independence required massive government 
involvement in the economy with relevant and sector-specifi c controls and restrictions. Th e 
perceived dearth of entrepreneurial talent and low savings in the private sector led to the 
establishment of numerous state enterprises in the agricultural, manufacturing and services 
sectors. On the external front Nkrumah embarked on an import-substitution strategy which 
required further controls. For this policy to work it was necessary to have an overvalued exchange 
rate to enable inputs to come in cheaply and to put restrictions on fi nal goods imports to protect 
domestic industry.
Ghana’s leadership followed trade protectionism ideology, in part because of some consensus 
on the part of development economists that there needed to be massive government involvement 
in the economy. Th is was informed by the usual market failure argument but many development 
economists of the 1950s felt that what was involved here was a much broader concept than the 
Marshallian-type external economies. Marshallian-type marginal economics was felt to be too 
static to be relevant to the essentially dynamic question of development (Killick, 1978).
Consequently the government’s general trade policy was characterized by exchange controls, 
tariff s and quantitative controls. Th e motivation, following the protectionism ideology, was to 
encourage indigenous manufacturing that was relevant to Ghana’s resource endowment. It was 
believed at the time that greater self-reliance could be achieved only if the movement of goods, 
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people and information was restricted and multinational enterprises were kept out in order to 
allow domestic infant industries to grow (Streeten, 1973).
Between 1950 and 1961 Ghana’s payments regime was a liberal one with virtually no 
restrictions. Whatever minimal restrictions that existed were related to trade with nations outside 
the sterling area. Th is period saw the accumulation of reserves following the commodity boom 
associated with the Korean War and the gradual drawing down of the reserves. However, there 
was a turnaround in the 1960s when the government started industrialization with the import-
substitution strategy contained in the Seven-Year Development Plan. Nkrumah launched an 
ambitious programme of infrastructure building – the most prominent of which were the 
artifi cial harbour at Tema, the Accra-Tema motorway and the Akosombo hydro-electric dam. 
Such projects required a lot of resources which came partly from domestic sources and partly 
from foreign borrowing.
In the middle of 1960s, there were widespread falls in primary product prices, especially 
cocoa, which impacted the economy of Ghana signifi cantly. Th is and other reasons led to the 
failure of the import substitution approach to industrialization. Many of the enterprises set up 
performed poorly, especially after Nkrumah’s overthrow, and thus drained the state of resources 
as many had to be bailed out continually (Killick, 1978). Th e policy also required an exchange 
rate that was low enough to let in imported inputs accompanied by restrictions to discourage 
fi nal goods imports. In the process however exports were penalized.
Th e problem largely persisted after the 1966 coup. Th e payment system remained unsustainable 
and the civilian government of Dr. K. A. Busia was left with only two options – seeking debt 
relief and/or a massive devaluation. Very little debt relief was forthcoming and the government 
devalued the currency by an enormous 44 percent Th is devaluation led to a big jump in prices of 
imported goods and thus the general price level. It did not go down well especially in urban areas 
and the government was toppled by a military coup in January 1972. Th ere was a revaluation of 
the currency that resulted in a smaller overall devaluation of about 20 percent.
Th e period between 1970 and 1983 has been described as one in which there was little macro 
management. What happened to the budget and to monetary variables was the result of decisions 
taken on political rather than economic grounds by a regime that showed little understanding 
of their macro consequences (Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000). Th e poor economic conditions 
triggered coups in 1979 and 1981.1
3. Ghana’s Trade Policies After 1983
In an attempt to prop up the Ghanaian economy, which was in crisis at the time, the then 
military leader Jerry Rawlings, with the support and guidance of the World Bank and IMF, 
1  For more detailed accounts of trade policy before 1983 see Killick, 1978; Leith, 1974; Jebuni et al 1994.
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embarked on Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment programme (ERP and SAP). 
Key among the policies contained in those programmes was trade liberalization. Trade policy 
under SAP included tariff  adjustments, import liberalization, liberalization of foreign exchange, 
deregulation of domestic market prices and controls and institutional reforms that particularly 
aff ected revenue generating bodies such as the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). 
Th e main objectives of these reforms were to restore incentives for the production of exports and 
increase the overall availability of foreign exchange, and to improve foreign exchange allocation 
and channel it into selected, high-priority areas (Republic of Ghana, 1983). Th e following sub-
sections concentrate on reforms that eased restrictions and liberalised prices, involving reforms 
of tariff s, quotas and the exchange rate.
3.1 Tariff  Reform and Quota reforms
With the advent of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, Ghana’s trade regime 
shifted towards more liberal, market-oriented and outward-oriented policies. Signifi cant trade 
liberalization began with the adjustment of tariff  rates in 1983. Rates were adjusted downwards 
from 35 percent, 60 percent and 100 percent to 10 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent and 30 percent. 
Tariff s were further simplifi ed and lowered to 0 percent, 25 percent and 30 percent the following 
year to create a uniform pattern of protection although some import controls remained in place. 
Further reductions occurred in 1986 when the higher rates were lowered to 20-25 percent. In 
addition, the authorities reduced the number of restricted imports.
In 1986 there was a re-defi nition of import license categories with the introduction of a 
new exchange rate system. Import licenses were divided into three categories. Th e fi rst category, 
the ‘A’ license, allowed the holder to bid for foreign exchange at the foreign exchange auction 
but restrictions were placed on the type of goods that could be imported using the license. 
Th e second category, the ‘S’ license, prevented the holder from bidding at the auction and the 
third type of license was issued to government organizations for the importation of essential 
goods and services. In 1987 there was a substantial increase in the number of goods that could 
be imported under the ‘A’ license. With the process of reforming the exchange rate system to 
a market-determined rate largely completed in 1988, the import licensing scheme which was 
considered redundant was abolished and was replaced with a special tariff  on imports.
Th e structural adjustment programme was implemented in 1987 as the second phase of the 
economic reforms. From 1987 to 1991 there were major changes to the tariff  structure. Th e tariff  
on luxury goods was lowered in 1988 but this was replaced with a super sales tax in 1990 which 
ranged from 50 percent to 500 percent. Imported fruits such as bananas, plantain, pineapples 
and guavas were subject to a tax of 500 percent while vegetables such as onions, potatoes and 
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beans were subject to a tax of 100 percent. However this was reduced to the range of 10 to 100 
percent in 1991.
Further liberalization occurred with the lowering of the import tax rate on raw materials and 
capital goods by 5 percentage points in 1990. Th e sales tax on imported basic consumer goods 
was also reduced between 1989 and 1994. However, protective duty rates were introduced for 
specifi ed goods in 1990 and in 1994 to help some import-substituting industries such as those 
producing vegetable oil and soap, which were being subjected to intense competition. In 1994 
import duties on all goods which were imported under exemption were raised to 10 percent and 
goods classifi ed as standard saw an increase from 20 percent to 25 percent (Table 1).
Th us by 1994, Ghana had a relatively simple tariff  structure, comprising three major rate 
categories:
(i)  A low rate of 0 percent (with some items raised to 5 percent) reserved primarily for 
primary products, capital goods, and some basic consumer goods;
(ii)  A moderate rate of 10 percent applied primarily to raw materials and intermediate 
inputs, as well as some consumer goods; and
(iii) A higher rate of 25 percent, mainly on fi nal consumer goods. In addition, there were 
a number of programmes under which imports could be exempted from duties and 
manufacturers could apply for permission to import raw materials and intermediate 
inputs at concessionary duty rates.
Table 1: Import duties structure in 1993 and 1994.
 1993 (%)  1994 (%)
Zero-rated  0  0
Exempted  0  10
Concession  10  10
Standard  20  25
Luxury  25  25
 
Source: Budget Statement 1994
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Table 2: Sales tax (on imports) structure in 1993 – 1995 (%)
 1993  1994  1995
Zero-rated  0  0  0
Exempted  0  0  0
Concession  7.5  15  17.5
Standard  17.5  15  17.5
Luxury  35  35  17.5
Source: Ibid
In 1995, as part of eff orts to increase government tax revenue a 10 percent import duty was 
imposed on selected zero-rated and exempted goods regarded as non-essential. However all 
import duties except those on vehicles remained the same. Th e import sales tax was also revised 
in 1995 (Table 2). In 1994, a number of tariff  rationalization measures were proposed. Some 
imported items lost their zero-rated status while the rates for some other items were lowered. 
With regard to sales tax (on imports) the rate on goods classifi ed as concessionary was raised 
from 7.5 percent to 15 percent while the rate for goods classifi ed as standard was reduced from 
17.5 percent to 15 percent (Table 2). In 1995 a uniform tax of 17.5 percent was placed on all 
taxable imported items.
Th e most radical tax reform in Ghana in the 1990s, which also impacted signifi cantly on the 
country’s external sector, was the replacement of the sales tax with the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
in 1998. Th e VAT was adopted for several reasons. First, it brought Ghana in line with the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol that made it mandatory 
for members to adopt the VAT system by the end of 1999 (Osei, 2000). Secondly, this system 
of taxation was thought to be more effi  cient, less burdensome in terms of its incidence, and its 
overall impact more equitable than the sales tax (GOG, 1994).
Table 3: Structure of MFN tariff s, 2007
2007 U.R.
1. Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 14.7 n.a.
2. Duty-free tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 11.9 0.0
3. Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff lines) 0.2 0.0
4. Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines) 0.0 0.0
5. Non-ad valorem tariffs with no AVEs (% of all tariff lines) 0.2 0.0
6. Simple average tariff rate 12.7 92.3
 Agricultural products (WTO defi nition)a 17.5 96.8




 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fi shing (ISIC 1) 15.7 96.5
 Mining and quarrying (ISIC 2) 11.4 n.a.
 Manufacturing (ISIC 3) 12.6 90.4
7 Domestic tariff “spikes” (% of all tariff lines)c 0.0 0.0
8. International tariff “peaks” (% of all tariff lines)d 41.9 100.0
9. Overall standard deviation of applied rates 6.9 19.3
10. “Nuisance” applied rates (% of all tariff lines)e 0.0 0.0
n.a. Not applicable.
a  WTO Agreement on Agriculture defi nitions.
b  Excluding petroleum.
c  Domestic tariff  spikes are defi ned as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied rate 
(indicator 6).
d  International tariff  peaks are defi ned as those exceeding 15 percent.
e  Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2 percent.
Source: :WTO Secretariat calculations, based on data provided by the Ghanaian authorities.
Initially the VAT rate was 10 percent but was subsequently increased to 12.5percent in 2000. 
Since then a 12.5 percent value added tax (VAT) has been tacked on the duty-inclusive value of 
all imports, with a few selected exemptions. In 2000, Ghana imposed an additional 0.5 percent 
ECOWAS levy on all goods originating from non- ECOWAS countries.
With respect to the WTO Ghana increased its coverage of bindings during the Uruguay Round 
from zero to 14.7 percent of tariff  lines (Table 3). Some 12 percent of tariff  lines are duty-free. In 
agriculture all tariff s were bound mainly at the ceiling rate of 99 percent. Lower bound rates of 
40 percent and 50 percent were set on a few agricultural products to apply from 1995. Very few 
industrial tariff s – 1percent of tariff  lines were bound at ceiling rates of between 30 percent and 
45 percent. Bindings were limited primarily to agricultural inputs such as fertilizer as well as tools 
and equipment. Applied rates are, however, much lower, as shown in Table 3. Th e reason for the 
big diff erence is to give the government some leeway in raising tariff s when, for instance, severe 
balance of payments problems arise without contravening the rules of the WTO.
Ghana’s simple average tariff  with all the changes made in the 1990s fell to 13 percent in 
January 2000 from a high of 17 percent in 1992. Th is did not last long though as in April of the 
same year a ‘special import tax’ of 20 percent was re-introduced covering some 7 percent of tariff  
lines. Th is raised the tariff  on many consumer goods to 40 percent - well above the previous rate 
of 25 percent and consequently raised the average tariff  to 14.7 percent.Th e cumulative frequency 
of Ghana’s most favoured nation(MFN) tariff s (as shown in Chart 1) indicates that 90 percent of 
tariff  lines are at or below 20 percent. In 2002 Ghana abolished its 20 percent ‘special import tax’ 
in an eff ort to bring its tariff  structure into harmony with ECOWAS and WTO provisions.
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In February 2003, the government imposed higher tariff s on imported rice and poultry but 
this was never implemented as development partners objected. Th e National Health Insurance 
Law was passed in September 2003 and, to partly fi nance it, the VAT was increased from 12.5 
percent to 15 percent.
Currently Ghana’s tariff  structure comprises four bands of 0 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and 
20 percent. Finished/consumer goods attract the highest rate of 20 percent while raw materials 
and intermediate goods are either zero-rated or attract a tariff  of 10 percent. Th is applies to all 
goods except for some petroleum products which face specifi c tariff s. Th e average applied tariff  
is now 12.7 percent, down from 14.7 percent in 2000 (Table 3).
Note: Th e fi gures in the brackets correspond to the percentage of total lines
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations, based on data provided by the Ghanaian authorities.
3.2  Th e Exchange Rate After 1983
Th e exchange rate was a very visible symbol of the large distortions in the Ghanaian economy 
and tackling this particular problem was thus a central part of the whole liberalisation process. To 
pursue this goal the government had four main objectives: fi rstly, to realign the offi  cial exchange 
rate, secondly, to achieve a convergence of offi  cial and parallel rates, thirdly, to absorb the parallel 
market into the legal market and fourthly, to allow demand and supply to determine the rate and 
allocation of foreign exchange (Dordunoo, 1994).
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A straightforward devaluation was perceived by some to be politically damaging given that 
the Busia government had been overthrown in 1972 mainly for devaluing the currency and the 
governments that followed had consequently taken devaluation off  the list of available policy 
options for several years. Th us the whole process was done gradually and in phases.
Th e fi rst phase in 1983, retained the offi  cial rate of ¢2.75 to $1 but instituted a system of 
bonuses and surcharges for exports and imports . Th us, exporters were given bonuses that varied 
according to what was being exported while importers were surcharged according to what they 
imported. Th e eff ect was to institute a multiple exchange rate regime. In eff ect traditional exports 
and imports of crude oil, essential raw materials, basic foodstuff s and capital goods were subject 
to a rate of ¢23.375 to $1. Th e rate for non-traditional exports and other imports was ¢29.975 to 
$1. Th e offi  cial rate was changed six months later to ¢30 to $1 thus eff ectively unifying the rate. 
Subsequently there were fairly large devaluations until in January 1986 the rate stood at ¢90 to 
$1.
Th e second phase involved a series of measures aimed at moving towards a market -determined 
rate. First, a retail foreign exchange auction market for selected transactions was introduced. Th e 
basic objectives of the foreign exchange auction were:
(i) To minimize and eventually eliminate the use of administrative mechanisms in the 
allocation of foreign exchange;
(ii) To provide foreign exchange fi nancing in a timely manner at prices which refl ect the 
prevailing scarcity of foreign exchange;
(iii) To promote trade liberalization through easing and fi nally eliminating controls on trade 
and payments, thereby enhancing the volume of external trade; and
(iv) To bring foreign exchange held outside the banks into the banking system by off ering 
competitive prices.
Secondly, an offi  cial two-tier system was introduced whereby imports and exports of selected 
goods were subject to the offi  cial fi xed rate while the remaining two-thirds of Ghana’s external 
transactions were subject to the auction rate. Th is two-tier system was unifi ed in February 1987 
at ¢150 to $1 with all transactions being settled at the weekly auction rate. Th e auction was 
initially characterised by increased instability but this stabilised after a few weeks.
Th e third phase of the reform process began in February 1988 when the parallel market was 
legalised with the granting of licenses to individuals to operate foreign exchange bureaux. Th e 
main aim of allowing the operations of such bureaux was to attract additional foreign exchange to 
offi  cial channels. Other aims were to facilitate the acquisition of small amounts of foreign exchange 
on a daily basis and to bring about convergence between parallel and auction rates (Oduro and 
Harrigan, 2000). Th us the rate was now wholly a market-determined rate. Subsequently a wholesale 
market auction was introduced in 1990 to be replaced by an inter-bank market in 1992. With 
these changes the gap between the inter-bank rate and the bureaux rate was largely eliminated.
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One remarkable thing about the substantial devaluations was the absence of what is known 
as ‘contractionary devaluation’. Th is is a scenario in which devaluation can lead to contraction 
in output because of mainly supply-side factors such as the increase in the prices of imported 
inputs and wage demands which accompany the resultant increase in prices. Some reasons have 
been given for this. Th ey include the fact that prices were already being determined by the 
black market rate which made the impact of the devaluation almost negligible. Other factors 
include the infl ows of foreign exchange from donors and the fact that fi scal policy emphasized 
expenditure control within the context of revenue generation (Oduro and Harrigan, 2000).
Subsequently, the broad policy objective was to maintain the fl exible exchange rate regimes 
that had been established. Having an exchange rate that was freely determined by market forces 
and thus neither undervalued nor overvalued is considered to be consistent with the outward 
oriented policies initiated in the 1980s.
Th e year 2006 saw the passing of the Foreign Exchange Act 723 in December. Until then 
the foreign exchange market was operated in accordance with the Exchange Control Act, 1961, 
Act 71 and subsequent amendments to that Act. Th rough the issue of Notices and Regulations 
by Bank of Ghana (under the authority of the 1961 Act), the Exchange Control Act was 
operationally amended to a very large extent, thereby substantially liberalising current account 
transactions. Capital account liberalization has, however, not been achieved. Th e new Foreign 
Exchange Act 2006, Act 723 removed all exchange controls and authorized dealer banks and 
agencies can undertake foreign exchange transactions without recourse to the central bank.
3.3  Other Trade-Related Reforms
Th ese are general reforms such as the creation of special institutions, programmes and projects 
to buttress the reforms.
During the 1990s the Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) was made more of a promo-
tional agency than a regulatory one. In line with this, a Product Development Division was created 
within the council to help identify new products and producers, organize exporters into produc-
tion associations and provide information to entrepreneurs in the fi eld. Education programmes 
were also organised for exporters and export facilitators throughout the period. Solo exhibitions in 
selected ECOWAS countries were organised to promote exports into the sub-region.
In 1993, two programmes were established under the Ministry of Trade and Industry to 
enhance the supply capabilities of exporters by assisting them with incentives. Th ese are the 
USAID-sponsored Trade and Investment Programme (TIP), and the Private Enterprise and 
Export Development (PEED) initiative sponsored by the World Bank. Th e TIP was a US$80 
Million programme which lasted for fi ve years. Its objective was to help eliminate the various 
obstacles to export expansion in order to achieve accelerated export growth. Th e programme’s 
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emphasis was on creating an enabling environment for the promotion of exports and improving 
on the low capacity of fi rms to export by providing institutional support for exporters. Th e 
TIP put in place Trade and Investment Management Unit which comprised all ministries and 
other organizations whose activities relate to export development. Accomplishments included 
the removal of foreign exchange control measures that required non-traditional exporters to 
surrender most of their foreign exchange earnings to the monetary authorities and the removal 
of restrictions on what could be exported.
At the end of TIP in 1999, USAID followed up with the Trade and Investment Reform 
Programme, (TIRP.) Under TIRP, all restrictions on non-traditional exports were removed, 
paving the way for a tremendous increase in the value and volume of non-traditional exports. 
Th is was followed by the Trade and Investment Programme for a Competitive Export Economy; 
(TIPCEE 2004-2009) also aimed at creating an enabling environment for further growth in 
non-traditional exports. TIPCEE had as one of its major objectives, the building of capacity for 
exporters in business development. It also aimed to provide technical assistance to smallholder 
farmer groups in the horticultural sector and businesses involved in agro-processing for export.
To address the problem of inadequate fi nancial services for exporters, the PEED scheme, a US 
$51m credit facility was introduced. It aimed at addressing the fi nancial problems of exporters 
of non-traditional goods, and was designed to provide fi nance in foreign exchange or in cedis 
for Ghanaian non-traditional exporters. Two methods of fi nancing exports were off ered under 
the PEED scheme. Th ese are the Export Refi nance Scheme, and the Export Credit Guarantee 
Scheme. Export refi nance meant that, the Bank of Ghana would refi nance short-term export 
credits made by banks to non-traditional exporters. For the repayment to be made in respect of 
loans provided under the refi nancing scheme, the Bank of Ghana was to set aside US$4 million 
under the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme to guarantee up to 65 percent of loans made by 
banks to non-traditional exporters. Other incentives provided included the waiver of duty for 
exporters who used imported inputs.
In addition to the programmes outlined above, a Business Assistance Fund (BAF) was 
launched as a short-term measure to support distressed but potentially viable Ghanaian non-
traditional exporting enterprises. Th is guarantee scheme was followed in 2000 by the Export 
Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) with the aim of boosting the fi nancing available 
from the banking sector to exporters. Th e industries targeted for support were textiles/garments, 
wood and wood processing, food and food processing and packaging. Money was to come from 
10 percent of divestiture proceeds and a levy on dutiable values of all non-petroleum products 
imported for commercial purposes. EDIF provides concessionary fi nancing at the rate of 12.5 
percent for exporters. It also helps with export insurance, re-fi nancing and credit guarantees 
through designated fi nancial institutions.
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Other interventions were made to improve the effi  ciency of institutions off ering trade- 
related services. Th ese were the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Ghana Ports 
and Harbour Authority, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, Ghana Immigration Service 
and the Ghana Free Zones Board. Th is support was part of the Ghana Trade and Investment 
Gateway project which was launched in 1999 to further buttress the initiatives adopted to attract 
investment into the country Th e project was to help modernise the equipment and raise the 
human capacity base of the institutions listed above for the prompt handling and the provision 
of off site infrastructure for the export-processing zone enclave.
Th e objective of the Gateway project was to attract a critical mass of export-oriented fi rms to 
kick-start export-led growth as well as facilitate trade. Th is involves the creation of an enabling 
environment to facilitate the increased level of private investment, reduce the cost of doing 
business as well as provide the necessary infrastructural services and the provision of off -site 
infrastructure for on-site facilities.
In the area of customs valuation, Ghana in 2000 adopted the WTO Valuation Agreement 
concurrently with the Destination Inspection Scheme (DIS). Th is is as a result of the 
implementation of the Gateway project. Prior to this, Ghana had over the previous 28 years 
been operating the Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI) scheme. Th e PSI scheme was long and 
cumbersome and required a 100 percent physical inspection of imports. Th us, on the average, 
goods took between 4-6 weeks before being cleared.
Furthermore, in May 2002, the WTO and Ghana’s Customs Excise and Preventive Service 
(CEPS) signed an agreement on customs valuation and trade facilitation to simplify customs 
procedures and facilitate swift clearance of goods. Th is was to establish a transparent environ-
ment for the conduct of international trade and underlined the importance of a commercial 
system that is standardized and fair. Under the initial valuation system, the ‘Commissioner of 
Valuation’ has the fi nal judgment on any queries regarding the declared value of goods but this 
was removed under the new agreement.
3.4  Sectoral Trade Reforms
Th is involves reforms that specifi cally targeted particular sectors. While traditionally sectors are 
divided into agriculture, industry and services in Ghana’s case-specifi c policies tended to target 
broad categories such as traditional and non-traditional exports. By ensuring that the exchange 
rate was now a market-determined rate, the bias against exports was largely eliminated. Right 
from the beginning of the reform process policies were adopted to promote exports.
3.4.1 Traditional Exports
According to the Export and Import Act, 1994 Act 503 traditional exports consist of the following: 
cocoa beans, lumber and logs, unprocessed gold and other minerals and electricity. Lately, yams 
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have been added to this category. Apart from the general liberalisation, policies were adopted to 
target this category. Th e main objective of policy was to increase foreign exchange earning from 
the cocoa sector mainly through the provision of incentives to cocoa farmers. Other objectives 
included the maintenance of Ghana’s distinctive position as the supplier of the fi nest and most 
consistent quality cocoa and in addition retain the traditional premium obtained by Ghana’s 
cocoa on world markets.
Measures taken included the privatisation of inputs distribution and the provision of credit to 
purchase inputs following the removal of input subsidies. Th e most important measure though 
was the increase in the producer price paid to farmers. By the start of the reforms the percentage 
of the world price received by farmers had fallen to as low as 25 percent. It was even in single 
digits if assessed at parallel market rates (Sarris and Shams, 1991).
Th is percentage was thus gradually increased to about 46 percent. All of these incentives 
boosted exports. Th e output of cocoa doubled between 1983 and 1989 even though the world 
price fell by over 50 percent during the period. In these diffi  cult circumstances, the steady 
improvement thus stalled but since the late 1990s there has been a steady increase and the aim 
of policy is to increase in the producer price to 70 percent. Currently, it is 68 percent. Since 2001 
the government has also intensifi ed the mass spraying of cocoa farms. Th e operations of Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) were also streamlined in order to reduce overhead costs and to 
intensify research on diseases and pest controls.
Gold production has increased since the ERP began because of the more favourable investment 
climate created which allowed investment in the sector to expand. Th e broad policy objectives 
for the mining sector have been
incentives to increase and sustain investment in the sector;• 
avoidance of degradation of the environment; and• 
ensuring that people in the sector benefi t from exploitation of the mineral resources.• 
For timber a new forest and wildlife policy was adopted in 1994 through which the government 
initiated a series of control measures including a ban on the export of logs, the designation of 
resource areas and the concept of “annual allowable cut”. A Timber Resource Management Act 
was also passed in 1998 to improve the allocation system of logging permits and to control illegal 
chainsaw operators. Th e Act also provided for a more effi  cient and transparent allocation process 
based on a new contract scheme – the Timber Utilization Contract (TUCs). Under the system, 
fi rms bid for contracts to log particular sections of the forest. Each contract has duration of 40 
years and is renewable as long as the contractor manages its designated logging area according to 
specifi ed criteria. Implementation, however, suff ers from malpractices (UNCTAD, 2003). Other 
policy initiatives include encouraging the use of lesser known species and the placement of levies 
on exports to support reforestation.
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3.4.2 Non-Traditional Exports
Th is category consists of all items exported other than those classifi ed as traditional. Prominent 
among them are horticultural products such as pineapples, processed agricultural products, 
furniture and processed aluminium products. One of the principal aims of the reform programme 
was the diversifi cation of exports and right from the beginning, non-traditional exports were 
targeted. Duty-free imports of machinery were allowed and income tax rebates were given to 
exporters. A foreign exchange retention scheme for non-traditional exports was liberalised and 
the proportion that could be retained was increased from 20 percent to 35 percent in 1987. 
As a further boost to non-traditional exports, agricultural pricing and marketing arrangements 
on all products except for cocoa were removed in 1990 and export procedures were made less 
cumbersome. At present, non-traditional exporters pay a company tax rate of 8 percent instead 
of 35 percent. Further incentives followed. Import tax rebates were introduced in 1991 and the 
surrender requirements for non-traditional exports were abolished. At the moment, surrender 
requirements exist for only gold and cocoa. During the fi rst six years of the reforms there was a 
big increase in the number of non-traditional exporting enterprises.
3.5 Recent Developments in Ghana’s Trade Policy
Th e General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) process has started and Ghana has 
made some commitments. Compared to many other developing countries Ghana has relatively 
few restrictions. Ghana made specifi c commitments in fi ve areas under the GATS. Th ese were 
construction, education, tourism and travel-related services, maritime transport and fi nancial 
services. Th is implies that Ghana is committed to liberalising these areas subject to specifi c 
limitations contained in the schedule. For most sectors listed in the schedule there are no 
limitations on foreign participation, consumption abroad, cross-border supply or commercial 
presence.
In February 2004 a new trade policy document was adopted. Th is policy was set within the 
context of Ghana’s strategic vision of achieving middle-income status by 2012 and becoming a 
leading agro-industrial country in Africa. Th e policy provides clear and transparent guidelines 
for the implementation of government’s domestic and international trade agenda. It is also 
designed to ensure a consistent and stable policy environment within which the private sector 
and consumers can operate eff ectively and with certainty.
Th is policy emphasized two parallel strategies: an export-led industrialization strategy and 
a domestic market-led industrialization based on import competition. Th ese new strategies are 
supported through the promotion of increased competitiveness of local producers in domestic 
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and international market based on fair and equal competition and by introducing an import and 
domestic trade regime which promotes and protects consumer interests.
Underlying the broad policy was the targeting of seven thematic areas for close attention. 
Th ese were:
International Trade: relating to multilateral trade issues;• 
Import-Export Regime: dealing with tariff  and non-tariff  measures.;• 
Trade Facilitation: covering customs clearance and related issues;.• 
Enhancing Production Capacity: addressing bottleneck issues such as investment fi nance, • 
production inputs, infrastructure and access to land;
 • Domestic Trade and Distribution: dealing with domestic trade;
Consumer Protection and Fair Trade: dealing with issues of health and safety of consumers;• 
Intellectual Property Rights.• 
It is hoped that this comprehensive approach will enable the country to take advantage of • 
opportunities off ered by trade.
A strategic plan-- the Trade Sector Support Programme (TSSP) was launched in 2006 to 
implement the policy prescriptions in the Ghana National Trade Policy. Essentially this consists 
of a series of projects aimed at improving the legal and regulatory environment for business and 
consumers.
4. Developments in Relations with Multilateral Institutions and  
 Partners
4.1 ACP-EU Relations
Ghana as a member of the African, Caribbean Pacifi c and (ACP) group of states has been part 
of the relationship since its inception in 1975. Th e reason for this relationship was the desire of 
some members of the then European Economic Community (EEC) to maintain some infl uence 
in their former colonies. It was also to maintain economic ties that gave them access to raw 
materials and provide a market for their fi nished goods. Th e former colonies on their part hoped 
to get aid to develop their economies and to enhance their exports by gaining duty-free access 
to the EEC market. Four Lome Agreements were subsequently signed and the fi fth and latest 
ACP/EU accord is the Cotonou Agreement.
Th ere were some fundamental components to the agreements —specifi cally, the trade part 
which ensured the removal of tariff  barriers to the entry of ACP exports to the EU market. Th is 
agreement was non-reciprocal in the sense that the ACP countries could impose restrictions 
on EU goods entering their markets. A second component of the agreement was development 
aid which over the years resulted in quite substantial infl ows to ACP countries. Lately a third 
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component, the political dimension, has become increasingly important. Th is involves political 
dialogue over the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organized crime, 
democratic principles and the rule of law and good governance.
By the time the Cotonou Agreement was signed, there was general agreement that ACP 
countries for various reasons had not been able to take advantage of opportunities off ered by the 
duty-free access to EU markets. Some of the reasons included lack of adequate information to 
prospective exporters, complicated rules of origin provisions, and inadequate trade infrastructure. 
At the same time some provisions of the Agreement violated WTO principles such as non-
reciprocity. Th us a waiver had to be granted to the EU-ACP but other developing countries 
outside the ACP were no longer willing to grant this waiver.
A timetable for the completion of WTO consistent trade agreements was subsequently en-
dorsed by WTO members at its 2001 ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. At this meeting 
the EU was granted a waiver of its WTO commitment with respect to the Cotonou Agreement 
through 2007. At the end of the period unilateral preferences were to be replaced by reciprocal 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and individual ACP countries or 
groups of countries. If Ghana had to sign as a member of a bloc it had to be as a member of 
ECOWAS.
ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with the express aim of gradually removing barriers to 
eventually create a customs union. Th e countries, however, could not lower barriers as envisaged 
and to move things along a trade liberalization scheme was introduced in 1990. Matters did not 
improve and in 1993 the ECOWAS Treaty was revised. Th e objective then was to establish a 
Free Trade Area by removing all barriers on all goods traded between member states by 1 January 
2000. A Common External Tariff  (CET) was to be established by 1 January 2004 to fi nalise the 
establishment of a customs union. However these have been delayed. Meanwhile a bloc within 
ECOWAS, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) was formed among 
members of the CFA zone. Th is bloc managed to create a CET. It was then expected that non-
WAEMU countries were to gradually align their tariff s with the WAEMU CET. Negotiations 
on this are on-going and all the ingredients needed for ECOWAS to sign an EPA as a bloc are 
not yet present.
Th us Ghana faced the prospect of an end to unrestricted access to the EU market. One option 
open was to agree on an interim EPA pending the creation of a fullyi-fl edged customs union 
and the signing of a full EPA. Ghana is yet to sign this agreement although it is being largely 
implemented.
4.1.1  Th e Interim EPA
It was necessary to reach agreement on the interim EPA to avoid disruption of trade that would 
have occurred with the expiry of the waiver granted by the WTO. Of the 77 countries in the 
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ACP 36 had signed either interim or full EPAs by the time Ghana reached its agreement. 
Another 31 were least developed countries ( LDCs) which, under WTO rules could continue to 
enjoy non-reciprocal agreements with the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. 
Within ECOWAS only Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria were non-LDCs. Cote d’Ivoire 
reached agreement just before Ghana did, leaving only Nigeria which exercised the option of 
adopting GSP+.
Ghana signed the interim EPA with the EU on 12 December 2007. Th e main features of the 
agreement included:
Duty-free and quota-free access into the EU for all imports as of 1 January 2008 with a • 
transition period until 2010 for rice and 2015 for sugar.
Ghana’s commitment to liberalise 80 percent of imports from the EU representing • 
81percent of tariff  lines over the next 15 years.
A chapter on trade defence with bilateral safeguards allowing each party to reintroduce duties • 
or quotas if imports of the other party disturb or threaten to disturb their economy.
A chapter on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) • 
measures to help Ghanaian exporters to meet EU import standards.
A chapter aiming to facilitate trade through measures such as more effi  cient customs • 
procedures and better co-operation between administrators.
In this regard Ghana, excluded a number of agricultural goods and non-agricultural processed 
goods. Th e exclusion list included chicken and other meats, tomatoes, onions, sugar, tobacco, 
beer and worn cloth.
Other features included a detailed dispute settlement mechanism to support the eff ective 
implementation of the agreement, and new improved rules of origin. Th ere was also an agreement 
on development co-operation which included the reinforcing and upgrading of the capacity 
of the productive sectors, co-operation over fi scal adjustment, improvement of the business 
environment and implementation of trade rules.
5 Developments in Exports, Imports and Capital Flows
 Th is section considers some of the developments which have accompanied the changes in trade 
policy from the early 1980s.
Th e reforms undertaken opened up the trade sector, with both exports and imports increasing. 
However, we can see that imports have been outstripping exports with the gap growing wider in 
recent years. (Table 4).
Th e initial growth in imports that took place in the earlier phase of the reforms (i.e. between 
1983 and 1986) was a response to the gradual removal of import restrictions and tariff s. It will be 
recalled that tariff s were adjusted gradually between 1983 and 1986 from 35 percent, 60 percent 
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and 100 percent to 0 percent, 20 percent and 25 percent respectively. By 1988 the exchange rate 
reforms aimed at the adoption of a market-determined rate had been completed. Consequently 
the import licensing scheme was dropped. Within 10 years of the reforms imports had grown by 
more than 200 percent in value.
Exports on the other hand expanded by a little over 100 percent. Indeed the exchange rate 
adjustment resulted in a considerable depreciation of the real eff ective exchange rate from 1984. 
Th is allowed the government to increase prices paid to farmers, resulting in an increase in their 
incomes. Th ey consequently responded by increasing production. Part of the increase in exports 
has been explained by the diversion of cocoa from unoffi  cial to offi  cial sources ( Jebuni et al, 
1994).
According to Jebuni. (1994) the trade defi cit during most of the period from1983 to 1989 
may be explained by the decline in the terms of trade and not necessarily because of a failure 
of export sector performance. It is further explained to a large extent by high levels of external 
support. In fact, infl ows of long and short-term capital doubled between 1983 and 1984 and 
doubled again between 1985 and 1986. Th ese allowed the balance of payments to be in surplus. 
Th e trade defi cits have continued over the years even though the terms of trade have generally 
improved, so there may be some other reasons for this. Some other studies have identifi ed export 
supply bottlenecks such as high transport costs and inadequate credit as the reason for this state 
of aff airs.
Table 4: Exports and Imports in Current Dollars    
Year Goods Services
Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit
1982
1983 439.1 -449.7 -60.6 32.8 -134.4
1984 565.9 -533 32.9 32.9 -162.9
1985 632.4 -668.7 -36.3 38 -167.5
1986 773.4 -712.5 60.9 39.7 -227.6
1987 826.8 -951.5 -124.7 72.4 -237.5
1988 881 -993.4 -112.4 71.4 -255
1989 807.2 -1002.2 -195 75.5 -270.7
1990 890.6 -1198.9 -308.3 79.3 -295.4
1991 997.6 -1318.7 -321.1 95.1 -318.8
1992 986.4 -1456.7 -470.3 110.3 -371.3
1993 1063.6 -1728 -664.4 144.7 -445.3




1995 1431.2 -1687.8 -256.6 150.6 -432.7
1996 1570.1 -1937 -366.9 156.8 -456.4
1997 1489.9 -2128.2 -638.3 164.9 -505
1998 2090.8 -2896.5 -805.7 438.6 -673.6
1999 2005.5 -3228.1 -1226.6 467.8 -665.9
2000 1898.4 -2741.3 -842.9 504.3 -597.3
2001 1867.11 -2968.5 -1101.4
2002 2015.19 -2707 -691.8
2003 2562.39 -3232.8 -670.4
2004 2704.46 -4297.3 -1592.8 702.29 -1058.47
2005 2802.21 -5347.3 -2545.1 1106.5 -1273.1
2006 3726.68 -6753.7 -3027 1398.7 -1532.8
2007 4194.71 -8073.6 -3878.9 1861.9 -2021.7
2008 5275.33 -10260.98 -4985.7 1820.9 -2210.96
Source: Bank of Ghana and World Bank African Development Indicators
Table 5 shows the trends and values of non-traditional exports since 1980. A major aim of 
the trade reforms was to diversify the export base. Th is implies an expansion in non-traditional 
exports. Apart from the 1981 fi gure which looks out of place, the trend is very clear. Modest 
improvements started in the early 1990s and there were more dramatic improvements starting 
from the mid-1990s.
Table 5: Proportion of Non-traditional Exports
YEAR NTE (US$M) Total Exports  Proportion
1980 11.4 1132.9 0.010
1981 338 978.87 0.345
1982 136.7 792.91 0.172
1983 163.8 1157.8 0.141
1984 32 535.55 0.060
1985 71.5 610.07 0.117
1986 23.8 859.67 0.028
1987 28 780.62 0.036
1988 42.4 826.31 0.051
1989 34.7 1018.5 0.034
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YEAR NTE (US$M) Total Exports  Proportion
1990 62.3 898.8 0.069
1991 62.6 997.7 0.063
1992 68.4 986.3 0.069
1993 71.7 1050.9 0.068
1994 119.3 1237.7 0.096
1995 159.7 1431.2 0.112
1996 276.2 1570.1 0.176
1997 329.1 1489.9 0.221
1998 401.7 2090.8 0.192
1999 404.4 2005.5 0.202
2000 400.7 1936.3 0.207
2001 459.6 1867.1 0.246
2002 504.3 2015.2 0.250
2003 588.9 2562.4 0.230
2004 705.4 2704.5 0.261
2005 777.6 2802.2 0.277
2006 892.9 3726.7 0.240
2007 1164.5 4194.7 0.278
2008 1340.9 5275.3 0.254
Source: Ghana Statistical Service and Ghana Export Promotion Council
Th e fi gures show that in 2008 non-traditional exports constituted over 25 percent of exports 
which is quite impressive. Earlier work carried out by Jebuni et al.(1992) identifi ed three trends 
in the data on NTEs. Firstly, there had been growth in the value of exports and the number of 
fi rms involved in the sector. Secondly, the composition had been towards processed and semi-
processed products and thirdly there had been increased earnings by fi rms. Tables 5 and 6 indicate 
that these trends have largely continued into the new millennium.
Using both fi rm-level survey data and more general data from available statistics, Jebuni 
(1992) showed that the most important factor responsible for the increase in NTEs has been the 
real depreciation of the exchange rate. Another prominent factor identifi ed is import availability. 
An important issue is the sustainability of fi rms’ exporting activities. Only a minority of the 
fi rms could be described as producers of exports. A suggestion made in the study was the need 
to maintain the enabling environment to sustain the increasing number of producers for exports. 






Table 6: Evolution of Non-Traditional Exports (fi gures are in current dollars)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Value 
(Total)
42.3 34.7 62.3 62.6 68.4 71.7 119.3 159.7 276.2 329.1 401.7 404.4 400.7 459.6
Agric. 27.1 21.1 28.9 33.0 22.1 26.1 39.2 27.4 50.3 57.4 77.8 84.5 74.5 82.0
Proc-
essed
15.2 13.3 33.1 28.6 44.9 43.0 77.8 130.2 223.0 266.9 317.5 313.3 321.1 362.7
Handi-
crafts
0.07 0.2 0.45 0.88 1.47 2.58 2.33 2.07 2.92 4.72 6.39 6.66 5.0 14.9
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Value 
(Total)
504.3 588.9 705.4 776.6 892.9 1164.5 1340.9 1216
Agric. 85.7 138.1 159.9 151.9 203.4 197.3 187.6 150.9
Proc-
essed
407.2 446.6 540.4 604.8 685.0 963.4 1150.0 1063.3
Handi-
crafts
11.3 4.2 5.2 20.9 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.4
Source: Ghana Export Promotion Council
Table 7: Capital Account (millions of current dollars)
1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital 
Account
102.0 62.40 284.0 459.1 369.29 392.23 -38.62 340.36 201.57 834.49 1,053.44 2,346.91 2,666.04
Offi cial 
Account
27.70 32.10 190.4 135.5 139.70 84.61 -115.18 85.77 52.45 141.14 212.64 1,168.6 486.62
Private 
Capital
13.40 5.80 52.8 261.2 176.80 137.31 105.66 199.91 331.98 559.29 817.84 1,061.48 2,307.20
Short- term 
Capital
60.90 24.50 -59.2 62.4 52.79 170.31 -29.10 54.67 -182.86 134.05 22.96 158.7 -401.64
Source: Bank of Ghana
31
An Overview of  Trade Policies and Developments in Ghana 
While capital fl ows have increased substantially, their overall growth has been less than that 
of the fl ows experienced in merchandise trade. Th ere has, however, been some substantial growth 
in private capital fl ows in the last few years (Table 5)
6 Conclusion
Ghana’s trade policy since independence has seen a lot of changes from a regime that required a 
lot of government involvement using non-price instruments such as controls and restrictions to 
promote the policy of import substitution to one that is increasingly more market oriented and 
thus more outward oriented. Developments over the years indicate that clear conclusions can be 
drawn from the experience. Comparatively, better results were achieved with the more outward 
-oriented policies and these policies have been sustained over the last 25 years. Increasingly, 
Ghana has become more integrated into the world economy. Th is presents both challenges and 
opportunities. Th ere is increasing competition for domestic producers, better deals for consumers 
and opportunities for exporters. Ghana will therefore have no choice but to position itself to get 
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Trends in Growth, Employment and 
Poverty in Ghana
Charles Ackah and William Baah–Boateng
1. Introduction
In the fi ve decades since its independence from British rule in 1957, Ghana has gone through 
diff erent cycles of growth, marked mostly by poor economic performance and military coup 
d’etats through to the 1980s. National economic policies during this period were often devoid of 
market principles, and characterized by frequent price and income controls. At best, the economy 
muddled through, with low productivity, high and volatile prices, an overvalued currency and high 
interest rates. In such an unfavorable investment climate, would-be investors and government 
offi  cials found it more profi table to engage in rent-seeking and other corrupt behaviours, rather 
than growth-enhancing activities.
Th e return of multi-party democracy and constitutional rule in the early 1990s began an 
economic and political stabilization process never seen before in the post-colonial era. Together 
with high commodity prices (especially gold and cocoa) and a set of prudent market-oriented 
policies, stabilisation has boosted investor confi dence and created an enabling environment for 
the private sector to grow. Ghanaians in the diaspora have also gained more confi dence in the 
growth prospects of their native country, as demonstrated by large amounts of money they remit 
into Ghana for private investment.
Ghana’s remarkable growth performance since 1984 made some analysts describe it as a 
frontrunner in the economic growth process (Leechor, 1994). Ghana undertook a major 
economic reform in the early 1980s after decades of domestic economic mismanagement and 
unfavourable external economic conditions which plunged the country into severe economic 
recession. Th e outcome of the reform was a strong recovery of the economy to record impressive 
growth for almost three decades. However, the fact that the majority of the country’s workforce 
is engaged in vulnerable employment with a high level of informality in the labour market and 
over a quarter of all households are estimated to be poor, raises concern about the quality of 
growth. Ghana is often showcased as the economic success in Africa by the Bretton Woods, but 
many Ghanaians continue to show little appreciation for the country’s growth achievement in 





Indeed, the poverty reduction impact of economic growth can be eff ectively realised through 
productive employment generation. Economic growth is a necessary rather than suffi  cient 
condition for poverty reduction if it fails to generate the needed productive jobs for the growing 
labour force. Many studies have pointed to the pattern of growth and the labour intensity of 
growth as important for eff ective poverty reduction2. But the decline in the employment elasticity 
of growth in Ghana in the 1990s and beyond raises concern about the quality of growth. Despite 
the importance of employment as the link between growth and poverty reduction, it was only in 
2008 that employment targets and indicators were incorporated in the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG). Th e focus of this chapter is to carry out a trend analysis of growth, employment 
and poverty over the last two decades, and assess Ghana’s performance in creating productive 
and decent employment with the aim eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.
2. Growth and Poverty Linkage: Th e Role of Employment
Poverty reduction has become the most important goal of development eff orts, as evidenced by 
many Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) set by the United Nations which include halving world poverty by 2015. Indeed, 
achieving this crucial goal requires either: a) the acceleration of growth; provided this does 
not benefi t the rich disproportionately and thereby increase inequality; or b) a redistribution 
of income, provided that this does not retard growth simultaneously; or, more likely, c) some 
combination of these two strategies (Bourguinon, 2002).
A number of theoretical models provide many compelling reasons why economic growth 
stimulates poverty reduction. Th ere is a very strong claim that globalization leads to faster 
economic growth and that the poor share (to some extent) in the benefi ts of growth ( Jenkins, 
2004). Implicitly, faster growth leads to increased incomes for the poor through some form 
of “trickle down” which ensures that the general benefi ts of growth are not typically off set by 
simultaneous worsening in income distribution (see Bruno, Squire and Ravallion, 1998), cited 
in McKay et al (2002). However, it is also possible to construct theoretical models in which the 
poor are actually bypassed by growth or even become increasingly marginalized (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 2002). Th us, the issue of the impact of economic growth on poverty remains a matter 
of empirical testing.
Employment as a vehicle through which growth can impact on poverty has in recent times been 
acknowledged in many policy fora. As noted by Islam (2004), the premise of earlier theories of 
development that the benefi ts of economic growth would automatically trickle down to the poor 
was fi rst questioned by many including Ademan and Moris (1973). It followed on Kuznets (1955) 
hypothesis of an inverted U shape of the relationship between economic growth and income 
2  See for example World Bank, 1990; McKay, 1997; Goudie and Ladd, 1999
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inequality. From the late 1980s, many studies on growth recognised the pattern of growth and labour 
intensity as critical for eff ective poverty reduction (Goudie and Ladd, 1999). Baah-Boateng (2008) 
identifi ed weak integration of employment strategies in the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS I) as a major fl aw in the design and implementation of the medium-term strategy.
Quite clearly, there seem to be no disagreement that economic growth is a necessary condition 
for poverty reduction but falls short of being a suffi  cient condition. Th e source and pattern of 
growth that refl ects the creation of productive employment and improvement in incomes of 
workers is critical for the realisation of eff ective poverty reduction. Indeed, the poverty reduction 
eff ect of growth depends on the employment outcome of growth and wage and income eff ect of 
employment which in turn depends on the kind of economic activity the poor are engaged in. 
Th e employment outcome of growth for poverty reduction does not only imply the number of 
jobs that could be generated from growth but, also, more importantly, the type of jobs. Growth-
employment linkage at the macro level could be drawn from Okun’s law3 which suggests that 
any given dip in growth is accompanied by loss of jobs. According to Okun (1962), growth-
employment elasticity varies between 0.35 and 0.4 and this brings to the fore, the importance 
of labour intensity of growth as the principal link in the growth-poverty nexus. Using cross 
country data, Islam (2004) demonstrates the link between poverty reduction and the employment 
intensity of growth, confi rming earlier studies4.
Th e poverty reducing eff ect of employment also depends on a number of factors including 
promotion of wage employment, increase in real wage and increase in productivity in self-
employment culminating in the reduction in vulnerable employment. Higher growth recorded 
in many developing countries has not eff ectively translated into signifi cant reduction in poverty 
because of the high incidence of informal employment associated with low productivity and 
limited expansion of wage employment. In sub-Saharan Africa, wage employment accounted 
for 25 percent of total employment in 2008 compared with 45 percent in East Asia, and 64 
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (ILO, 2008). In Ghana, informal sector constitutes 
over 80 percent of total employment with less than 20 percent engaged in wage employment in 
spite of the average 5 percent growth of GDP experienced since 1984.
In eff ect, growth-poverty nexus that emphasises employment intensity of growth measured by 
gross output elasticity of employment without looking out for the type of job has been questioned. 
Sundaram and Tendulkar (2002) contend that output growth is just one of several determinants 
of employment growth and that principal among them is the rate of change in the ‘real’ wage 
rate. Th us, economic growth that fails to increase wage employment and promote the expansion 
of productive self-employment would not be associated with eff ective poverty reduction.
3  Implies a reduction of 1percent in unemployment raises output by 3%
4  See for example World Bank, 1990,, Squire, 1993
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3. Ghana’s Growth Performance
Th e dismal growth trend that characterised the Ghanaian economy ended in 1983 with the 
introduction of economic reforms supported by the Bretton Woods institutions. Th e country 
recovered strongly from low and negative growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s to record 8.6 
percent in 1984. Th is remarkably favourable growth has continued until now with little variance. 
Ghana’s growth performance was quite remarkable during the fi rst six years of the reforms, 
with annual average growth of 5.7 percent. Th e decade that followed witnessed a slower growth 
rate with an annual average growth of about 4.4 percent between 1990 and 1999. Th e economy 
picked up again to record a 5.3 percent annual average growth rate the over the 10-year period 
between 2000 and 2009.
Figure 1: Ghana’s Economic Growth Performance, 1980–2010
Source: Ghana Statistical Service
Th e impressive post-1983 growth rate was largely driven by the industrial sector which 
recorded annual average growth of 9.3 percent between 1984 and 1990. Th is emanated from the 
remarkable growth performance of the manufacturing sub-sector which was largely attributed 
to improved capacity utilisation on account of the minimisation of foreign exchange constraints 
that resulted from the foreign exchange reforms. Th e liberalisation of the foreign exchange 
market created the opportunity for industrial enterprises to easily access foreign exchange for 
importation of needed raw materials, spare parts and equipment for industrial production. 
37
Trends in Growth, Employment and Poverty in Ghana 
Th e worst performing sector has been agriculture with less than 3 percent growth rate during 
the period. Th e sector however picked up gradually in the second half of the 1990s but could 
not match the strong growth performance of services and industry. Consequently, the sector’s 
contribution to GDP has consistently shrunk from about 41 percent in the early 1990s to 36 
percent in 2010 as against an increase in the share of service from 31 percent to 36 percent Th e 
composition of industry has however remained relatively stagnant around 28 percent over the 
last two decades. Th e sector’s growth performance since the beginning of the 1990s has been 
driven by mining and construction with the dominant manufacturing struggling to survive.
Table 1: Sectoral Growth Performance and Composition of GDP, 1985-2010 (%)
Year Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
1985-89 2.2 (47.1) 9.3 (26.6) 10.2 (11.2) 7.4 (26.3)
1990-94 1.1 (42.2) 4.4 (27.8) 2.7 (10.7) 4.1 (30.0)
1995-99 4.4 (40.5) 4.4 (27.8) 3.8 (10.1) 4.7 (31.7)
2000-04 4.7 (39.7) 4.2 (27.4) 4.3 (10.0) 5.0 (32.8)
2005-09 4.4 (38.1) 7.3 (27.9) 3.1 (9.0) 7.9 (34.0)
2010 4.8 (35.6) 7.0 (28.3) 4.0 (8.3) 6.1 (36.1)
Based on 1993 constant prices; original fi gures for 1985–1992 adjusted to 1993
Sectoral composition of GDP in parenthesis
Source: Computed from Quarterly Digest of Statistics, GSS
Ghana’s growth pattern since the introduction of economic reform suggests little structural 
change as depicted in Table 1. Th ere has been a shift from agricultural dominance to services with 
little change in the share of industry in GDP. Agriculture has witnessed a consistent decline in its 
share from about 48 percent in the second half of 1980s to 35.6 percent in 2010 against a surge 
in services share from 26.3 percent to 36.1 percent over the same period. Industry contribution to 
GDP has seen marginal improvement from 26.6 percent to 28.3 percent over the past twenty fi ve 
years. Manufacturing, which has a relatively high labour absorption rate, has however seen its con-
tribution to GDP drop from 11 percent to only 8 percent refl ecting its dismal growth performance 
over the past two decades. Lack of consistent supply of power, high cost of credit, and competition 
from external sources are some of the challenges confronting manufacturing. Th e mining and 
construction subsectors have been the main drivers of industrial growth with the gradual collapse 
of hitherto dominant manufacturing subsector. With the discovery and commercial production of 
oil, the composition of national output and export earnings is expected to change. Th is undoubt-
edly has adverse implications for employment, poverty and inequality if steps are not taken to 
prevent potential neglect of the productive sectors of agriculture and manufacturing.
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Th e dominance of the services sector has largely been driven by wholesale, retail, restaurants 
and hotels which are considered to be low-order sub-sectors. As shown in Figure 2, the share 
of these activities in GDP has consistently increased from 6.0 percent in 1991 to 8.8 percent in 
2010 compared with less than 2 percentage-point gain in the contribution of other services to 
national output over the same period. Th is is consistent with faster growth of the trade sub-sector 
relative to other services. Th e trade sub-sector recorded an average annual growth rate of 7.4 
percent as against 5.5 percent of other sub-sectors in the services sector between 1991 and 2010. 
Th e dominance of the services sector has become much more pronounced with the rebasing of 
national accounts from a 1993 base year to 2006. Th e rebasing exercise raised the share of servicesin 
GDP to 51.1 percent compared with 30.2 percent for agriculture and 18.6 percent for industry. 
Th e share of trade and related activities also appreciated on the new base to about 11.5 percent 
compared with 8.8 percent under the old series in 2010. Th e share of remaining sub-sectors 
also increased in the new series. Th e increasing importance of trade and related activities in the 
overall national economy could be linked to the external trade liberalisation that accompanied 
the economic reforms introduced in 1983 and the increasing incidence of globalisation.
Figure 2: Growth Rate of Trade Sector and its Share in National Output
Source: Computed by Authors
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4. Employment in Ghana
Employment is the outcome of interaction between demand and supply of labour. Th e supply of 
labour in aggregate terms is generally determined by the growth and skills of the labour force. 
On the one hand, labour demand is mainly infl uenced by the growth of the economy and on the 
other, source of growth. Th e favourable growth performance in response to economic reforms 
appears to have failed to translate into adequate and good quality employment growth in Ghana 
and this has implications for unemployment and poverty. Th is is largely explained by the slow 
growth of manufacturing and agriculture which are noted as the high labour absorption sectors. 
Indeed, mining, fi nance and telecommunication considered to be the driving force behind 
the favourable economic growth of recent times, are estimated to have low labour absorption 
capacity.
Generally, over the past 25 years employment growth has not kept pace with economic growth 
and this is refl ected in a consistent decline in employment elasticity of growth from 0.64 in 
1992-96 to 0.4 in 2004-08 (ILO, 2008). Indeed, a 4.8 percent annual average economic growth 
between 1984 and 2000 could only translate into 2.0 percent annual average employment growth 
compared with over 2.5 percent annual average expansion of the labour force and 3.2 percent 
annual average growth of the adult population (Table 2). In eff ect, the Ghanaian economy’s ability 
to create jobs during this period suff ered, with a drastic drop in employment-to-population from 
about four-fi fths to about two-thirds. Consequently, unemployment rates rose from 2.3 percent 
to 10.1 percent over the period.
Table 2: Annual Average Growth of Employment and Labour Force (%)
Year Employment Labour force Adult Population
15 years +
1960-70 2.04  5.25 1.99
1970-84 4.00 1.48 2.88
1984-00 1.99 2.51 3.15
1991-99 3.94 3.90 3.80
1999-06 2.69 1.99 4.07
Source: Computed by Authors from Population Censuses and GLSS
Th e 1990s, however, saw an improvement in the labour absorption rate, with strong annual 
employment growth of 3.9 percent against 4.6 percent annual average GDP growth between 
1991 and 1999. Th is was refl ected in a marginal surge in the employment-to-population ratio 
from 73.2 percent to 73.9 percent during the period indicating an improvement in the economy’s 
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employment generation ability. Th e improved job creation eff ort could not be sustained beyond 
the 1990s as the employment-to-population ratio dropped again by 7 percentage points between 
1999 and 2006. In eff ect, annual GDP growth of 5percent was able to create annual employment 
growth of only 2.7 percent.
Agriculture remains the main source of employment for the growing workforce in Ghana 
even though its share in total employment has shrunk by 8 percentage points between 1984 and 
2000. During the same period the contribution of industry and services increased by 2.5 and 5.5 
percentage points respectively. Between 1991 and 2006, agriculture lost 7 percentage points of its 
employment share in favour of industry and services which gained 5.5 and 1.5 percentage points 
respectively. Th e declining share of agriculture in employment in favour of industry and services 
has not been as drastic as the drop in the contribution of agriculture to GDP. Indeed, agriculture 
remains the main source of livelihood for Ghanaian workers, accounting for about 55 percent 
of total employment in 2006 compared with 31 percent in services and 14 percent in industry. 
Manufacturing remains the key source of industrial sector employment, accounting for over 80 
percent of total industrial sector employment or 11percent of total employment despite its poor 
performance in terms of national output.
Table 3: Employment Trend, 1991 - 2006
Indicators 1984 1991/92 1998/99 2000 2005/06
Employment 15+ (in millions) 5.42 5.74  7.59 7.43 9.14
Employment by Economic Sector (%)
 Agriculture 61.1 62.2 55.7 53.1 54.9
 Industry 12.9 10.0 11.7 15.5 14.2
 Manufacturing 0.9 8.2 8.3 10.7 11.4
 Service 25.0 27.8 32.6 31.5 30.9
 Trade 14.6 15.3 15.4 17.3 18.0
Employment Type/Status (%)
 Wage Employment 16.2 16.6 14.2 15.8 17.5
 Self-employed 69.7 81.6 67.7 73.5 59.5
 Other 14.1 1.8 18.1 10.7 20.4
Source: Computed by Authors from GLSS
Within the services sector, trade and related activities accounted for over half of employment 
or 18 percent of total employment in 2006. Employment in trade and related activities has 
improved considerably since 1984, as refl ected in the consistent growth of the sector’s share 
in total employment. As reported in Table 3, the contribution of trade and related activities 
to total employment increased from 14.6 percent in 1984 to 17.3 percent in 2000 based on 
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population census. Using the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) dataset, the share of trade 
in total employment rose from 15.3 percent in 1991/92 to 18.0 percent in 2005/06. Generally, 
trade employment is dominated by own account work or self-employment. For instance, in 
2005/06, own account work constituted for almost three quarters of total employment in trade 
and related activities (see Figure 3). Wage employment constituted about 13 percent while 5 
percent comprised of employers or self-employed with employees.
Figure 3: Distribution of Trade Employment by Status (%), 2006
Source: Computed from GLSS5, Ghana Statistical Service
Generally, overall wage employment has remained consistently low since 1984, accounting 
for less than one fi fth of total employment. Th e proportion of wage employment declined 
marginally by 0.4 percentage point between 1984 and 2000 but improved from 16.6 percent 
to 17.5 percent between 1991 and 2006. Self-employment is considered to be a vulnerable 
type of employment and constitutes the major employment type. In 2006, about 60 percent of 
Ghanaian adult workers were self-employed with over half of them engaged in agriculture (see 
Table 3). Only 8 percent of self-employed people have employees with over 90 percent engaged 
as own account workers with very low earnings. In eff ect, the impressive growth performance in 
Ghana has not translated into the generation of gainful and decent employment which comes 
from the formal sector. Th e reduction in public sector employment through retrenchment and 
privatisation coupled with slow growth of the private sector could be blamed for the lower 
proportion of wage employment.
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Employment and the MDGs
On the basis of the recognition that decent and productive work for all is central to addressing 
poverty and hunger, a new target and four new indicators were added to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2008. Th e new target MDG1b is to “achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all including women and young people”. Th e four 
indicators used in monitoring the employment target are; growth rate of labour productivity;, 
employment-to-population ratio, working poverty rate; and vulnerable employment rate. Th e 
other employment indicator relates to gender empowerment and is measured by the share of 
women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector.
Th e rate of growth of productivity provides the basis for assessing the likelihood of a country’s 
economic environment creating productive and decent employment that will help in reducing 
poverty and hunger. It is measured by the annual change in GDP per person employed of a 
country. Indeed, productivity increases often infl uence the social and economic environment 
positively, leading to poverty reduction through investment, sectoral shifts, trade, technological 
progress and increases in social protection (ILO, 2009). Th e second indicator, employment-
to-population ratio, measures the ability of a country to provide jobs and it is measured as the 
proportion of a country’s working-age population that is employed. A high ratio means that a 
large proportion of a country’s population is employed. On the other hand, a low ratio means 
that a large proportion of the population is not involved directly in market-related activities, 
because they are either unemployed or out of the labour force altogether.
Th e third indicator is the working poverty rate, defi ned as the proportion of working poor 
in total employment. It provides a measure of quality of employment and poverty reduction 
implications of job creation. It is measured by the number of employed persons living in a 
household with incomes below the poverty line as a percentage of total employment. Th e rate 
is an indication of the lack of decent work i.e. whether a person’s work is decent and productive 
enough to earn suffi  cient income to move him/her and household members out of poverty. Th e 
fourth indicator is the vulnerable employment rate and it measures the proportion of employed 
people working in precarious circumstances as indicated by the employment status. It is computed 
as the proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment and 
gives an indication of quality of employment in the country.
Ghana’s performance in the MDGs in the area of employment has largely been disappointing. 
Th e increased growth of labour productivity between 1991 and 2006 has not translated into the 
creation of decent and productive employment as measured by a reduction in the number of 
vulnerable jobs and working poor. As reported in Table 4, annual growth of labour productivity 
fell from 1.3 percent in 1991/92 to 0.5 percent in 1998/99, culminating in a decline in the 
country’s ability to create jobs as measured by a drop in the employment-to-population ratio 
43
Trends in Growth, Employment and Poverty in Ghana 
over the period. Consequently, the vulnerable employment rate rose marginally by 0.1 percentage 
point before dropping by 5 percentage points by 2005/06. At the same time, the working poverty 
rate surprisingly declined by 9 percentage points to 35 percent with the extreme working poverty 
rate dropping by about 6 percentage points.
Table 4: MDG Employment Indicators
Indicator 1991/92 1998/99 2005/06









Working poverty rate 44.1 35.4 25.6
Extreme working poverty 
rate
30.3 23.6 16.1




Source: Computed by Authors from Ghana Living Standards Survey 3,4&5
Th e country’s progress towards the achievement of MDG1b was confi rmed between 1998 
and 2006 with a consistent rise in the growth of labour productivity, reaching almost 4 percent 
in 2005/06. Employment-to-population ratio also went up by about 6 percentage points while 
vulnerable employment rate dropped from about 83 percent to 77 percent, indicating some 
improvement in the creation of productive and decent employment. Nonetheless, the vulnerable 
employment rate remains high and this can be explained by the limited availability of formal 
sector employment and large number of uneducated workers. Baah-Boateng and Sparreboom 
(2011) estimate that about a third of employed adults have not had any formal education. Th e 
proportion of employed adults in households living below the upper poverty line further declined 
by 10 percentage points to 25.6 percent while those under lower poverty lines dropped from 
23.6 percent to 16.1 percent over the period. Th e share of women in wage employment has 
however witnessed consistent decline from 30 percent in 1991/92 to 27 percent in 1998/99 and 
further down to 26 percent in 2005/06. Th is is against the backdrop of the improved educational 
attainment of women over the years (Baah-Boateng, 2009). Th is implies that there may be other 
obstacles to women’s access to wage employment in Ghana.
44
Chapter  3
5. Pattern of Poverty in Ghana
Ghana is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has been able to almost halve 
poverty within a period of 15 years. Th e country witnessed a remarkable reduction in national 
poverty incidence from 51.7 percent in 1991/92 to 39.5 percent in 1998/99 and further down 
to 28.5 percent in 2005/06 (see Figure 4). At the same time, the incidence of extreme poverty 
consistently dropped by about 10 percentage points from 36.5 percent between 1991/92 and 
1998/99 and further down to 18.2 percent in 2005/06. Poverty in Ghana is fundamentally a 
rural phenomenon with about 39.2 percent of rural households estimated to be poor in 2005/06 
compared with 10.8 percent of households in urban areas. Within rural areas poverty is said to 
be most endemic in the rural savannah and lowest in rural coastal areas. Poverty incidence in 
rural Ghana declined substantially by 14 percentage points in the 1990s as against a decline of 
about 10 percentage points between 1998/99 and 2005/06 to 39 percent.
Figure 4: Poverty Incidence by Locality, 1991 – 2006 (%)
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2007)
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Poverty in urban areas is observed to be relatively low and was estimated at 10.8 percent 
in 2005/06. Th e urban coastal area, excluding Accra, has the lowest poverty incidence while 
urban savannah has the highest poverty incidence in urban areas. Surprisingly, Accra, which is 
generally noted to have had the lowest poverty incidence in the 1990s, saw poverty incidence 
surge between 1998/99 and 2005/06. Urban poverty has seen consistent decline since 1991/92 
with only the urban forest recording declining poverty in line with the overall urban poverty 
trend. Poverty incidence in the urban coastal and urban savannah areas surged in the 1990s 
before dropping afterwards.
Incidence of Poverty by Economic Activity
One important dimension of the incidence of poverty is the main economic activity in which 
the household is engaged. Poverty incidence in Ghana used to be highest among food crop and 
export farmers confi rming the general assertion that poverty is a rural phenomenon. In 2005/06, 
about 46percent of food crop farmers and 24percent of export farmers were found to be living 
below the upper poverty line. Poverty incidence is also estimated to be high among non-farm 
self-employed. Unsurprisingly, the lowest poverty incidence is reported among formal sector 
employees where higher income opportunities exist with low-risk vulnerability in employment. 
Th e incidence of poverty has consistently declined in all economic activities since 1991 with 
workers in the formal sector and export farmers experiencing the most drastic decline. Th is 
culminated in a consistent decline in the contribution of the formal sector and export farming to 
national poverty between 1991 and 2006. Th e decline in poverty incidence is however moderate 
among food crop farmers and this accounted for a surge of the contribution of this economic 
activity to national poverty by over 11 percentage points over the 15 years.
Th e drastic decline in poverty incidence among formal sector workers, particularly, those 
in the public sector, could be linked to the government’s social policy of protecting workers at 
the lower echelon of the job ladder through a minimum wage. Although, the minimum wage 
determined by the National Tripartite Committee (NTC) had no legal backing until the passage 
of the Labour Act in 2003, (Act 651), formal sector workers have nonetheless benefi ted from 
the implicit government policy of keeping the minimum wage above the poverty threshold. In 
contrast, workers in the informal economy, particularly food crop farmers and non-farm self-
employed, hardly benefi t from minimum wage provisions.
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Table 5: Poverty Incidence by Economic Activity, 1991-2006 based on Upper Poverty 
Line (370.8 Ghana cedis).
Economic Activity Incidence Contribution to Poverty
1991/92 1998/99 2005/06  1991/92 1998/99 2005/06
Public Sector Employment 34.7 22.7 7.8 9.1 6.2 1.9
Private Formal Employment 30.3 11.3 10.1 2.3 1.4 2.5
Private Informal Employment 38.6 25.2 17.1 2.3 1.9 4.0
Export Farming 64.0 38.7 24.0 7.8 6.9 6.2
Food Crop Farming 68.1 59.4 45.5 57.3 58.1 68.5
Non-Farm Self-employment 38.4 28.6 17.0 20.5 24.5 15.6
Non-working 18.8 20.4 13.3 0.7 1.1 1.3
Trade and related activities* 29.7 19.6 10.6 9.3 8.3 7.5
* Computed at the individual level by Authors
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2007)
Th e substantial decline in poverty incidence among export farmers is also linked to the 
technical support and other export promotion packages the government continues to provide . 
(Baah-Boateng, 2008). Over the years, farmers in the cocoa sector have benefi ted from guaranteed 
prices and other forms of support such as cocoa mass spraying and these have created stable and 
increased income among farmers in this sector. On the other hand, no such comparable schemes 
are available for food crop farmers, making them more likely to continue with low productivity 
and low incomes.
Poverty among workers in the trade sector is estimated to be relatively low and declining 
over a period of 15 years. Th is is due to more jobs created in the sector and its contribution to 
economic growth. Th e sector witnessed a decline in poverty incidence of about 10 percentage 
points in the 1990s and about a 9 percentage point decline subsequently between 1998/99 and 
2005/06. As a result, the contribution of the sector to national poverty also dropped from 9.3 
percent to 7.5 percent between 1991 and 2006.
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Poverty-Reducing Impact of Growth
Th e issue of pro-poor growth is quite critical in analysing the quality of growth. Ravallion 
and Chen (2003) defi ne pro-poor growth as growth that reduces poverty. Th ere is a strong 
link between overall economic growth and the speed of poverty reduction and greater poverty 
reduction arises when policies facilitate the participation of the poor in growth (World Bank, 
2005). Th e extent to which the poor in Ghana have benefi ted from the remarkable growth 
performance of the economy depends on how pro-poor growth is perceived and measured. Th e 
Ghana Statistical Service (2007) used the growth incidence curve5 to assess whether Ghana’s 
growth has been pro-poor and it concluded that Ghana’s growth over the 15-year period from 
1991 has not been pro-poor if pro-poor growth is seen as that which is faster for the poor than 
richer households. However, if pro-poor growth is seen as that which raises the welfare levels of 
all households measured per percentile, then Ghana has indeed experienced pro-poor growth. 
In a nutshell, the drastic decline in national poverty incidence by about 23.2 percentage points 
over the 15-year period suggests that to a considerable extent the poor have benefi ted from the 
impressive growth performance of the economy.
6. Conclusion
Ghana’s growth performance since the introduction of economic reforms in 1983 has been quite 
remarkable but the structure of the economy still remains fragile, with the gradual collapse 
of productive employment-friendly manufacturing and stagnant agriculture. Th e start of oil 
production in commercial quantities is expected to facilitate the acceleration of growth but may 
worsen the plight of agriculture and manufacturing if steps are not taken to halt the apparent 
continuity of policy neglect. Th e favourable growth performance has failed to translate into 
the generation of quality employment. Th e labour market is still dominated by agriculture and 
vulnerable employment, with about a quarter of employed people estimated to be working poor. 
Th e disconnect between growth and employment is explained by the favourable growth of low 
labour absorption sectors of mining, telecommunications and fi nance while employment -friendly 
sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing continue to struggle. Nonetheless, the Ghanaian 
economy has recorded a consistent decline in poverty incidence since 1991, with formal sector 
workers and export farmers being the greatest benefi ciaries. Poverty remains endemic among 
food crop farmers who continue to face exclusion from minimum wage policies and government 
support schemes for farmers. In all, Ghana appears to have experienced pro-poor growth if the 
phenomenon is taken to mean growth that inures to the benefi t of all households.
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Wage and Employment Eff ects of  Trade 
Liberalization:  Th e Case of Ghanaian Manufacturing
Charles Ackah, Ernest Aryeetey and Kwadwo Opoku
1. Introduction
Th e persistence of poverty in many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in the 
face of increased globalisation and rapid trade liberalization over the past three decades has in-
spired a serious controversy on the impact of globalisation, in general, and trade liberalisation, in 
particular, as well as on economic growth and poverty. Proponents of liberalization argue, on the 
basis of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade theory, that the poor (unskilled la-
bourers) will be the chief benefi ciaries of trade liberalisation in developing countries. Th e standard 
argument is that trade liberalisation would lead to a reallocation of resources to areas of compara-
tive advantage, typically towards the production of labour-intensive goods. Th us, depending on the 
structure of the prevailing labour market, the resulting increase in demand for labour should classi-
cally translate into some combination of an increase in employment and/or wages. In other words, 
since developing countries are more likely to have a comparative advantage in producing unskilled 
labour-intensive goods, one would expect trade reforms in these countries to be inherently pro-
poor (see Krueger 1983; Srinivasan and Bhagwati 2002; Bhagwati 2004; Harrison 2005).
While the logic of this argument is fairly compelling and generally supported by the experi-
ences of the newly industrialized economies of East Asia6, the experience of many developing 
countries, particularly in SSA, has been disappointing and in many cases, poverty has increased 
following trade liberalisation (see Easterly, 2001). Not surprisingly, labour market consequences 
of trade liberalisation still remain controversial. Th e evidence so far shows that trade creates or 
expands some activities and destroys or diminishes others. For developing countries, it is widely 
feared that trade implies increasing job losses and downward pressure on wages, often resulting in 
demands for protection. In recent times, the interest in the labour market response of trade liber-
alisation in developing countries has been intense, particularly due to the extensive trade reforms 
implemented in a large number of these countries since the early 1980s and the increasing trend 
of regional and multilateral free trade agreements in which developing countries are involved.
While a vast literature exists that studies the labour market outcomes of trade liberalisation, 
it appears most of the papers are focused on Latin America, with very little empirical evidence 
produced in Africa so far. In Latin America, while there is no consensus yet, the message 
6 There is still some debate over the extent to which East Asian countries actually ‘opened up’ their economies (i.e. some 
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that emerges from the majority of papers suggests that tariff  liberalisation has increased the 
economy-wide wage and created disparity in labour earnings between skilled and unskilled 
workers.7 In the case of Africa in general, and Ghana in particular, despite the general concerns 
expressed by many, relatively little empirical evidence has been produced on the matter. Indeed, 
in Ghana, the debate over the internal distributional consequences and labour market outcomes 
of trade reforms has heightened in the policy community, particularly as Ghana pursues regional 
economic integration in ECOWAS, which is expected to implement a Common External Tariff  
(CET) among member countries, and as the country becomes a signatory to the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. Th e underlying anxieties appear to be 
anchored on purely anecdotal evidence of the apparently dismal performance of the Ghanaian 
manufacturing sector coinciding with the period of liberalization, and certainly not informed by 
empirical work on the labour market outcomes of the reforms in Ghana.
Th is chapter aims to improve our understanding of the labour market impact of trade policy 
reforms in Ghana and in particular, if the outcome has been pro-poor. By so doing, it is our hope 
that we can make some contribution to the existing empirical evidence on the matter of trade 
liberalization and labour market outcomes in developing countries. Indeed, Ghana lends itself as 
a valuable case study, as it is regarded by many as ‘adjustment’s star pupil’ (Alderman, 1994). To 
preview our results, we fi nd strong evidence that the growth of employment in the manufacturing 
sector in Ghana was signifi cantly negatively impacted by the trade policy reforms of the 1990s 
and early 2000s, as high job losses were found in sectors with the largest tariff  cuts. Th e evidence 
suggests that trade protection creates more employment for he unskilled labour than skilled labour 
in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, we fi nd that trade liberalization in the manufacturing 
sector led to a fall in the average wage paid by manufacturing fi rms in Ghana, suggesting that 
workers employed in industries that were more exposed to liberalization experienced lower 
wages. We also fi nd that greater openness is likely to be associated with signifi cantly lower 
wages in fi rms which employ workers with low levels of education (the unskilled) contrary 
to the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theory, suggesting high trade 
protection that shields manufacturing fi rms from outside competition protects the wages of 
unskilled workers.
Furthermore, the study confi rms that the impacts of trade liberalization on the wage bill of 
manufacturing fi rms signifi cantly depend on the export status of fi rms. We discover that, following 
trade liberalization, workers in export fi rms found in low tariff  sectors enjoy relatively higher 
wages than those in low-tariff -non-exporting fi rms. Th us, for fi rms with similar characteristics 
in a given sector (and thus facing similar tariff s) but with diff erent export status (exporters and 
7 For a review of the recent empirical fi ndings on trade and wage inequality in developing countries, see Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2004); Attanasio et al. (2004); Hanson and Harrison (1999); Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003); and on trade and employment, 
see Hoekman and Winters (2005).
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non-exporters), a tariff  reduction in that sector will have diff erent eff ects on their respective 
workers wage bill. Workers in export fi rms stand to lose less than workers employed in non-
exporting fi rms.
Th e remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief background 
on trade reforms and labour market developments in Ghana. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
and empirical literature related to trade reforms and labour market outcomes. Section 4 describes 
the empirical methodology and the data used in the econometric estimations. In Section 5, we 
present and discuss the econometric results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter by briefl y 
outlining some general policy implications deriving from the empirical fi ndings.
2. Trade policy reforms and labour market developments in Ghana
In this section, we provide a brief historical overview of trade policy reforms as well as developments 
in the Ghanaian labour market over the last three decades when the economy was liberalised and 
opened to external economies.
Trade policy reforms
Ghana was one of the fi rst countries in SSA to initiate a programme of economic stabilisation and 
market reform under the banner of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) it was launched 
in 1983 and supervised by the IMF and the World Bank, to rectify the economic imbalances and 
distortions that contributed to the stagnation and decline of the economy in the 1970s and early 
1980s. As discussed in Aryeetey et al. (2000), the main focus of Ghana’s economic reforms has 
been in the area of trade and exchange rate liberalisation.
Like the vast majority of SSA countries, Ghana has had restrictive and distortionary trade 
policies from independence until the 1980s (at least), typically motivated by some desire to 
protect domestic producers. Following independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Ghana 
embarked on a process of import-substituting industrialization for the next two decades. Th e 
economy had been characterized by a quantity-controlled and fi xed exchange rate regime 
subject to infrequent devaluations, and controlled import quantities through foreign exchange 
allocations. Th e fi xed exchange rate regime was characterized by a highly overvalued offi  cial 
exchange rate, an active parallel market in foreign exchange, capital controls and allocation of 
foreign exchange based on import licenses.
Ghana has undertaken a signifi cant and discernible trade liberalisation, one that has been 
associated with substantial structural adjustment to the economy. Over the course of the early 
1980s and throughout the 1990s, Ghana has liberalized its trade regime quite substantially, 
though the liberalization process has been gradual and uneven. External trade policy has evolved 
from a regime of controls to a liberal one with emphasis on export diversifi cation. With the 
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inception of the ERP, the new trade policy has the long-term objective of replacing the quantitative 
restrictions with price instruments and the liberalization of trade in an environment of more 
liberal, market-oriented and outward-oriented policies. Trade reforms under the ERP included 
tariff  adjustments, import liberalization, liberalization of foreign exchange, deregulation of 
domestic market prices and controls and institutional reforms that particularly aff ected revenue- 
generating bodies such as the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). Conscious eff orts 
were made to dismantle the import licensing regime via reductions in the number of products 
listed under the banned or restricted category.
Ghana was already open by the early 1990s, and has become continuously more open since 
then. Th e stabilisation and adjustment policies were generally maintained in the 1990s. Th e state 
continued to undertake extensive economic reforms and trade policies aimed at transforming the 
economy from a largely state-controlled one to a market economy in the 1990s. In the 1990s, 
extensive reforms aimed at reversing previous inward-looking policies were pursued. Th is included 
major structural reforms in both the real and fi nancial sectors of the economy, and trade and 
investment liberalization has been an integral part of them. Trade reforms in the 1990s included 
specifi c export promotion measures aimed at improving the relative incentives to producers of 
exportables. Th ese policies were pursued with the aim of creating an enabling environment for 
the achievement of middle-income status by the year 2020 underlined in Ghana’s Vision 2020 
development strategy. Th e growing openness of the economy, has resulted in both imports and 
exports increasing as a proportion of GDP, but with the latter consistently exceeding the former, 
and to an increasing extent over time.
Tariff s remain Ghana’s main trade policy instrument after elimination of quota and other 
quantitative restrictions during the implementation of the ERP. By the end of the 1990s, the 
tariff  rate had been notably cut, the tariff  structure had been considerably simplifi ed and few 
non-tariff -barriers were applied. By January 2000, Ghana’s tariff  structure showed an average 
rate of 13 percent having reduced from a high rate of 17 percent in 1992. However, the special 
import tax rate of 20 percent which was imposed on some 7 percent of tariff  lines raised the 
tariff  on many consumer goods to 40 percent - well above the previous rate of 25 percent. 
Th is policy action defeated the aim of the trade policy reform, which had been undertaken 
since the structural adjustment programme, to rationalize the incentive system and improve the 
competitiveness of the domestic manufacturing sector. Th us, by the end of 2000, Ghana had a 
relatively simple tariff  structure, comprising four bands; 0 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and 20 
percent. Th e average applied tariff  was 14.7 percent, having increased from 13 percent in January 
2000, with sectoral averages of 20.2 percent and 13.8 percent on agriculture and manufacturing 
respectively (WTO Trade Policy Review, 2001). In an eff ort to bring Ghana’s tariff  structure 
into harmony with ECOWAS and WTO provisions, the 20 percent special import tax imposed 




Th e labour market in Ghana has experienced dramatic changes over the past three decades due 
to globalisation and the economic reform programme that led to the reduction in the direct 
role of government in the productive economic activities (Baah-Boateng and Turkson, 2005). 
One of the most interesting issues that have come out of Ghana’s reform eff orts of the last three 
decades has been the rather slow growth of formal employment. Th is has often been linked to 
the slow growth in investment and the absence of employment- generating investment. In fact, 
in the public sector, which forms a major part of the formal sector, the redeployment exercise 
introduced in 1987 as part of the ERP and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) contributed 
substantially to the loss of public sector employment between 1985 and 1991.
Although Ghana has been categorized as a relatively successful adjuster, trade liberalization 
has had a negative impact on the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing value-added did rise 
rapidly after 1983, when imported inputs were made available to industries that were suff ering 
from substantial excess capacity. However, as liberalization spread to other imports and 
excess capacity was used up, the exposure to world competition led to a steady deceleration of 
manufacturing growth. For instance the rate of growth of manufacturing value added fell from 
5.1 per cent in 1988 to 1.1 per cent in 1992. Indeed, between 1981 and 2001, manufacturing 
value added per capita grew annually by less than 0.9 per cent, from US$37 to US$44 (ISSER, 
2004). Employment in manufacturing declined from a peak of about 78,000 in 1987 to 28,000 
in 1993. Indeed, between 1992 and 2003, the proportion of the working population aged 15 
years and above that was employed declined from 8.2 per cent to 6.4 per cent.
Th e performance of the manufacturing subsector can be viewed as consisting of two periods: 
the import substitution industrialization era soon after independence (1960-1982); and the era 
of the structural adjustment and economic recovery programme (1983-2000).
Import Substitution Industrialization/Pre-ERP Era (1960-1982)
Under an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy, the manufacturing sector between 
the early 1960s and the early 1970s saw tremendous changes with the state taking an important 
and growing role in the process. An aspect of the nationalism of the early post-independence 
period was the perception that Ghana had an opportunity to chart its own path to development. 
An integral part of the development agenda was the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
strategy that was then being practiced in Latin America.
Th e expectation was that ISI would facilitate the transformation of the Ghanaian economic 
structure from a predominantly agricultural economy to a modern industrialized economy. Th e 
share of industry in GDP was expected to rise, generate opportunities for employment, and 
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raise levels of productivity and incomes as well as the standard of living of the majority of 
the population. By restructuring the predominantly primary structure of production to a value 
-added structure of production, the industrial sector, especially manufacturing, was expected to 
create a more diversifi ed export sector in which exports of manufactured products would play an 
increasingly important role in external trade.
Th e logic behind the ISI strategy was to seek economic independence through the domestic 
production of imported goods as well as to improve the deteriorating terms of trade that 
characterized trade between African countries and the rest of the world. Th e expectation of the 
Ghanaian government just after independence was that in broad terms, the ISI strategy was 
going to ensure structural transformation and export diversifi cation. In line with the ISI strategy, 
massive capital investments were undertaken by the government. Th e rationale was to provide 
suffi  cient investment in order to get Ghana on a high growth path and to break the political and 
economic concentration of power in the hands of foreigners.
Th us, with the view that industrialization was a key factor in modernization and development, 
industrial strategy over the period 1960 to 1982 was characterized by (i) strong emphasis on 
import substitution through high levels of eff ective protection, (ii) reliance on administrative 
controls rather than market mechanisms to determine incentives and resource allocation and (iii) 
reliance on large-scale public sector investment as the leading edge in industrial development.
Th e emphasis of policy on these areas was due to the belief that the country wanted to reduce 
economic dependence and that if market mechanisms were allowed to determine prices and 
allocate resources, they would not meet the objectives of national development. Th us high levels 
of protection were given to manufacturers of import substitutes. Th e protection took the form 
of high tariff  and quantitative restrictions on imported products. By the late 1960s eff ective 
protection for nearly half of the manufacturing industries in the country had exceeded 100 
percent (Asante and Addo, 1997).
Th e manufacturing sector responded positively to these policy initiatives by recording some 
signifi cant gains until the late 1970s and early 1980s when the performance of the sector started 
experiencing economic downturn. Th e import substitution and direct control policies stimulated 
rapid growth of manufacturing output and employment with an annual average output growth 
of 13 percent and annual average employment growth of 8 percent (Asante and Addo 1997). 
In 1977, the manufacturing sub-sectors contribution to GDP had increased to 14 percent. Th e 
increasing role of the state in industrial development saw state-owned manufacturing enterprises 
and joint public/private fi rms accounting for about 49 percent of value-added in manufacturing 
with private fi rms accounting for the remaining 51 percent.
With respect to capacity utilization, though evidence from estimates obtained by the Ghana 
Statistical Service on medium and large manufacturing establishments indicates that average 
capacity utilization which stood at 52 percent in 1971 had declined to around 40 percent 
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between 1972 and 1978, some individual product groups such as textiles, garments, non-metallic 
minerals, and pharmaceuticals had signifi cantly better performances than others.
However, between 1978 and 1982, the manufacturing sub-sector experienced a signifi cant 
decline in output and contribution to overall industrial sector and GDP growth. Total 
manufacturing output as a percentage of GDP declined continuously from its peak of about 
14percent in 1977 to 7.4 percent in 1982. Th e manufacturing sector growth rate declined at an 
annual average rate of -2.5 percent over this period. Between 1981 and 1982 alone, manufacturing 
output declined by about 32.1 percent.
Table 1: Share of Industry and Manufacturing in GDP 1970 to 1983(%)
Subsector 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Industry 19.3 18.6 17.2 19.9 18.6 21.0 21.2
Manufacturing 12.7 11.3 10.5 12.7 11.2 13.9 13.8
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Industry 21.5 18.4 15.1 14.8 15.2 12.6 11.3
Manufacturing 13.9 12.4 10.7 10.5 10.9 7.4 6.9
Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, GSS
An unfavourable international economic environment, a distorted domestic incentive and 
policy framework as well as mismanagement were the main factors that contributed to the 
abysmal performance of the manufacturing sector in the 1970s and early 1980s. Th e global 
recession that was experienced during that period resulted in terms of trade shocks that created 
balance of payments problems for the economy. Th is resulted in the non-availability of foreign 
exchange required to import the needed inputs (i.e. raw materials, equipment, spare parts, etc.) for 
effi  cient and eff ective utilization of the installed capacity of many import-substitution industries. 
Th is was so because the structure of production under the ISI strategy was heavily dependent 
on imported raw materials and spare parts. What Ghana failed to do was to produce the capital 
goods that were necessary to support the import substitution industries. For instance, between 
1977 and 1982, the average contribution of capital goods to manufacturing was only 3 percent 
as against the average percentage contribution of 46.3 percent by consumer goods. By 1983 the 
share of capital goods in manufacturing had declined to 0.9 percent.
At the same time, an increasingly overvalued cedi (resulting from price and distributive 
controls) and import restrictions discouraged eff orts at export promotion by providing massive 
protection to import-substitution industries. Th e price and distributive controls which favored 
trade and discouraged agricultural production undermined the support that the agricultural sector 
was off ering to the resource-based processing of manufactured exports. For instance, there was a 
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drastic decline in the production of rubber, sugar, tobacco, etc. as a result of production rigidities 
(poor transportation infrastructure and shortages of inputs) within the agricultural sector.
Th e Era of Structural Adjustment and the Economic Recovery Programme (1983-2000)
Th e reform eff ort in Ghana which begun in 1983 sought to arrest and reverse the economic 
turmoil of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Th e reform eff ort, which focused on stabilization and 
liberalization was principally aimed at introducing a market-based economy and at promoting the 
private sector as the “engine” of sustained economic growth by removing all forms of protection 
and minimizing the involvement of the state in the allocation of resources.
Industrial strategy over this period shifted from an import-substitution and over-protected 
strategy to an outward-oriented and less protected or liberalized strategy. Th e liberalized strategy 
emphasized two main areas: fi rst, the development of a more internationally competitive 
industrial sector with an emphasis on local resource-based industries with the capacity for 
increased exports and effi  cient import substitution, and secondly, the introduction of measures 
that would attract entrepreneurs and investors, into all major sub-sectors with special emphasis 
on the development of appropriate technologies in small- and medium-scale manufacturing 
industries (Asante and Addo, 1997).
In order to achieve these two broad industrial goals, the ERP had specifi c objectives for the 
industrial sector. Th ese were to increase production of manufactured goods through greater use 
of existing capacity; to remove production bottlenecks in effi  cient industries through selective 
rehabilitation; to encourage the development of local resources to feed industries and promote 
the development of agro-based and other resource-based industries; to strengthen existing 
institutions providing assistance to the industrial sector; and to develop economically viable 
linkages among local industries and between key economic sectors (Asante and Addo, 1997).
Among the most signifi cant and successful measures adopted were exchange rate liberalization, 
fi scal discipline and restructuring of the tax and tariff  system, tightening of monetary policy, 
foreign trade and fi nancial sector reforms, privatization of state-owned enterprises, investment 
expansion, price deregulation, and labour market reforms.
Th e manufacturing sector initially responded positively to the various policy measures adopted 
under the reforms after several years of continuous decline. Indeed, one of the initial benefi ts 
of liberalization that accrued to Ghana’s manufacturing sector was the improved utilization of 
installed capacity. Th is was a direct result of foreign exchange reforms that were pursued as part 
of the adjustment process. Exchange rate liberalization in Ghana initially eased foreign exchange 
pressures that had built up the early 1960s to the late 1970s. Th e reduced pressure made available 
and accessible the foreign exchange required to import the needed inputs (i.e. raw materials, 
equipment, spare parts, etc.) for effi  cient and eff ective utilization of the installed capacity of 
many import substitution industries.
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As a result of increased imports of machinery, raw materials, as well as essential spare parts 
and the replacement of obsolete machinery and plants, capacity utilization increased steadily 
from 18 percent in 1984 to about 40 percent in 1989 and 46 percent in 1993 even though by 
1987 production from the manufacturing sector was still 35 percent and 26 percent lower than 
in 1975 and 1980 respectively. Before this remarkable improvement, the sub-sector’s capacity 
utilization had declined continuously from 40 percent in 1978 to 18 percent in 1984. Some 
sub-sectors, mainly the local resource-based manufacturing fi rms showed remarkable increases 
in capacity utilization of over 50 percent, with tobacco and beverages recording 76.3 percent, 
metals 80 percent, wood processing 65 percent, non-metallic minerals 72.8 percent and food 
processing 52.3 percent, On the other hand, other manufacturing industries such as textiles, 
garments and electrical products which depended heavily on imported inputs did not perform 
well because of stiff  competition from imports.
In terms of output, the manufacturing sector during the early years of reforms responded 
positively by growing at an annual average rate of 14.5 percent between 1984 and 1987 while 
contribution to GDP averaged 8.5 percent over the same period. Th is was against the background 
of growth of -36.2 percent and -11.2 percent recorded in 1982 and 1983 respectively. In 1988, the 
growth rate of the industrial sector and the manufacturing sub-sector started slowing down. Th e 
strong correlation in growth rates (Figure 1) can be explained by the fact that industrial growth 
under ERP was manufacture-led. For instance, between 1988 and 1995, annual industrial and 
manufacturing growth declined to 4.4 percent and 2.6 percent respectively from the 12.2 percent 
and 14.5 percent recorded between 1984 and 1987. Th e manufacturing subsector’s dominance in 
the industrial sector continued as its share in real industrial output stood at 65.2 percent over the 
period 1984-87, lower than the average for the decade preceding the ERP but higher than the 
average for the period 1988-2000. Th e decline in the rate of growth of both the industrial sector 
and the manufacturing sub-sector was due to the pace of trade, exchange rate and fi nancial 
sector liberalization and the fact that new investment in the industrial sector went to the non-
manufacturing sectors such as mining and electricity.
In the late 1990s, the performance of the manufacturing sub-sector was mixed, with an annual 
average growth rate of 4.5 percent from 1995 to 2000. While in some years the growth rate 
increased, in other years it declined. For instance, in 1996, the manufacturing sub-sector grew by 
4.7 percent and this increased to 6.4 percent the following year. However, it fell to 3.2 percent in 
1998 and then increased to 4.9 percent in 1999 and then to 3.8 percent in 2000. During the latter 
part of the 1990s, the decline in the manufacturing sub-sector’s growth rate was attributed to the 
increase in crude oil prices, high domestic interest rates, signifi cant depreciation in the value of 
the cedi and the domestic energy crisis that hit the economy in 1998. In addition, manufacturing 
industries in the textile and garments sub-sectors experienced substantial declines in output as a 
result of the intense competition that they were exposed to from cheaper imports.
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Figure 1: Growth in industrial and manufacturing sub-sector, 1983-2000 (%)
Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, GSS
3. Literature review
Th e literature on the labour market eff ects of trade liberalization has been dominated by the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model and its extensions. Th e standard argument with regard to trade and 
poverty is based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which suggests that international trade 
will lead to a rise in the relative returns of the abundant factor;- unskilled labour in the case of 
developing countries. Th us, according to this theory, the poor (unskilled labour) will be the largest 
benefi ciaries of trade liberalisation. In other words, we would expect trade reforms in developing 
countries to be inherently pro-poor, since these countries are more likely to have a comparative 
advantage in producing goods which use unskilled labour relatively more intensively8. Th e claim 
is that specialization within developing countries in the production of labour-intensive products 
will lead to an increase in employment in the labour-intensive sector. Also, as this sector utilizes, 
for the most part, unskilled labour, the relative demand for unskilled workers should increase, 
and therefore, the wage gap between unskilled and skilled workers should decrease. In other 
words, wage inequality should decline.
8 For an empirical example, see Hertel et al. (2003) who estimate that global trade liberalization leads in the long run (i.e. 
when labour and capital are mobile across sectors) to a decline in poverty for all strata of the population largely because of 
increased demand for unskilled labour.
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Recently, these sharp predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem have been challenged. 
According to the new theories, trade liberalization could reduce the wages of unskilled labour 
even in a labour abundant country, thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Many observers fi nd the Stolper-Samuelson theorem quite restrictive, in that the theorem 
does not off er defi nitive conclusions if one or more assumptions are relaxed (see Davis, 1996). 
Davis and Mishra (2004 cited in Harrison, 2005), argue that the popular expectation that trade 
openness should increase the incomes of the poor in low-income countries is based on a very 
narrow interpretation of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. Davis and Mishra show that in 
a world of many factors and many goods, a poor country might no longer have a comparative 
advantage in producing unskilled-labour intensive goods. Similarly, if a poor country has large 
supplies of non-labour factors of production (land or mineral resources), trade liberalization may 
not benefi t the labour-intensive sectors. Th e empirical literature has shown that the predictions 
of the traditional trade models do not hold for developing countries. For example, liberalization 
may promote exports but also induce import substitution of goods produced in the previously 
protected sectors, increasing unemployment and informal labour. Moreover, in many developing 
countries, there is evidence of a rise in wage inequality following trade liberalization.
Th e specifi c sector and the Ricardo-Viner models have become the natural alternative to the 
Heckscher–Ohlin model and the associated Stolper–Samuelson theorem. According to these 
models, workers may gain from trade reforms depending on which sectors (import-competing 
or exporting) they are attached to. Th e models focus on the short- to medium-run and assume 
imperfect factor mobility, with one factor mobile across sectors while the other is taken to be 
sector-specifi c. With these assumptions, the models predict a positive association between 
protection and returns to factors of production (e.g. wages). Protection reduces imports, and 
reduced imports increase labour demand, which in turn increases wages. When the price of a 
good falls following trade liberalization, the model predicts that the factor specifi c to the sector 
that experienced price reduction loses, while the other specifi c factor gains in real terms. In other 
words, if trade liberalization occurred, workers affi  liated to the industries that experience large 
tariff  reductions would see a decline in their wages relative to the economy-wide average wage, 
while workers attached to relatively protected industries would gain, relatively.
Edwards (1998), investigates labour market adjustment to trade liberalization for a small, 
two-factor (capital )(K  and labour )(L  economy that produces three goods (exportables )(X , 
importables )(M  and non-tradeables )(N ), in the context of a specifi c-factors model. Th is specifi c 
factor model typically allows for short-run capital-specifi city (i.e. the capital is immobile between 
sectors in the short run), labour mobility between sectors and inelastic aggregate factor supply 
(Mussa, 1978). Production functions of these commodities are assumed to have conventional 
properties with the following ranking of factor intensities; XNM LKLKLK )/()/()/( <> . Th e 
model further assumes incomplete specialisation and fi xed supplies of inputs. Th e model is used 
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to investigate the adjustment of employment and wages to trade liberalisaton in both the short 
run and the long run. Th e main fi ndings of Edwards are summarised in Table 2.










Source: Adapted from Milner and Wright (1998:511) Table 1.
Note: ↑ and ↓ denotes increase and decrease respectively with ? denoting ambiguity. Wages are defi ned in relative terms, i.e. relative to 
the numeraire, the price of non-tradeables.
Long-run eff ects
In this model of a small economy with three goods operating in a freely liberalised environment, 
the long -run eff ects of the fall in the relative price of importables following liberalization are in 
line with those predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Th us, if exportables are relatively 
labour-intensive, tariff  reduction increases demand for the economy’s abundant factor, driving 
wages higher (and the return to capital lower). With respect to adjustment of employment in the 
tradeables sector, the within-tradeables shift in production and employment is unambiguously 
towards exportables and away from importables, given the rise in the relative price of exportables. 
Th us, in the long run the model, just like the Heckscher-Ohlin model, predicts employment 
to increase in the labour-intensive exportable sector. For the non-tradeable sector, while trade 
liberalisation unambiguously increases wages of workers as determined by export prices, its 
eff ect on employment is, however, ambiguously determined. On the one hand, production of 
non-tradeables can be expected to be higher, given the assumed pattern of factor intensities 
as demand grows (due to switching from tradeables and any positive income eff ects of tariff  
reduction) but on the other hand, production of non-tradeables (as is the case in all sectors) will 




In the short run, given the sector specifi city of capital, the direct link between the price of 
tradeables and factor rewards is broken. Hence, prices of non-tradeables will be determined by 
both demand and supply factors. If capital is immobile across sectors as assumed in this model, 
a reduction of the price of importables resulting from trade liberalisation generates changes in 
the price of non-tradeables, which depends on the pattern of substitution and on the extent of 
income eff ect. Th us, if non-tradeables are a gross substitute in consumption and production with 
tradeables, and the substitution eff ect of a tariff  change dominates the income eff ect, then the 
price of non-tradeables will fall relative to exportables but will rise relative to that of importables 
following liberalisation. Hence, the output and employment implications of these adjustments 
is that employment will increase in the exportables sectors, while their adjustments in the non-
tradeables sector are ambiguous as they depend on the pattern of substitution between tradeables 
and non-tradeables. In the importable sector, however, the fall in the relative price of importables 
combined with capital specifi city reduces production, labour intensity and employment.
4. Empirical methodology
In this study, we use regression techniques to examine the impact of trade liberalisation or 
increased trade on employment in the manufacturing sector of Ghana. Following Milner and 
Wright (1998), we adopt a fairly simple static profi t-maximizing model of fi rm behaviour and 
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
βαγ
iii LKAQ =       (1)
where:
Q = real output
K = capital stock
L = units of labour utilised
Α = total factor productivity
and where α  and β  represent the factor share coeffi  cients, γ  allows for factors changing the 
effi  ciency of the production process. A profi t-maximising fi rm will employ labour and capital at 
such levels that the marginal revenue product of labour equals the wage ( w ) and the marginal 
revenue product of capital equals the user cost ( c ). Solving this system simultaneously to eliminate 







⎛ ⎞= Α ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
      (2)
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Taking logarithms and rearranging equation (2) allows us to derive the fi rm’s derived demand 
for labour as:
ii Qc
wL lnlnln 210 θθθ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛+=      (3)
where:
0 ( ln ln ln ) ( )θ γ α α α β α β= − Α+ − +
1 ( )θ α α β= − +
2 1 ( ).θ α β= +
Our main goal is to estimate the eff ects of trade liberalization on fi rm-level employment and 
wages, while controlling for other sources of variation in employment and wages across fi rms. 
Th e estimating equations with the introduction of our measure of trade policy (tariff ) are as 
following:9
ijtijjtijtjtijtijtijt TQWL εδλτθθθθ ++++Χ+++= 4321 lnlnlnln     (4)
ijtijjtijtijtjtijtijtijt WTQLW εδλτβββββ +++++Χ+++= −154321 lnlnlnlnln   (5)
where:
ijtL  = total employment in fi rm i  in sector j  during time t ,
ijtW  = average real wage in fi rm i  in sector j  during time t ,
ijtQ  = real output in fi rm i  in sector j  during time t ,
jtT  = tariff  in sector j  during time t ,
ijtΧ  = other exogenous variables,
tτ = time eff ect common to all fi rms,
jλ = sector-level fi xed eff ect,
ijδ = fi rm-level fi xed eff ect,
ijtε = unobserved error term.
Data Description
In this subsection we describe the data and the main features of the variables that are relevant 
for the subsequent econometric analysis. Th e data for this study were drawn from two main 
sources. Th at is a dataset that combines micro-level data on fi rms and worker characteristics in 
the manufacturing sector with data on import tariff s obtained from the UN COMTRADE 
database. Th e World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise Development (RPED) survey is a 
9  Following Milner and Wright (1998), we assume perfect capital markets. By this assumption, the user cost of capital can only 
vary over time, so that in estimation its variation can be captured by time dummies.
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comprehensive panel dataset from surveys of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector conducted in 
seven rounds between 1991 and 2002. Th e data was collected by a team from the Centre for the 
Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford, University of Ghana, Legon, and 
the Ghana Statistical Service. Th e fi rst sample of fi rms was drawn randomly from the Census 
of Manufacturing Activities conducted in 1987. Th e fi rms were categorized based on sector 
and location. Th ey were also categorized by location: Accra, Cape Coast, Kumasi and Takoradi, 
all of which constitute major industrial centres in Ghana. Th e coverage of this dataset is quite 
extensive as most of the major manufacturing sub-sectors at the time under investigation are 
represented. When fi rms exited from the sample, they were replaced with fi rms of the same size 
category, sector, and location, so that approximately (but not exactly) 200 fi rms were sampled 
in each year. Th e dataset has the advantage of containing a large number of fi rms over a long 
period of time and information on many fi rm characteristics. We have a panel of nine (3-digit 
ISIC level of aggregation) manufacturing industries for the 10 years from 1993 to 2002. We use 
data on ad-valorem import tariff s to measure changes in Ghanaian trade policy. We construct a 
database of annual tariff  data for 1993 to 2002 to calculate average sector-level tariff s.
 Since we have information both cross-sectionally and through time, the modelling of 
employment and wages adopts panel estimation techniques. To obtain consistent estimates, 
equations (4) and (5) are diff erenced so as to eliminate the fi xed eff ects, and dynamic labour 
demand and wage equations are implemented. Th e one used in this chapter is the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Th is estimator 
relies on fi rst-diff erencing to eliminate unobserved individual-specifi c eff ects, and then uses 
lagged values of endogenous or predetermined variables as instruments for subsequent fi rst-
diff erences. However, eliminating the fi xed eff ects introduces a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the new error term. To address the endogeneity problem, Arellano and 
Bond recommend using the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments 
under the assumptions that there is no serial correlation in the error term itε  and the right-hand 
side variables. Th us, the GMM estimation procedure simultaneously addresses the problems of 
correlation and endogeneity. Th e consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of 
the assumption that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the 
instruments. By construction, the test for the null hypothesis of no fi rst-order serial correlation 
should be rejected under the identifying assumption that the error is not serially correlated; but 
the test for the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, should not be rejected. 
We use two diagnostic tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, and whether the diff erenced residuals are 
second-order serially correlated.
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Table 3: Composition of the Sample
Sector  Number of Firms  Percent
Bakery  240  8.4
Garment  550  19.2
Textile  100  3.5
Wood  230  8.0
Furniture  540  18.9
Metal  540  18.9
Machine  90  3.1
Chemicals  170  5.9
Food  400  14.0
Location of fi rms
Accra  1,680  58.7
Kumasi  880  30.8
Takoradi  180  6.3
Cape Coast  120  4.2
Total  2,860  100
Source: Authors’ calculation from RPED data
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable
1993 2002
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev.
Real Monthly Wages 2.29 1.63 3.61 1.95
Firm Age 15.27 11.38 24.44 11.81
Exports 0.13 0.33 0.19 0.39
Employment 50.54 88.66 65.39 155.81
Real Output 21,295 78,230 31,677 107,905
Foreign Direct Investment 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37
Education of Workers 10.15 2.37 9.38 2.79
Age of Workers 29.55 7.09 35.83 7.83
Tenure of Firm Workers 4.71 3.27 11.06 4.63
Tariff 19.0% 0.04  17.0% 0.03





Th e estimated employment equations are given in Table 5. Th e estimated coeffi  cients are generally 
highly signifi cant, fairly reasonable, and are in line with theoretical predictions. Increases in a 
fi rm’s output increase the demand for labour, whereas increases in average wage rates cause a fall 
in employment, ceteris paribus. It may also be seen that employment exhibits strong persistence 
as the growth of a fi rm’s employment depends signifi cantly on its lagged value. Th e implication 
of the estimated coeffi  cient is that fi rms that pay higher wages employ few workers. Specifi cally, 
a 10 percent increase in the wage rate is estimated to be associated with employment growth of 
0.86 percent. It can also be observed from the estimated coeffi  cient of the lag of employment that 
employment exhibits persistence as the change of employment depends signifi cantly on its lagged 
value. Turning to the eff ects of trade liberalization, the results of the regression found in columns 
2 and 3 of Table 5 indicate that protection has a signifi cant positive eff ect on employment.10 Th us, 
trade protection is found to protect jobs in the manufacturing sector in Ghana. Th is fi nding is 
evidence that trade liberalization or greater import penetration, ceteris paribus, will lower the 
level of labour demand in manufacturing. Specifi cally, the results suggest that a 10 percentage 
point decrease in tariff s reduces labour demand by 0.3 percentage points. Th e results therefore 
suggest that trade liberalization, by exposing manufacturing fi rms to external competition, may 
have had adverse eff ects on manufacturing employment in Ghana. Th is might be interpreted 
as evidence of a disciplinary eff ect, with greater competition from imports inducing greater 
effi  ciency and reducing labour demand. Following the Edward model, these fi ndings suggest 
that either the adverse employment eff ect of trade liberalization in the import-competing sector 
far exceeds the favourable employment eff ect in the exportable sector or trade liberalization has 
harmful employment eff ects on both importable and exportable sectors.
10  We treat tariffs as endogenous in all regressions and use tariffs dated 2−t as instruments.
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Table 5: Trade Policy and Manufacturing Employment: Dynamic Regressions 
(GMM)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS THE LOGARITHM OF EMPLOYMENT
Variables 1 2 3
1ln −Δ tEmployment 0.875*** 0.869*** 0.868***
(0.0106) (0.0092) (0.0076)
WageslnΔ -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.088***
(0.0107) (0.0088) (0.0067)
1ln −Δ tWages 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.086***
(0.0093) (0.0082) (0.0065)
2ln −Δ tWages -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0040)
OutputlnΔ 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.046***
(0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0058)




Foreign -owned fi rm 0.025
(0.0118)
Exporting fi rm 0.102***
(0.0093)
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.727*** -0.755*** -0.562***
(0.072) (0.063) (0.0661)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.36 0.40 0.40
Second order 0.241 0.245 0.190
Observations 1051 1051 1025
Number of fi rms 194 194 187




Four specifi cations are examined. Th e fi rst specifi cation estimates a standard wage equation, 
modelling the eff ects of employment and output on wages. Th e remaining specifi cations investigate 
the eff ects of introducing tariff s and other explanatory variables directly into our wage equation. In 
specifi cations 3 and 4, the trade variable is interacted with the average level of education of workers 
and export dummy to show the diff erential eff ects of trade liberalization on workers characterized 
by diff erent levels of education and belonging to fi rms of diff erent export orientations.
Th e results of all the regressions indicate a positive and signifi cant impact of trade liberalization 
on workers’ wages at the fi rm level. Th e positive and signifi cant relationship between tariff 
and wages is observed to be robust to diff erent specifi cations, despite the diff erences in the 
magnitude of the estimated tariff  coeffi  cients. According to these results, a reduction (rise) in 
tariff  is associated with a decrease (increase) in the real hourly wage of workers, implying that 
trade liberalization (protection) is bad (good) for workers in the manufacturing sector. In other 
words, wages would be lower for workers who were previously employed in protected sectors 
which were subsequently exposed to import competition during the era of trade liberalization 
in Ghana. Th e fi nding seems to suggest that tariff s may protect wages of workers employed in 
relatively protected manufacturing sectors.
In model 3 in column 3, we present the estimates of the diff erential impact of the trade reforms 
on skilled or education level of workers. Th us, tariff  is interacted with the skill level in order to 
examine how the eff ect of trade liberalization on workers may vary by education. Th e interaction 
term is meant to capture the non-linearity in the impact of trade policy on wages, in order to 
ascertain whether the impact of greater openness is borne disproportionately by diff erent skill 
groups. Th e signifi cant coeffi  cient of the interaction term indicates the existence of such [skill] 
contingency relationships between trade liberalization and wages, suggesting contingency bias 
results of the models discussed previously.
Table 6: Trade Liberalization and Firm Wage: Dynamic Regressions (GMM)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS THE LOGARITHM OF REAL WAGE
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
1ln −Δ tWages 0.679*** 0.675*** 0.574*** 0.573***
(0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0049)
EmploymentlnΔ -0.145*** -0.149*** -0.0777*** -0.0890***
(0.0269) (0.0254) (0.0232) (0.0236)
1ln −Δ tEmployment 0.195*** 0.202*** 0.112*** 0.120***
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS THE LOGARITHM OF REAL WAGE
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
(0.0256) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0217)
2ln −Δ tEmployment -0.0249*** -0.0247*** -0.0670*** -0.0669***
(0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0083)
OutputlnΔ -0.0501*** -0.0097 -0.0196* -0.0032
(0.0134) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0095)
1ln −Δ tOutput 0.0890*** 0.0528*** 0.0372*** 0.0176*
(0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0094) (0.0096)






Average education of workers 0.0135* 0.0501***
(0.0081) (0.0025)
Average age of workers 0.0282*** 0.0262***
(0.0017) (0.0015)
Average tenure of workers 0.0059** 0.0093***
(0.0026) (0.0023)
Foreign-owned fi rm 0.0216 0.0333
(0.0233) (0.0231)
Exporting fi rm 0.0207 -0.163***
(0.0156) (0.0625)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.900*** 1.023*** 0.840*** 0.701***
(0.133) (0.128) (0.149) (0.137)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.51 0.60 0.35 0.49
Second order 0.019 0.020 0.045 0.035
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS THE LOGARITHM OF REAL WAGE
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
Observations 1074 1074 1050 1070
Number of fi rms 200 200 199 200
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *, **, and *** denote signifi cant at 10%; 5%, and 1% respectively.
Th is result implies that, ceteris paribus, trade liberalization would disproportionately reduce 
the earnings of unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector in Ghana. Skilled workers, on the 
other hand, lose less, following trade liberalization. We can therefore infer that unskilled workers 
in highly protected sectors enjoy relatively higher wages than they otherwise would. Hence, 
trade liberalization will worsen their plight disproportionately, increasing the skill wage gap and 
inequality, contrary to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson.
Finally in column 4, we investigate the eff ects of introducing an interaction between tariff  and 
the export status of a fi rm to allow wage responses to vary between workers employed in exporting 
and non-exporting fi rms. We are assuming that the wage responses to trade liberalization may 
depend on the mode of globalization of the fi rm in which a worker is employed (see Amiti and 
Davis, 2008). Th e coeffi  cient on the interactive term gives the diff erential eff ect between exporters 
and other fi rms. Th e results of this estimation, reported in the last column of Table 5, indicate 
a positive and statistically signifi cant coeffi  cient on tariff , suggesting that, in general, a cut in 
tariff s reduces wages. In eff ect, it shows that trade liberalization reduces the average wage bill of 
the manufacturing industry. Th e coeffi  cient on the interactive term is negative and statistically 
signifi cant, suggesting that greater openness is likely to be associated with signifi cantly higher 
wages to workers employed in exporting fi rms. Th is means that workers in export fi rms found in 
low-tariff  sectors enjoy relatively high wages than those in low-tariff  non-exporting fi rms.
Hence, further trade liberalization will increase their wages disproportionately, ceteris paribus. A 
decline in tariff s reduces the wages of workers at fi rms that sell only in the domestic market, but 
raises the wages of workers at fi rms that export. Th e net eff ect of trade liberalization on workers 
employed in exporting fi rms also reinforces the relative benefi cial eff ect of trade liberalization. 
Th e negative result of the sum of the two coeffi  cients implies that trade liberalization fi rst benefi ts 
workers in exporting fi rms relative to those employed in non-exporting fi rms (indicated by the 
negative sign of the interactive term), and fi nally enhances their overall wages. In other words, 
while a positive wage eff ect of trade liberalization is ascertained for workers in exporting fi rms, 
workers in non-exporting fi rms experience lower wages when trade is liberalized in Ghana. Th us, 
for fi rms with similar characteristics in a given sector (and thus facing similar tariff s) but with 
diff erent export status (exporters and non-exporters), a tariff  reduction in that sector will have 
diff erent eff ects on their respective wage bill. While workers in exporting fi rms stand to gain from 
trade liberalization, workers employed in non-exporting fi rms suff er in terms of decline in wages.
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We fi nd interesting results on other control variables which are deemed important for fi rm 
wage determination, hence the need to discuss their eff ect on manufacturing wages in Ghana 
as shown in models 3 and 4 in Table 3. Persistence of wage determination as indicated by 
the signifi cance of the lag of real wage suggests that previous wage levels aff ect current wage 
determination in Ghana. Education is found to be positively correlated with manufacturing 
wages, implying that fi rms which hire workers with high-level education tend to pay high wages. 
Age of workers tends to aff ect the wage that fi rms pay to these employees. Firms with relatively 
old employees pay high wages. Firm internationalization (foreign ownership and exporting) is 
found to be good for manufacturing workers in Ghana-fi rms which participate in international 
market by exporting and those with foreign ownership are found to pay high wages to their 
employees.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
While economic theory has long advocated openness to trade as an important element of sound 
economic policy, empirical evidence of the actual eff ects of trade liberalisation on the labour market, 
in general, and employment in particular, has been diffi  cult to measure. Recently, discussions of 
the eff ects of regional integration and arguments for a more liberalized trade regime in developing 
countries and the eff ects on wages, employment and poverty have rekindled the debate.
Th is chapter seeks to test empirically a model of employment response to trade liberalization 
using data from Ghana 1993-2002, a period in which the country’s market, and thus the 
environment faced by fi rms, underwent diff erent episodes of tariff  changes and trade reforms. 
A dataset of about 2,860 fi rms-- roughly 285 fi rms for each year covered by the survey – is 
used to estimate the fi rm employment eff ect of trade policy after controlling for diff erences in 
sector, regional and worker characteristics. Th e modifi ed Edwards specifi c-factor model of labour 
response utilized in this chapter predicts that there may be diff erentials between fi rms that 
employ skilled and unskilled. In order to determine these diff erential responses, we estimated 
dynamic models of employment and wages using panel data estimation technique with skill level 
and tariff  interaction in addition to tariff  as explanatory variables.
Our results indicated that increased competition from foreign fi rms led to a fall in employment 
in the manufacturing industry in Ghana. In other words, while fi rms in sectors with high tariff  
semployed many workers, fi rms operating in lower tariff  sectors employed few workers. Th us, 
while trade protection, by shielding local fi rms against foreign competitors, is able to create more 
jobs, trade liberalization signifi cantly decreases employment and job creation. One implication is 
that opening up to trade by dismantling tariff s may increase unemployment in the manufacturing 
sector in Ghana. Th us, the Economic Partnership Agreement that is seeking about 90 percent 
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dismantling of tariff  may adversely aff ect output and employment in the already relatively 
small manufacturing sector in Ghana. Moreover, though trade liberalization hurts workers 
employment opportunities, we observe that unskilled workers suff er disproportionately. We fi nd 
that a fall in trade protection decreased growth of employment creation in fi rms that employed 
relatively unskilled labour when compared to fi rms that employed skilled workers thus opposing 
the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which posits an employment expanding eff ect 
of trade liberalization for unskilled workers in a developing country. Also, the evidence that 
tariff  reductions, and for that matter, trade liberalization, have adverse eff ects on both wages and 
employment implies that, if competition is good, then the rent accrued from tariff  dismantling is 
only enjoyed by capital owners of manufacturing fi rms but not transferred for workers’ benefi t.
Th is study used fi rm-level data and tariff  data to investigate the eff ect of trade liberalization 
on wages paid by fi rms to their employees. Th e study specifi cally examined the eff ects of trade 
policy on wages in Ghanaian manufacturing over 10 years using data sets that combined micro 
fi rm-level and average employee characteristics with data on tariff s. It is one of the fi rst direct 
microeconomic studies of the relationship between trade policy and workers’ welfare. Industry 
average tariff s for nine industries in the tradeable goods sector were calculated and matched 
to the fi rm-level data from 1993 to 2002. We examined whether trade liberalization has wage 
diff erential impacts on the level of workers’ education as well as the export status of the fi rm.
Our major fi nding is that there is enough evidence that trade liberalization has a negative and 
signifi cant impact on manufacturing workers’ wages at the fi rm level, implying that manufacturing 
workers benefi ted from trade protection in Ghana. Th us, workers in manufacturing fi rms get 
their share of the rent accrued to the manufacturing sector from being shielded from external 
competitors. Hence, we fi nd that greater openness has decreased manufacturing wages, as 
predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We also fi nd that greater openness is likely to 
be associated with signifi cantly lower wages in fi rms which employ workers with low levels of 
education (the unskilled).
We also fi nd that trade liberalization worsened the wages paid to unskilled workers in 
manufacturing fi rms, disproportionately contrary to the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin and 
Stolper-Samuelson theory, suggesting that high trade protection that shields manufacturing 
fi rms from outside competition protects the wages of unskilled workers. Furthermore, the 
study confi rmed that the impacts of trade liberalization on the wage bill of manufacturing 
fi rms signifi cantly depend on the export status of fi rms. It was discovered that following trade 
liberalization, workers in export fi rms found in low tariff  sectors enjoy relatively high wages than 
those in low-tariff  non-exporting fi rms. Th us, for fi rms with similar characteristics in a given 
sector (facing similar tariff s) but with diff erent export status (exporters and non-exporters), a 
tariff  reduction in that sector will have diff erent eff ects on their respective wage bill. Workers in 
export fi rms stand to lose less than workers employed in non-exporting fi rms.
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1. Introduction
Th e persistence of poverty in many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
in the face of increased globalisation and rapid trade liberalization during the past two decades 
has inspired considerable public debate on the impact of globalisation, in general, and trade 
liberalisation, in particular, on poverty. Th e standard arguments, based on the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem of international trade theory, are that trade liberalisation would lead to a rise in the 
incomes of unskilled labour in developing countries. Th us, according to the associated Ricardian 
comparative advantage theory, the poor (unskilled labour) will be the largest benefi ciary of trade 
liberalisation. In other words, since developing countries are more likely to have a comparative 
advantage in producing unskilled labour-intensive goods, one would expect trade reforms in 
these countries to be inherently pro-poor (see Krueger (1983); Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2002); 
Bhagwati (2004); Harrison (2005)). However, the experiences of many developing countries, 
particularly in SSA, have been disappointing and in many cases poverty has increased following 
trade liberalisation (see Easterly, 2001).11 It is estimated that more than 1 billion people still live 
in extreme poverty (based on the US$1 per day poverty line), and half the world’s population lives 
on less than US$2 a day. Th ese statistics have stimulated a lot of concern about whether the poor 
gain from trade liberalisation, and in what circumstances it may by-pass or actually hurt them.
Not surprisingly, the impact of trade reforms on the welfare of the poor has become an 
important subject of ongoing interest to researchers and policy makers alike. However, there 
has been limited empirical research on how these reforms aff ect poverty at the household level 
(Winters, 2002; Winters et al., 2004). Th e main objective of this chapter is to make a contribution 
to this scanty literature through an empirical investigation of the poverty eff ect of trade protection, 
based on Ghanaian household data. Th is objective is motivated by the paucity of research in this 
area for Ghana. Very little evidence in Ghana concentrates on trade eff ects and few studies are 
based on household data. Despite general concerns expressed in many quarters, relatively little is 
known about the actual impacts of trade policy reforms on the welfare of the poor. While there 
11 Compared to other regions, Africa, and especially SSA, has exhibited poor economic performance over at least the past two 






has been some work on poverty measurement and descriptive analysis of the characteristics of 
the poor, to our knowledge, there is no accessible multivariate econometric analysis using policy 
variables, such as tariff s, to examine the impact of trade policy on household poverty (whether 
measured in terms of wages or income) in Ghana. Th e scarcity of studies on this important topic 
is primarily due to the lack of representative household panel data sets on one hand, and the 
non-availability of trade policy data coupled with the problem of identifi cation of the poverty 
eff ects of trade policy at the household level, on the other hand.12
Th is chapter takes a step towards fi lling this gap. Specifi cally, this is one of the fi rst studies to 
use repeated cross-section data (RCS) from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) data 
against the background of trade reforms of the 1990s to gauge some of the poverty eff ects of 
trade policy in Ghana. By so doing, we have moved beyond the limits of cross-sectional analysis 
into the realm of panel data that has long been acknowledged as required to address issues of 
endogeneity and heterogeneity. While the relationship between trade policy and poverty at the 
household level is not by any means clear and analysis, as a result, is complex, we demonstrate 
that even with limited data, it is still possible to assess some of the poverty eff ects of trade 
policy and therefore contribute to a more informed policy debate. Our analyses include static 
and dynamic, linear and non-linear levels and fi rst-diff erence models to indicate that a lower 
industry tariff  tends to be associated with lower welfare being earned by households affi  liated to 
the industry, controlling for household-specifi c characteristics, geographic variables and industry 
fi xed-eff ects. We fi nd that this positive eff ect of protection is disproportionately greater for low 
skilled labour households, suggesting an erosion of welfare of unskilled labour households would 
result from trade liberalization.
Th e remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Th e next section briefl y reviews some 
relevant theoretical literature on international trade. Section 3 discusses the dataset and variable 
selection. Section 4 follows with a description of the empirical strategy. In Section 5, we 
summarize and assess the econometric results. Section 6 provides additional robustness checks 
while Section 7 concludes.
2. Trade and Labour Income: A Th eoretical Consideration
Th is section provides a brief review of the main theories on the labour market impact of 
international trade. Specifi cally, we discuss what theory predicts about the impact of trade on 
labour income (wages) in developing countries. Th e standard argument with regard to trade and 
poverty is based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which suggests that international trade 
will lead to a rise in the relative returns of the abundant factor; unskilled labour in the case 
12 Coulombe and McKay (2003) cite the non-availability of panel data as one of the major limitations of using the Ghanaian 
Living Standards Survey in an analysis of the determinants of changes in poverty and inequality.
77
The Effects of  Trade Liberalization on the Return to Education in Ghana 
of developing countries. Th us, according to this theory, the poor (unskilled labour) will be the 
largest benefi ciary of trade liberalisation. In other words, since developing countries are more 
likely to have a comparative advantage in producing goods that use unskilled labour relatively 
more intensively, we would expect trade reforms in these countries to be inherently pro-poor 
(see Krueger (1983); Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2002); Bhagwati (2004); Harrison (2005)).13 
Th ese expected gains are conditional on a number of assumptions - including free mobility of 
labour, given technology and perfect competition14. However, the assumptions underpinning the 
theorem are inherently too restrictive to provide a practical interpretation of the complexity of 
the relationship between trade reform and poverty. Moreover, adjustment to trade may result in 
additional short- and medium-term costs and challenges for the poor (see Ackah and Morrissey, 
2005:5-7 for a discussion of the benefi ts and costs of trade policy reforms).
Recently, these sharp predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem have been challenged. 
According to the new theories, trade liberalization could reduce the wages of unskilled labour 
even in a labour-abundant country, thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Many observers fi nd the Stolper Samuelson theorem quite restrictive, in that the theorem does 
not off er defi nitive conclusions if one or more assumptions are relaxed (see Davis, 1996). Davis 
and Mishra (2004, cited in Harrison, 2005) argue that the popular expectation that trade- 
liberalisation should increase the incomes of the poor in low income countries is based on a very 
narrow interpretation of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. Davis and Mishra show that in 
a world of many factors and many goods, a poor country might no longer have a comparative 
advantage in producing unskilled intensive goods. Similarly, if a poor country has large supplies 
of non-labour factors of production (like land or mineral resources); trade liberalization may not 
benefi t the labour-intensive sectors.
Th e specifi c sector and the Ricardo-Viner models have become the natural alternative to the 
Heckscher–Ohlin model and the associated Stolper–Samuelson theorem. According to these 
models, workers may gain from trade reforms depending on which sectors (import-competing 
or exporting) they are attached to. Th e models focus on the short to medium run and assume 
imperfect factor mobility, with one factor mobile across sectors while the other is taken to be 
sector-specifi c. With these assumptions, the models predict a positive association between 
protection and returns to factors of production (e.g. wages). Protection reduces imports and 
reduced imports increase labour demand, which in turn increases wages. When the price of a 
good falls following trade liberalisation the model predicts that the factor specifi c to the sector 
13 For an empirical example, see Hertel et al. (2003) who estimate that global trade liberalization leads in the long run (i.e. 
when labour and capital are mobile across sectors) to a decline in poverty for all strata of the population largely because of 
increased demand for unskilled labour.
14 This is an assumption that is unlikely to hold in developing countries like Ghana, especially in the short run, where labour 
markets are characterized by signifi cant labour rigidities.
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that experienced price reduction loses while the other specifi c factor gains in real terms. In other 
words, if trade liberalisation occurred, households affi  liated to the industries that experience 
large tariff  reductions would see a decline in their incomes relative to the economy-wide average 
income, while households attached to relatively protected industries would gain, relatively.15
Given the apparent ambiguity in the theoretical literature discussed above, the relationship 
between trade liberalization and poverty appears an empirical matter. Empirically, it is not simple 
to disentangle the eff ects on incomes of trade reform from other macroeconomic policies and 
technological changes occurring simultaneously.
Although many economists tend to agree, in general, that in the long run openness to trade 
is good for poverty reduction, in the short and medium run, signifi cant adjustment costs have 
been acknowledged. In fact, in the short run, trade liberalization appears to increase poverty and 
inequality (McCulloch et al., 2001).
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this subsection we describe the data and the main features of the variables that are relevant 
for the subsequent econometric analysis. Two sources of data for Ghana are used to assess the 
impact of trade policy on household welfare during the 1990s. Th e primary data source is the 
Ghana Living Standard Surveys (GLSS) the recent two of which were conducted in 1991/92 
and 1998/9916. Th e second data source is the most favoured nation (MFN) tariff  data for years 
close to the two household surveys. Tariff , our preferred measure of trade policy covers the period 
1993 and 200017. We construct a database of annual tariff  data for 1993 and 2000 at the two-digit 
ISIC level to calculate average industry-level tariff s. Th e result is a two-digit classifi cation of 26 
industries per year, of which 19 are in the traded-goods sector and 7 in the non-traded sector18. 
Our sample is restricted to households with heads aged between 18-64 inclusive, employed in 
15 Given the underdeveloped labour markets in most developing countries, this model appears a plausible starting point for 
thinking about the relationship between trade protection and income poverty in Ghana (see Attanasio et al., 2004). There 
are good reasons to believe that the assumption of perfect labour mobility across sectors is unlikely to hold, at least in the 
short run, in most developing countries including Ghana. Even the assumption of perfectly competitive markets can only be 
envisaged in the long run. While we do not propose, in this paper, to subject these theories to empirical testing, we hope that 
in the end we are able to fi nd a theoretical basis for explaining the observed changes in household welfare (income) and 
inequality in Ghana vis-à-vis the trade reforms in the 1990s.
16 The main advantage of using these two surveys is that they employed almost identical questionnaires, which aids in analysing 
changes in poverty between the two survey years.
17 Ideally, we would have required tariff data for 1998/99. However, for some reason these data are not readily available. 
This imposes a limitation on this study. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the tariff data captured in 2000 fairly 
represent tariffs prevailing in 1998/99. Evidence from Figure A1 in the Appendix A suggests that tariffs remained stable 
during the latter part of the 1990s (from 1997) and we believe this pattern may have continued into 2000.
18 Following Topalova (2005:16) all households employed in non-tradable industries are assigned a tariff of zero.
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any sector (tradable or non-tradable). Th e sample is selected conditional on working so that 
the eff ects of protection conditional on being in the labour force are examined. Non-working 
households are excluded19. Each of the selected households is mapped on to one of the 26 sectors 
according to the sector of main employment of the household head. Th ese exclusion restrictions 
leave us with a sample of 3,350 and 4,484 households from GLSS 3 and GLSS 4 respectively.
Among the household-level variables, we start by considering the following categories of 
variables: a set of demographic variables, variables relating to educational attainment, household 
size. Linear and quadratic terms in the age of the head of the household are also included 
to capture possible life-cycle eff ects. We include agro-climatic zones in our model as dummy 
variables to control for the eff ects of agro-ecological zone characteristics on household welfare. 
Doing so allows us to gauge the eff ects of the other determinants on household welfare 
independent of the eff ect of agro-climatic conditions on the household. To ascertain whether 
there were any signifi cant changes in household welfare between the two periods, we introduce 
a survey-year dummy, GLSS 4. Furthermore, we allow for sectoral heterogeneity by including a 
dummy for households located in urban sectors, Urban. Using the information on the highest 
qualifi cation obtained, we defi ne fi ve education indicators: No education, Basic education, 
Secondary education, Post-secondary education and Tertiary education (university degree). For 
each cross-section, Table 1 reports summary statistics of our key variables.
Ghana embarked on a massive expansion in the provision of education during the 1990s 
which has resulted in the increased educational attainment during the period. Th e proportion 
of households with illiterate heads (no education) fell from 32.3 percent to 28 percent. Th ere 
were substantial increases in the proportion of households whose heads have completed more 
than primary school education. Th e proportion of heads with secondary education increased 
from 5.7 percent to 6.6 percent while those with post-secondary education increased from 3.5 
percent to 6.6 percent. Th e share of heads with basic education has remained stable at around 
57 percent. Th e percentage of heads with tertiary education, however, declined marginally - the 
share of those with university degrees fell from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent. Over the period we 
observe a decrease (from 15.9 percent to 11.4 percent) in the share of households employed in 
the public sector, consistent with the public sector retrenchment which began in the mid-1990s 
under SAP/ERP (see Aryeetey, 2005). Even though food-crop farming is the largest source of 
employment for a great majority of households, its share declined signifi cantly from about 40 
percent in 1991/92 to 37 percent in 1998/99. On the other hand, the share of export farming 
increased by a massive 51 percent between the two surveys, but only from 5 percent to 7 percent. 
Non-farm self-employment saw a 14 percent increase in its share to maintain its position as the 
second largest employer.
19 This was necessitated by the fact that the survey questionnaire only solicited information about industry of employment for 
working individuals and since our tariff data is at the industry level.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1991/92 1998/99
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Welfare (consumption expenditure) 1,457,110 1,293,483 1,668,206 1,483,357
Log Welfare 13.927 0.710 14.056 0.729
Age of Head 38.169 9.823 42.281 10.504
Age of Head squared 1553 767 1898 921
Female-headed household 0.304 0.460 0.308 0.462
Household Head has -
 No Education 0.323 0.468 0.280 0.449
 Basic Education 0.574 0.495 0.578 0.494
 Secondary Education 0.057 0.231 0.066 0.248
 Post-secondary Education 0.035 0.183 0.066 0.248
 Tertiary Education (University) 0.008 0.091 0.006 0.074
Log Value of Land 3.510 5.597 3.419 6.283
Economic Activity indicators
Public Sector 0.159 0.366 0.114 0.318
Private Formal 0.053 0.224 0.060 0.237
Private Informal 0.040 0.197 0.035 0.185
Export Farmer 0.047 0.211 0.071 0.257
Food -Crop Farmer 0.396 0.489 0.371 0.483
Non-farm Self-employment 0.304 0.460 0.347 0.476
Observations 3,350 4,484
Note: Th e reported fi gures are weighted using survey weights. Values (welfare and land) are in constant prices of Accra in January 
1999.
Table 2 provides information on the incidence of poverty and contribution to national 
poverty by each occupation. In 1991/92, the incidence of poverty in food crop and export 
farming households were quite similar, 68 percent and 64 percent respectively. However, by 
1998/99 poverty incidence decreased to 39 percent in export farming households, whilst food 
crop farmers recorded about 59 percent. In terms of poverty shares, food -crop farmers actually 
saw a marginal increase in their share of national poverty from 57.3 percent to 58.1 percent. 
Similarly, the non-farm self-employed experienced an increase in their contribution to national 
poverty despite a drop in the incidence of poverty.
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Table 2: Poverty, by Economic Activity and Location, 1991/92 and 1998/99
 Economic Activity









Public Sector Employment 0.35 9.1 0.23 6.2
Private Formal Employment 0.30 2.3 0.11 1.4
Private Informal Employment 0.39 2.3 0.25 1.9
Export Farmers 0.64 7.8 0.39 6.9
Food crop farmers 0.68 57.3 0.59 58.1
Non-Farm Self Employment 0.38 20.5 0.29 24.5
Non-working 0.19 0.7 0.20 1.1
Location
Rural 0.63 82.2 49.50 83.7
Urban 0.27 17.8 19.40 16.3
All Ghana 0.52 100.0 0.40 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculation from GLSS, 1991/92 and 1998/99
Spatially, poverty in Ghana is almost entirely a rural phenomenon. With a population share of 
just about 64 percent the rural sector contributes a disproportionate 82 percent to total poverty, 
while urban households account for only 18 percent. Th e story that emerges from Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 suggests that those who appear to have benefi ted the most from the economic policies of 
the 1990s were the urban and export farming households.20 Th e rural households and food crop 
farmers who form the bulk of the population appear to have benefi ted the least. What is clear 
is that policy reform has had a diff erential impact on diff erent groups of households. Indeed, 
our conservative measure of inequality, defi ned as the standard deviation of the log welfare, 
increased slightly over this period (from 0.71 to 0.73). Th is is broadly consistent with inequality 
as measured by the Gini coeffi  cient which suggests a modest increase from 0.37 in 1991/92 to 
0.39 in 1998/99 (Aryeetey and McKay, 2004).21
20 In principle, economic reforms (of which trade liberalisation is one aspect) are expected remove anti-export biases and shift 
incentives towards the production of tradables. To the extent that trade liberalisation leads to a rise in returns to exporting 
activities, it is not surprising that export farming households in Ghana recorded the highest reductions in poverty incidence 
during the 1990s. Aryeetey (2005) has argued, however, that one of the reasons why the export farmers performed relatively 
better than their counterparts engaged in food crop farming is due to the fact that while agricultural subsidies were removed 
in the food sector as part of the liberalisation process, export farmers were benefi ting from governmental support in terms of 
technical training and other export- promotion packages.
21 See also Teal (2001) who fi nds that inequality as measured by the standard deviation of log household expenditure per capita 
(in 1998 prices) increased from 0.76 to 0.77. This evidence is further corroborated by his Gini coeffi cient measure based on 
household expenditure per capita in 1998 prices, which indicates a rise from 0.42 in 1991/92 to 0.46 in 1998/99.
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Table 3: Economic Activity Shares, by Skill Levels, 1991/92
Skill
Economic Activity Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled All
Public Sector Employment 0.61 0.19 0.20 1.00
Private Formal Employment 0.82 0.14 0.05 1.00
Private Informal Employment 0.89 0.10 0.01 1.00
Export Farmers 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.00
Food Crop Farmers 0.99 0.01 0.00 1.00
Non-farm Self Employment 0.94 0.03 0.02 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculation from GLSS, 1991/92 and 1998/99
Note: Unskilled households are households whose head has completed basic or no education, semi-skilled for heads who have 
completed secondary or post-secondary and skilled for households with university graduate heads.
Table 4: Share of Skill Levels, by Rural/Urban Location, 1991/92
Location
Skill Rural Urban All
Unskilled 0.67 0.33 1.00
Semi-skilled 0.27 0.73 1.00
Skilled 0.45 0.55 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculation from GLSS, 1991/92 and 1998/99
Note: Unskilled households are households whose head has completed basic or no education, semi-skilled for heads who have 
completed secondary or post-secondary and skilled for households with university graduate heads.
Table 3 takes issues further by looking at the skill composition of these occupational groups 
while Table 4 does the same for the rural and urban sectors. Skilled (or semi-skilled) households 
are largely wage earners in either the public sector (39 percent) or the private formal sector 
(19%). Even though the unskilled dominate all socio-economic groups, almost all agriculture 
households (about 99 percent of food crop farmers and 98 percent of export farmers) are 
disproportionately unskilled. Moreover, while the unskilled are predominantly rural (67percent) 
the semi-skilled (73 percent) and skilled (55 percent) are largely located in urban centres. Th e 
foregoing descriptive evidence is instructive. Th e main message is that policy reforms in the 
1990s were possibly not pro-poor if indeed unskilled labour households benefi ted the least.22 
Of course the simple descriptive analysis adopted here is unable to attribute changes to any 
22 Teal (2000a, b) presents further evidence that the 1990s witnessed a continuing fall in real wages for unskilled labour in 
Ghana.
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particular policy. A reasonable hypothesis is that trade policy is accountable for the observed 
evolution of poverty and inequality.
An alternative claim which seems to be gaining support is to say that trade is actually not to 
blame but rather skill-biased technological change is the problem (see for example, Görg and 
Strobl (2002). (Görg and Strobl 2002) using fi rm-level data on manufacturing in Ghana, have 
shown that skill-biased technical change arising from increased purchase of foreign machinery 
after the trade reforms has resulted in increased demand for skilled workers. However, to the 
extent that skill-biased technological change is an endogenous product of trade liberalisation, 
the relative non-performance of unskilled rural and food-crop farming households could be 
attributed, at least partially or indirectly, to trade liberalisation. Moreover, Teal (1999, 2001), 
using both fi rm-level and household data respectively, fi nds no evidence of any underlying 
technical progress in explaining increased income inequality in the 1990s. In a related study, 
Teal (2000) provides evidence which suggests that high rates of infl ation and low investment 
are the two major factors responsible for the substantial falls in the real wages of the unskilled 
in manufacturing between 1992 and 1998. Unfortunately, Teal did not consider the role of trade 
policy in his analysis. In this chapter we argue that trade policy is one of the factors contributing 
to the observed trends in poverty and income inequality in Ghana during the period in question. 
However, one needs to test this with econometric methods, which we take up in Section 4.4.
Table A1 and Figure A1 in the Appendix show the average tariff  levels and changes across 
all the 19 traded sectors between 1993 and 2000. It is worth pointing out that whereas the 
average unweighted scheduled tariff  across all industries declined from 17 percent in 1992 to 8.5 
percent in 1999 (Figure A1 in the Appendix) the structure and pattern of tariff  reductions was 
not uniform across sectors. Hence, our data reveal that for a sizeable number of manufacturing 
industries (usually, relatively skilled sectors) the average tariff  actually increased during the 
1990s. Most manufacturing sub-sectors continued to enjoy high levels of protection, with the 
average tariff  for the industry increasing by 12.41 percent. Th e agriculture and allied industries 
enjoyed especially high levels of protection to begin with but these are also the sectors where 
tariff  reductions were intensive. Th is suggests that Ghana protected relatively unskilled, labour-
intensive sectors during the era of import- substitution industrialization which persisted into 
the early 1990s, notwithstanding the economic reforms of the 1980s. Th e rapid and substantive 
liberalization of trade in agriculture in the 1990s was not accompanied by similar reforms in 
manufacturing. What is unique about the 1990s was the sudden attempt to change the structure 
of protection from low-skilled agriculture and relatively low-skilled manufactures to relatively 
high-skilled sectors.
Since Ghana’s trade reforms entailed larger tariff  reductions (and hence the largest reductions 
in the price of their output) in relatively unskilled and relatively protected sectors, the logic of the 
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Stolper-Samuelson theorem would imply that unskilled labour households will lose, relatively23. 
If labour is really perfectly mobile, i.e., if we assume an absence of labour market rigidities 
(which is very unlikely for Ghana), as the theory assumes very strongly, we would expect an 
accompanying reallocation of labour across sectors. We would expect to see labour reallocation 
from the sectors with the largest tariff  reductions (the contracting unskilled sectors) to the sectors 
with the smaller tariff  reductions (the expanding skilled sectors). Th e theory further predicts 
that the share of unskilled labour in industrial employment should rise as fi rms move away 
from skilled labour with the rising relative return to skilled labour. However, both predictions 
are not borne out by the evidence in Table A2. First, we fail to observe any discernible shifts in 
employment between sectors (see right panel of Table A2). In fact, shares of industry in total 
employment remained relatively stable between 1991/92 and 1998/99.
4. Empirical Methodology
In this section, we discuss the econometric models estimated and some econometric issues 
encountered. Our main objective is to investigate the causal eff ect of trade policy on household 
welfare in Ghana during the 1990s. Of particular interest here is the potential contingency of 
the eff ect of trade policy on educational qualifi cation or skill type of the household. We are also 
interested in systematically distinguishing the long-run impact of trade protection on household 
welfare from that of the short run. In the end, we hope to provide answers to the following 
questions: (1) Does trade protection aff ect every household equally independent of the skill type 
of the household? In other words, would the eff ect of trade liberalisation be felt equally across 
households (skilled and unskilled)?; and (2) Is the eff ect of trade protection constant or time-
dependent? Put diff erently, is the long-run impact of protection similar or diff erent from that of 
the short run?
In order to investigate such questions, longitudinal data with multiple observations on the same 
households over time would be ideal. Unfortunately, such data are seldom available in developing 
countries, Ghana being no exception. Th e analysis in this chapter therefore applies pseudo-panel 
econometric techniques to our repeated cross-sectional data. We consider what can be learnt 
from analyzing repeated cross-sections, as is predominant in studies interested in consumption 
and labour supply issues (see Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985). We extend these approaches 
for the analysis of trade policy and poverty in Ghana. In this way, this study circumvents the 
absence of ‘true’ panel data for Ghana, while still exploiting some of the attractive features of 
panel data analysis such as the ability to control for household-specifi c eff ects and unobserved 
heterogeneity (Deaton, 1985). Th is method has rarely been used in poverty analysis.
23 There is compelling evidence that the relative incomes of skilled labour in Ghana rose over the period under study (see Görg 
and Strobl (2002) and Teal (2000)).
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 After matching each household with the relevant industry tariff  information, we examine how 
the standard of living measure relates to trade protection. Th e approach is based on modelling 
the natural logarithm of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure of survey households, 
adjusted for variations in prices between localities and over time (Welfare, used here as proxy 
for income and by implication poverty). One of the key features of the recent policy reforms in 
Ghana has been the signifi cant changes in the levels of import protection. In the case of Ghana, 
household incomes and consumption expenditures are likely to have been signifi cantly aff ected 
by the cross-sector pattern of tariff s.
We formalize the determinants of household welfare (or income) as follows:
2
1 2 3 4 5ln it it it it it itw age age hsize educ urbanα β β β β β= + + + + +
6 7 1it it jt i j t itecoz land tariff fβ β δ λ γ ε+ + + + + + +     (16)
where the dependent variable is as previously defi ned, age  is the age of household head at 
the time of the survey, 2age  is squared age, hsize  is the size of the household, educ  is education 
of the household head, urban  is a 0/1 dummy which is 1 for households in urban localities, ez  
is agro-climatic zone, land  is the value of land owned by the household (instead of the actual 
land cultivated, in order to implicitly account for land quality), tariff  is the average (MFN) tariff  
applied to imports of industry j ’s products in year t , f is the household fi xed eff ects, λ  is the 
fi xed eff ects for the household’s industry affi  liation, γ  is the year fi xed eff ect and ε  is the error 
term. Subscripts i  and t  index households and survey years respectively. Year fi xed eff ects are 
included to absorb economy-wide shocks (such as technological change) that may aff ect welfare 
while industry dummies control for sector-specifi c eff ects.
Each of the explanatory variables is likely to explain some of the diff erences in household 
welfare. However, it must be recognized that other unmeasured or unobservable diff erences 
among households may also matter. Unmeasured or unobservable individual heterogeneity is a 
problem that faces all survey research. A pooled analysis of the data based on equation (16) will 
be seriously fl awed, in part because such analysis cannot control for unobservables, and in part 
because it assumes that repeated observations on each household are independent. Th e presence 
of f and λ  in the model implies that we need panel data to consistently estimate the parameters 
in the model.24 So to address these issues, we employ the ideas espoused by Deaton (1985) by 
constructing a pseudo panel from our repeated cross-sectional data. Following the pseudo panel 
24 Pooling individuals across years has obvious advantages but generates a number of estimation issues regarding individual 
heterogeneity. It is likely that observations over time for the same individual will be more similar than observations across 
different individuals. This might be due to persistence in or unmodeled characteristics of household living standards. This is 
particularly pertinent to our analysis because there are good reasons to think that unobserved factors may affect household 
welfare. So we allow f  to vary across households to capture unmeasured or unobserved heterogeneity.
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data literature, the fi rst extension is to take cohort averages of all variables and estimate (16) 
based on the cohort means.
 
2
1 2 3 4 5ln ct ct ct ctct ctw age age hsize educ urbanα β β β β β= + + + + +
  6 7 1 ctct ct ctct ctecoz land tariff fβ β δ λ γ ε+ + + + + + +   (17)
Equation (17) can be estimated via random- or fi xed-eff ects estimators. Th e random-eff ects 
estimator generates consistent parameter estimates if the individual eff ects are uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables. Th e fi xed-eff ects estimator is also consistent under this 
assumption, but is less effi  cient. Under the alternative hypothesis that the individual eff ects are 
correlated with other explanatory variables, only the fi xed-eff ects estimator is consistent. We will 
use both methods to estimate (17), and report diagnostics to evaluate the estimators. To examine 
whether the trade policy changes can be directly linked to changes in living standards we will 
also estimate a diff erenced model based on (17) as an alternative econometric specifi cation.
Th e consumption (welfare) models (16) and (17) both assume preferences to be time 
separable. However, some recent studies have drawn our attention to a class of time non-
separable preferences, exhibiting habit formation or persistence. Th e distinctive characteristic 
of these models is that current utility depends not only on current consumption, but also on a 
habit stock formed from past consumption (see Fuhrer, 2000; and Deaton, 1992)25. In eff ect, 
equation (17) may be misspecifi ed (dynamically) if dynamics really matter. Th e best solution 
would obviously be to directly model the dynamics; unfortunately this is very diffi  cult without 
panel data. But failing to deal with the dynamics can cause serious problems. To test this we 
employ an alternative dynamic econometric specifi cation, introducing the lagged dependent 
variable as additional regressor26. Here, for the same reasons discussed earlier in Section 2.2, we 
follow Moffi  t’s (1993) guidance to estimate the model using the underlying micro data.
 21 2 3 4 5ln it it it it it itw age age hsize educ urbanα β β β β β= + + + + +
  6 7 8 1 1lnit it it jt j t itecoz land w tariffβ β β δ λ γ ε−+ + + + + + +    (18)
Equation (18) imposes a uniform and linear restriction on the parameter 1δ ; the eff ect of tariff  
on welfare. Th e implicit assumption of such an approach is that the welfare eff ect of tariff s is 
uniform for all households. However, in light of the discussions in section 4.2 such an approach 
will be badly misspecifi ed. Th e above specifi cation may suff er from an un-modelled contingency 
in the relationship between tariff s and welfare. In other words, the assumption that all households 
would derive the same benefi ts from trade liberalisation is unlikely; and it is not supported by 
25 A dynamic specifi cation could be justifi ed on several grounds. First, households are likely to incur short-term costs resulting 
from trade liberalisation due to rigidities. It may also take time to adjust to any policy shocks such as switching jobs from 
industries where wages are declining to ones where wages are rising.
26  A signifi cant coeffi cient on the lagged dependent variable is evidence that the previous models were mis-specifi ed or under 
-specifi ed.
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the evidence in Section 4.2. Equation (19) is a variant of (18) except now the structure explicitly 
allows the eff ects of tariff s on households to diff er. We hypothesize that diff erences can, at least 
partially, be attributed to skill diff erentials among households and return eff ects on education. 
Th e resulting estimating equation is of the form:
2
1 2 3 4 5 6ln it it it it it it itw age age hsize educ urban ecozα β β β β β β= + + + + + +
 7 8 1 1 2ln *it it jt jt it j t itland w tariff Tariff Skillβ β δ δ λ γ ε−+ + + + + + +   (19)
where Skill  comprises three mutually exclusive educational dummies (unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled) denoting the skill category of the household. Unskilled labour comprises 
households whose head has at least primary education; semi-skilled labour includes households 
with secondary education; and skilled labour is represented by households with graduate heads. 
Th is identifi cation strategy assumes that tariff  reductions during the 1990s aff ected households 
diff erently according to their skill type. We are thus able to assess whether trade protection is 
benefi cial for households regardless of the level of skill.
4.1 Construction of the Pseudo Panel Data
Following the seminal work of Deaton (1985), we can construct a pseudo-panel and track 
cohorts of households through our two cross-sections. While we continue to wait for panel data 
to become available, we follow Deaton’s procedure to create a pseudo panel for the econometric 
analysis in this chapter. Cohorts can be defi ned in terms of a single characteristic or multiple 
characteristics. In our case, since we have only two cross-sections, if the cohorts contain a large 
number of households, the number of cohort-groups will be small and hence the cross-sectional 
dimension of the panel will not be large. Th us, we construct our pseudo-panel by grouping 
households into cohorts based on some common multiple characteristics varying by generation 
(age category of head), gender of head and household’s region of domicile. Since we are interested 
in a panel of households with heads between the ages of 18 to 64 and we have two cross-
sections that are seven years apart then for the fi rst cross-section (1991/92) the sample only 
includes households whose heads are aged 18 to 57, while the second cross-section (1998/99) 
only includes households with heads aged 25 to 64 so that all are in the normal working span 
in both surveys. Note that we add seven years to the age limits as we move to the next cross-
section; this allows the households to “age” over time. We used fi ve-year bands in defi ning the 
generational cohorts, resulting in eight birth cohorts constructed for each region in each survey 
year. For example, the fi rst age cohort studied here was aged 18-22 in 1991/92 and 25-29 in 
1998/99 (see Table A4 in the Appendix for details). Households whose heads are of these ages 
and are found in the relevant cross-sections are pooled to form the pseudo cohorts. Although 
the actual households surveyed will diff er in each survey year, they will be representative of the 




In this section we discuss the econometric results, focusing on estimates of equations (17) to 
(19). First, we estimated all equations, (16) - (18) without controlling for industry-specifi c 
eff ects. Th e results are reported in Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix. Th e eff ects of tariff s on 
welfare are negative for all the specifi cations. It is possible that these results in Table B1 and B2 
exaggerate the eff ect of tariff s on income; other factors such as industry eff ects are potentially 
important. To examine if tariff  eff ects can be accounted for by industry of employment, we re-
estimate all the regressions but this time we include industry dummies. Not surprisingly, the 
eff ect of tariff s gets reversed controlling for industry fi xed eff ects27. Th is suggests that unobserved 
industry heterogeneity was responsible for the negative tariff  eff ect in the previous regressions. 
Th us, the rest of the analysis and discussions in this chapter refer to the regressions with controls 
for industry heterogeneity28.
We now turn to an in-depth discussion of the regression results. Our main fi ndings are 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. For a start, Table 5 reports the simple impact of the degree of 
openness on welfare. Th e fi rst column lists the results for the case where we apply conventional 
ordinary least squares (OLS), based on equation (16), to the pooled cross-sections. Columns 2 
to 4, on the other hand, are based on the pseudo panel equation (17).
Table 5: Trade Protection and Household Income (Welfare): Evidence from Static 
Regressions
Dependent Variable: Welfare (Consumption per adult equivalent)
Cross-Sectional Pseudo Panel
Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects Differenced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agehead -0.022*** -0.038***  -  -
(0.005) (0.011)
Agehead2 0.001*** 0.001***  - -
(0.001) (0.001)
Hsize -0.109*** -0.085*** -0.096*** -0.096***
(0.003) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025)
Urban 0.268*** 0.310*** 0.332** 0.332**
27 Other authors have found similar results. Attanasio et al. (2004), for example, estimates a positive tariff effect on industry 
wage premia only after controlling for unobserved sectoral heterogeneity. In their experimentation without industry dummies 
the tariff-wage effect turned negative.
28 A Wald test of the hypothesis that the effects of the industry dummies are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 
0.1 level or better.
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Dependent Variable: Welfare (Consumption per adult equivalent)
Cross-Sectional Pseudo Panel
Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects Differenced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.016) (0.077) (0.146) (0.140)
Basic  0.135*** 0.103 0.126 0.126
(0.016) (0.087) (0.165) (0.193)
Secondary 0.360*** 0.434 -0.787 -0.787
(0.029) (0.293) (0.562) (0.723)
Post-secondary 0.344*** 0.414 0.303  0.303
(0.033) (0.311) (0.511) (0.542)
Tertiary 0.768*** 1.880** 1.956  1.956
(0.085) (0.892) (1.391) (1.845)
Land 0.006*** -0.009* -0.013 -0.013
(0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015)
Forest 0.017 0.110* 0.026  0.026
(0.015) (0.064) (0.194) (0.128)
Savannah -0.187*** -0.227*** 0.169  0.169
(0.019) (0.062) (0.372) (0.350)
Tariff 0.010** 0.056*** 0.068**  0.068**
(0.005) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
GLSS 4 0.127*** 0.154*** 0.185***  -
(0.015) (0.047) (0.058)
Constant 14.798*** 15.818*** 14.948***  0.185***
(0.135) (0.897) (1.498) (0.050)
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 7834 310 310  152
R-squared 0.42  0.74  0.35 0.32
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes signifi cant at 10%; ** denotes signifi cant at 5%, *** denotes signifi cant at 
1%.
Columns 2 and 3 report random-eff ects and fi xed-eff ects results respectively. Even though 
the key message is the same across these two models, we employed the Hausman specifi cation 
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test and report the diagnostic results in Table A3 in the Appendix29. To examine whether the 
trade policy changes can be directly linked to changes in living standards we also estimate the 
fi rst-diff erence model in column 4 based on (17). Th is specifi cation could also mitigate the 
potential for any spurious correlation between tariff s and welfare. Th e eff ects of protection on 
welfare are positive and signifi cant in all regressions in Table 5. In other words, holding other 
factors constant, the pseudo-panel econometric evidence presented here suggests that welfare 
is higher (poverty is lower) in households (or cohorts) employed in protected sectors (sheltered 
from competition). Th e coeffi  cient on tariff  implies that increasing protection in a particular 
sector raises consumption expenditure (or incomes) in that sector. Th e corollary that reducing 
tariff s in previously protected sectors lowers incomes (or welfare) in those sectors is equally 
supported by the fi rst-diff erence model in column 4.
Although the regressions in Table 5 provide interesting results, we can be sceptical about their 
static nature and the unwarrantable linearity (homogeneity) restriction on the coeffi  cient of tariff . 
Th us, Table 6 presents results based on the dynamic models (18) and (19). Th e specifi cations as in 
column 1 of Table 6 and its variant as in column 2 are dynamically specifi ed (with the lag of the 
dependent variable, log welfare, as a regressor) and estimated using 2SLS applied to RCS data 
as reviewed in Section 4.1. Moreover, column 2 presents the estimates of the diff erential impact 
of the reforms on unskilled and skilled labour households. In column 2, based on equation (19), 
tariff  is interacted with the skill dummy to show the diff erential eff ect of trade protection on 
households characterised by diff erent levels of education30.
As discussed already, the main problem we face in estimating (19) is that the true value of the 
lagged dependent variable (lagged welfare), is unobserved because the same individuals are not 
tracked over time. Following Moffi  t (1993), however, the regressions in Table 6 are estimated 
by regressing the dependent variable (welfare) on the time-invariant explanatory variables using 
the observations in the fi rst cross-section (1991/92). We then obtain the predicted dependent 
variable from the OLS estimation. In the second stage the predicted dependent variable is 
substituted in the original model (19) as the lagged dependent variable and estimated by OLS 
using all observations in both cross-sections; on the assumption that the (predicted) lagged 
dependent variable is asymptotically uncorrelated with the error term31.
29 The test statistic equals 21.16 (probability of 0.98). This clearly fails to reject the null, at the 0.05 level of signifi cance, 
that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors, i.e. it fi nds that the random effects estimates are 
not signifi cantly different from the fi xed effects estimates. The more effi cient random effects specifi cation is therefore the 
preferred one.
30 The assumption of homogeneity implies that the coeffi cient on the interactive term should equal zero. This restriction is 
obviously rejected as indicated by the signifi cant coeffi cient on the interactive term. This suggests that the regressions in 
Table 5 may suffer from an unmodelled heterogeneity.
31 It is important to mention that we test for the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in the section devoted to robustness 
checks.
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Table 6: Trade Protection and Household Income: Evidence from Dynamic 
Regressions
Dependent Variable: Welfare (Consumption per adult equivalent) (Consumption per adult equivalent)
(1) (2)
Lagged Welfare  0.386**  0.386**
 (0.156)  (0.156)
Agehead  0.036**  0.035**
 (0.015)  (0.015)
Agehead2  -0.001**  -0.001**
 (0.001)  (0.001)
Hsize  -0.063***  -0.063***
 (0.018)  (0.018)
Urban  0.067  0.067
 (0.070)  (0.070)
Basic  0.066***  0.096***
 (0.023)  (0.028)
Secondary  0.186***  0.227***
 (0.065)  (0.069)
Post-sec  0.195***  0.237***
 (0.062)  (0.065)
Tertiary  0.391**  0.447***
 (0.156)  (0.158)
Land  0.004***  0.004***
 (0.001)  (0.001)
Forest  0.040*  0.039*
 (0.022)  (0.022)
Savannah  0.029  0.028
 (0.031)  (0.031)
Tariff  0.009*  0.012**
 (0.005)  (0.005)
Tariff x Skill  -0.002*
 (0.001)
GLSS 4  0.093***  0.093***
 (0.033)  (0.033)
Constant  8.057***  8.042***
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Dependent Variable: Welfare (Consumption per adult equivalent) (Consumption per adult equivalent)
(1) (2)
 (2.473)  (2.473)
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes
No. of Observations  7834  7834
R-squared  0.45  0.45
Note: Robust standard errors  in parentheses, * denotes signifi cant at 10%; ** denotes signifi cant at 5%, *** denotes signifi cant at 
1%. Regressions include controls for cohort group (dummies) suppressed here for brevity.
Interestingly, we still fi nd robust evidence regarding the eff ects of tariff s on poverty. In both 
regressions (Table 6) the average welfare responds positively to tariff s, so that tariff  reductions 
would lead to a decline in welfare. In other words, welfare would be lower in households 
employed in protected sectors which were exposed to import competition. Th is fi nding supports 
the interpretation that incomes fell most in those industries where openness increased the most. 
Th us, we again fi nd a positive and statistically signifi cant correlation between trade protection 
and household welfare. Although the magnitude of the tariff  coeffi  cient changes, the positive 
and statistically signifi cant relationship between tariff s and welfare is robust. Th e estimated eff ect 
of protection on welfare drops, however, from an average of about 0.064 in columns 2 to 4 of 
Table 5, to 0.009 and 0.012 in columns 1 and 2 respectively of Table 6. Th ese results suggest, 
in the case of Ghana, that trade policy reforms had a signifi cant eff ect (albeit marginally) on 
household welfare. Households whose heads work in industries with the largest tariff  reductions 
(mainly the agriculture and allied sectors) would tend to experience a decline of their welfare 
(income) relative to the economy-wide average32. Th e evidence seems to suggest that tariff s 
may protect incomes of households employed in relatively protected sectors. Th is implies that 
some of the economic rents are shared with labour, so that liberalisation could reduce incomes 
and potentially increase poverty (in protected sectors). Whether inequality increased depends 
on whether the sectors with the largest tariff  reductions were the ones in which the poor are 
mainly located. Anecdotal evidence and the results contained in the descriptive analysis of this 
chapter, however, point to the contrary. Th e poor in Ghana are predominantly rural, unskilled 
and employed relatively intensively in agriculture (mostly as landless peasant food crop farmers). 
It is for this reason that the results in Table 7 are especially important.
32 The only exceptions are households engaged in export farming (predominantly cocoa farmers). Aryeetey (2005) has argued, 
however, that one of the reasons why the export farming sector performed relatively better than food crop farmers is due 
to the fact that in the face of the severe agricultural import liberalization, the export farmers have been benefi ting from 
governmental support in terms of technical training and other export promotion packages.
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Table 7: Contribution of Trade Protection to Household Income (Welfare)
 1991/92 1998/99
 Skill Type of Household Skill Type of Household
Unskilled Semi- Skilled Unskilled Semi- Skilled
Actual Welfare (log) 13.875 14.456 14.324 13.981 14.586 14.482
Predicted Welfare (log) 13.870 14.480 14.378 13.984 14.571 14.458
Residual 0.004 -0.024 -0.055 -0.003 0.016 0.025
Contribution of Tariffs to Welfare 0.200 0.184 0.182 0.176 0.168 0.168
Number of Observations 3016 190 144 3869 294 321
Note: Authors’ calculations based on regression in column 1 of Table 6.
Figures are simple averages over all households in each skill type except tariff  which is over households in traded sectors only.
In Table 7 we show the three skill types of all households in our regressions, along with 
their actual welfare as reported in the data and the predicted welfare from the regression in 
column 1 of Table 6. In addition, we estimate how much of the variation in within-household 
welfare is explained by trade policy. Overall, the model explains reasonably well the experience 
of all households irrespective of the skill type. Th e unexplained welfare (residual) is negligible, 
ranging between 0.3 percent and 5.5 percent in absolute terms. Th e fi rst main message from 
this table is that for all households in traded sectors the contribution of protection to welfare 
is positive. Second, the results in this table corroborate the non-linear specifi cation employed 
in column 2 of Table 6 (the model with the interactive term). We fi nd that the contribution of 
tariff s to welfare is relatively higher (20 percent) for unskilled households. Without any special 
safety nets or complementary policies, one can expect that trade liberalisation, alone, would have 
disproportionate negative consequences for households in this skill type, ceteris paribus. Finally, 
the results reveal that over the period of seven years, the contribution of tariff s to welfare has 
fallen for all skill types while average welfare for each skill type has increased slightly. Th is seems 
to suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that in the medium to long run there appears to be a negative 
relationship between trade protection and welfare. If this were the case, it would be good news 
for free trade protagonists. Th e second and fi nal messages from this table are the basis for the 
subsequent empirical analysis in this chapter. First, we investigate further the apparent, non-
linear tariff -welfare relationship. Th en, given the inherent dynamics in our model, we estimate 




It appears reasonable to expect that trade protection and, for that matter, trade liberalization 
will impact diff erentially, either by direction or magnitude, on households with diff erent levels 
of education. To examine how the eff ects of trade liberalization on households may vary by 
education, we have hypothesized a potential contingency in the relationship between protection 
(liberalization) and welfare. To attempt to capture this contingency, we introduced an interaction 
term between Tariff  and Skill which is a categorical dummy variable constructed from the highest 
education completed dummies. Th e interaction term is meant to capture the non-linearity in the 
impact of trade policy on poverty, in order to ascertain whether the impact of greater openness 
is borne disproportionately by diff erent skill groups33. Evidence of a contingent relationship 
is provided by a signifi cant coeffi  cient on the interaction term suggesting an un-modelled 
contingency bias in the results discussed previously.
Th e results reported in column 2 of Table 6 are quite revealing. Th is specifi cation reveals a 
signifi cant interaction eff ect under which the marginal impact of tariff s on welfare is decreasing 
in skill. We fi nd that the positive tariff  eff ect applies to all households but is more pronounced 
for less skilled households, suggesting that greater openness is likely to be associated with 
signifi cantly lower returns to households with lower levels of education (the unskilled). Th is 
leads to the inference that households with higher education (skilled) in highly protected 
industries have lower welfare than households with only one of those attributes. A corollary is 
that unskilled households in highly protected industries enjoy relatively higher welfare than they 
otherwise would. Hence, trade liberalization would worsen their plight disproportionately. It is 
therefore reasonable to suppose that only skilled households (because they are more educated 
and more mobile) would have benefi ted from trade liberalization in the 1990s. Th is evidence on 
the diff erential impact of trade protection on poverty is consistent with our earlier descriptive 
results concerning the fi nding that the rural, food crop farmers and non-farm self-employed, all 
of whom are relatively unskilled, benefi ted the least from the trade reforms in the 1990s. Trade 
liberalization in Ghana seems to accord with an increase in income inequality in favour of skilled 
households.
33  Alternatively, we could simply conduct separate regressions for households in different skill categories. However, this 
approach would impose too much restriction on the data and would also not permit us to explore how the marginal effect of 
trade policy varies for more-skilled and less-skilled households.
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Table 8: Marginal and Long-run Eff ects of Trade Protection on Income (Welfare)
Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled
Marginal Effects 0.01 (2.01)**  0.009 (1.92)* 0.006 (1.20)
Long-run Effects 0.016 (1.45)  0.01 (1.45) 0.01 (1.11)
Note: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses, * denotes signifi cant at 10%; ** denotes signifi cant at 5%.
In order to test the hypothesis that the simple slope (marginal eff ect of tariff s) diff ers 
from zero, we approximate the standard error of the simple slope by the following equation: 
2
11 12 222bs sqrt s Zs Z s⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦ , where 11s  is the variance of the tariff  coeffi  cient (i.e., the squared 
standard error of 1δ ), 22s  is the variance of the interaction coeffi  cient (i.e., the squared standard 
error of 2δ ) and 12s  is the covariance of the two. Th ese values are obtained from the asymptotic 
covariance matrix based on our regression model in Table 6 column 2.
Th ese results imply that the impact of trade protection on household welfare is a function 
both of the level of restriction and of the level of education (skill). To evaluate this conditional 
hypothesis, we use the three values for Skill (1 for unskilled; 2 for semi-skilled; 3 for skilled) to 
compute the marginal eff ects of trade policy and report the results in the fi rst row of Table 8. 




δ δ∂ = +
∂          (20)
Evaluated at Unskilled and Semi-skilled, we fi nd a positive and statistically signifi cant tariff  ef-
fect. However, evaluated at Skilled, the marginal eff ect of Tariff  becomes statistically insignifi cant. 
Th us, the regression indicates that the derivative of welfare with respect to tariff s is a decreas-
ing and linear function of the level of skill. We know from the fact that the coeffi  cient on the 
interaction term is negative that the positive eff ect of trade protection declines as the level of 
skill increases. Consequently, the potential adjustment costs resulting from any given trade policy 
reforms will not be universal across diff erent skill groups. Th us, for two households with similar 
characteristics, affi  liated to the same sector (and thus facing similar tariff s) but belonging to dif-
ferent skill groups (unskilled and skilled), a tariff  reduction in that sector will have diff erent eff ects 
on their respective welfare. Skilled households stand to benefi t more than unskilled households. 
Alternatively, unskilled households will benefi t the least relative to skilled households.
5.2 Long-run Eff ects of Trade Protection
Th e analysis so far has been restricted to the short-run impact of trade policy. While the 
short-run is defi nitely important and merits analysis, many economic policies have important 
long-run perspectives which equally deserve scrutiny. Most often, these long-run impacts are 
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ignored by researchers and policy analysts. Th is is partly because of data constraints or because 
the electoratesonly cares about the short-run costs and benefi ts of public policy. However, 
to the extent that it is possible, we need to investigate the long-run impacts as well. In our 
empirical application, we are interested in knowing whether the long-run eff ects of trade policy 
are the same as the short-run consequences already documented. Specifi cally, we want to see 
whether the positive impact of tariff s on welfare weakens over time. Fortunately, the dynamic 
specifi cations employed in Table 6 allow us to explore this. Th e estimated signifi cant coeffi  cient 
on the lagged dependent variable is 0.386 with a standard error of 0.156. Th is suggests that past 
shocks to household welfare do aff ect current levels of welfare, above and beyond the infl uence of 
household-specifi c characteristics. Th e estimated tariff  coeffi  cient is 0.012 with a standard error 
of 0.005. Th is estimate divided by one minus the coeffi  cient estimate on the lagged dependent 
variable yields the long-run eff ect of trade protection on welfare. Th e last row of Table 8 reports 
this long-run impact for all three skill groups. Th ere is an interesting twist. None of the long 
run tariff  eff ects is statistically distinguishable from zero. In other words, conditional on controls 
for the persistence of household welfare the positive and signifi cant tariff  eff ect disappears. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to speculate that the arguments for protection are valid (especially for 
poor unskilled labour households) so long as the short run is the period of interest. In the long 
run, however, it is highly unlikely for any household, irrespective of the skill type and industry 
affi  liation, to benefi t from protectionism. Trade liberalization has therefore, a potential role in 
enhancing welfare in the long run.
Results for the other control variables are also of interest. Household welfare correlates 
positively and signifi cantly with land value. As expected, household size correlates negatively and 
signifi cantly with welfare. Th e education variables show the expected pattern. All the estimated 
coeffi  cients are positive and statistically signifi cant, indicating that, other things being equal, all 
levels of education (relative to no education) of the household head improve welfare. It turns 
out that the returns to having progressively higher education are larger. Th e strong positive eff ect 
of education on welfare increases with the level of completed education of the household head. 
Th e incremental gain in welfare is smallest for households with heads with basic education 
and largest for graduate-headed households. Note that the eff ects of post-basic education (i.e., 
secondary, post-secondary and tertiary) are quantitatively the largest of all included explanatory 
variables. Hence, education emerges as the fundamental household characteristic determining 
the probability that a household experiences a reduction in welfare, ceteris paribus.
6. Further Robustness Checks
To verify our main fi ndings, we now turn to a number of robustness checks. Our fi rst check was to 
take seriously the measurement error problem raised in the pseudo-panel literature and reviewed 
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in Section 4.1. We are interested in fi nding out whether the results are sensitive to the construction 
of the pseudo-panel. With an average cell size of 52 we may worry that the measurement error 
problem could be an issue in the results in Table 5. However, since the main conclusions in this 
chapter are based on Table 6 in which the regressions are based on the underlying micro data 
(not on cell means), we can safely ignore the measurement error problem. Nevertheless, we 
follow most researchers in this fi eld (upon the advice of Verbeek and Nijman, 1993) and divide 
the sample into a smaller number of cohorts to ensure that observations per cell are reasonably 
large. To do this, we construct a new pseudo-panel by taking 10-year generation bands while 
maintaining the regional (10) and gender (2) categories34. Cohorts are defi ned by the interaction 
of four age intervals (GLSS 1991/92: 18-27, 28-37, 38-47 and 48-57; GLSS 1998/99: 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54 and 55-64), two gender categories (male and female) of head and 10 geographic 
regions (see Table A5 in the Appendix for details). For example, the fi rst cohort here is aged 
18-27 in 1991/92 and 25-34 in 1998/99. By so doing, the average number of observations per 
cell increases to 104 at the expense of a relatively small total number of observations (a potential 
of 160 but 148 realized). Tables B3 to B5 in the Appendix replicate all the regressions in Tables 
5 and 6 using this new data. In all cases, we fi nd that cohort selection issues are not driving 
the results. Our results remain largely unaltered. Both the signs and statistical signifi cance of 
the coeffi  cients are preserved in most cases. Th us the model parameters are robust in that they 
show little sensitivity to changes in the data construction. We still fi nd convincing evidence of a 
positive and statistically signifi cant correlation between tariff s and welfare which is contingent 
on skill (human capital). In fact, the orders of magnitude of the estimated tariff  coeffi  cient have 
actually become larger.
 Next, we used the estimator proposed by Verbeek and Vella (2005) as a robustness check on 
using Moffi  t’s version of estimating dynamic models from RCS. Our aim is to check if failure 
to instrument Tariff  and the lag of the dependent variable as the authors suggest aff ected the 
estimated parameters. In eff ect, we relax the assumption that the (predicted) lagged dependent 
variable is uncorrelated with the prediction error. Essentially, we estimated (19) using standard 
IV methods with cohort dummies interacted with time dummies, serving as instruments for both 
lagged welfare and tariff s. Th e results are presented in Table B6 in the Appendix. We found no 
big diff erence in the estimated coeffi  cients. In other words, we did not have any major changes in 
signifi cance or signs of the estimated coeffi  cients in Table 6. In fact, the estimated coeffi  cients on 
tariff s and the interaction term becomes stronger and both are signifi cant at the 1 percent level. 
Hence, our results are not driven by model specifi cation and the choice of estimator.
 We also test for the joint signifi cance of the industry fi xed eff ects. Th e null hypothesis of the 
joint insignifi cance of the industry fi xed eff ects (i.e., that each of the coeffi  cients for the industry 
34  Th e choice of 10-year intervals is essentially arbitrary, but meets the requirements for the cell sizes to be 
reasonably large (on average) so that the measurement error problem discussed previously is negligible.
98
Chapter  5
dummies is not signifi cantly diff erent from zero) is safely rejected for all relevant specifi cations. 
Th e specifi cations controlling for unobserved industry heterogeneity are thus retained as our 
preferred models. Th e fi t of the models is good, with R2 ranging from 0.32 to 0.74. With only a 
few exceptions, the signs on the parameters are as expected, and the relative magnitudes of the 
parameters are reasonable.
7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented one of the fi rst direct microeconometric studies of the impact 
of trade protection on household income in Ghana. We matched tariff  measures at the two-
digit ISIC level to household survey data for 1991/92 and 1998/99 to represent the tariff  for 
the industry in which the household head is employed. We examined the possibility that the 
eff ect of protection on income might not be uniform across households characterized by diff erent 
education (skill) levels. We have presented both descriptive and econometric evidence to show that 
trade policy reforms in Ghana during the 1990s could have resulted in increases in poverty among 
certain sections of the population, especially the rural unskilled-labour households. Unskilled 
households, predominantly employed in agriculture, would experience the largest increases in 
poverty. Th is is consistent with the observations made by Aryeetey and McKay (2004) that the 
poorest of the poor participated much less in the growth and poverty reduction over this period.
In the econometric section of this chapter, we regressed the living standards indicator, 
consumption per equivalent adult, on household-specifi c demographic characteristics, tariff s and 
industry indicators. In particular, we allowed the relationship between welfare and trade policy 
to diff er for households with diff erent levels of education. Th e econometric results confi rmed our 
previous descriptive fi ndings and suggest that higher tariff s are associated with higher incomes 
for households employed in the sector, implying that some of the economic rents are shared 
with labour, so that liberalisation could reduce incomes and potentially increase poverty, at least 
in the short run, but with diff ering eff ects across skill groups. We fi nd that the positive eff ect of 
protection is disproportionately greater for low-skilled labour households, suggesting an erosion 
of welfare of unskilled-labour households would result from trade liberalization. In the short 
run, all households regardless of skill type would have lost out from trade liberalization, but 
the poor unskilled households (because they are sector-specifi c and less mobile) would lose 
disproportionately. Th e results suggest that within the same sector, a trade reform may lead to 
diff ering impacts on households with similar attributes but diff erent skills. Moreover, education 
emerge as the fundamental household characteristic determining the probability that a household 
experiences poverty, ceteris paribus. From a policy standpoint, we conclude that contemplating 
trade liberalization without recognizing the complementary role of human capital investment 
may be a sub-optimal policy for the poor, at least in the short run.
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APPENDIX A: Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Inter-Industry Trade Protection (Liberalisation) during the 1990s
Industry Classifi cation (26) Tariff (%) Tariff Change (%)
1992/93 1999/00
Traded Sectors (19)
Agric, Forestry and Fishing (3) of which
 Agriculture Crop & Livestock 23.2 19.44 -16.18
 Forestry & Logging 24.77 20 -19.27
 Fishing 20.34 13.97 -31.36
 Average (unweighted) 22.77 17.8 -22.27
Manufacturing (14) of which
 Food 18.94 24.94 31.63
 Beverages 20.45 21.43 4.76
 Furniture 19.73 27.84 41.1
 Electrical 12.63 10.86 -14.08
 Metals 7.89 11.03 39.83
 Chemicals 10.61 12.08 13.84
 Plastics 14.39 17.17 19.34
 Footwear 19 20 5.26
 Textiles 21.35 23.04 7.93
 Wood 18 16.89 -6.16
 Apparel 24.44 22.22 -9.09
 Printing 20 23.33 16.67
 Rubber 10 10 0
 Other manufacturing 11.21 13.76 22.75
 Average (unweighted) 16.33 18.19 12.41
Mining & Quarrying 9.77 11.64 19.14
Utilities 12.14 10.71 -11.76
Source: Authors’ calculations using SITC 2-digit level tariff  data from the (UNCTAD) TRAINS Database.
Note: Th e other seven Non-traded sectors including Trading, Construction, Restaurant & hotel, Transport & communication, 
Financial services, Other services and Community & social care were all assigned a tariff  of zero.
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Table A2: Industry Employment Shares by Skill Levels
1991/92 1998/99 1991/92 1998/99
Industry Name Share of different skill 
levels in industry















Agriculture Crop & 
Livestock
0.982 0.014 0.004 0.969 0.022 0.010 0.481 0.486
Forestry & Logging 0.903 0.065 0.032 0.833 0.056 0.111 0.009 0.004
Fishing 0.960 0.000 0.040 0.988 0.000 0.012 0.015 0.018
Food 0.983 0.017 0.000 0.967 0.016 0.016 0.035 0.041
Beverages 0.957 0.000 0.043 0.903 0.065 0.032 0.007 0.007
Furniture 0.885 0.038 0.077 0.895 0.053 0.053 0.008 0.008
Electrical 0.667 0.000 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Metals 0.889 0.111 0.000 0.810 0.143 0.048 0.005 0.005
Chemicals 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.001 0.000
Plastics 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.001 0.001
Footwear 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.818 0.182 0.000 0.001 0.002
Textiles 0.800 0.200 0.000 0.679 0.214 0.107 0.006 0.006
Wood 0.833 0.000 0.167 0.826 0.087 0.087 0.002 0.005
Apparel 0.944 0.037 0.019 0.882 0.082 0.035 0.016 0.019
Printing 0.571 0.429 0.000 0.545 0.273 0.182 0.002 0.002
Rubber 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.730 0.135 0.135 0.006 0.008
Other Manufacturing 0.968 0.000 0.032 0.769 0.154 0.077 0.009 0.012
Mining & Quarrying 0.636 0.273 0.091 0.733 0.133 0.133 0.003 0.003
Utilities 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.001 0.000
Trading 0.931 0.063 0.006 0.877 0.085 0.038 0.142 0.147
Construction 0.931 0.056 0.014 0.793 0.103 0.103 0.021 0.026
Restaurants & Hotels 0.955 0.000 0.045 0.889 0.056 0.056 0.007 0.004
Transport & Communica-
tion
0.879 0.093 0.029 0.800 0.103 0.097 0.042 0.039
Financial Services 0.357 0.429 0.214 0.286 0.457 0.257 0.004 0.008
Other Services 0.796 0.122 0.082 0.632 0.211 0.158 0.015 0.013
Community & Social 0.632 0.163 0.206 0.540 0.138 0.322 0.160 0.134
Total 0.900 0.057 0.043 0.863 0.066 0.072 1.000 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS surveys. Th ese are the 26/68 sectors for which we successfully matched households by the main 
employment of head.
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Figure A1: Th e Pattern of Trade Protection in Ghana during the 1990s
Note: Th ese are all the 19 tradable sectors in our data. Th ere are seven non-traded sectors with tariff s coded as zero.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1980s most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), under the auspices of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
have departed from inward-looking protectionist development strategies, as a reaction to the 
disappointment of previous import-substitution industrialization policies. Trade policy reforms – tariff  
reduction and removal of non-tariff  barriers - were an important element of SAPs. Th ere is by now 
a rapidly growing literature on the impact of trade liberalization on productivity levels and growth 
in the manufacturing sectors of developing countries. Th e conventional theoretical argument is that 
trade liberalization would lead to signifi cant gains in productivity. However, the theoretical literature 
has not yielded a defi nite prediction on the direction of causality (see Rodrik, 1988, 1992, and Tybout 
1992). Supporters of trade liberalization claim that liberalization will raise productivity through at 
least two pathways. First, increased foreign competitive pressure faced by domestic producers from 
import competition can result in higher productivity supposing the producers eliminate slack, cut 
costs and use inputs more effi  ciently to remain competitive. Th is eff ect is referred to in the literature 
as the elimination of ‘X-ineffi  ciency’ among fi rms in import-competing industries (Fenandes, 2003, 
2007). A process of selection is expected to occur following trade liberalization during which the most 
productive fi rms survive and thrive while the ineffi  cient ones exit. As a result, the average productivity 
across fi rms increases (Melitz, 2003). Secondly, trade liberalization may result in productivity gains 
through more access to foreign technology (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Th is may occur through 
the importation of capital goods and intermediate inputs embodying technologies previously 
unavailable to the domestic fi rms. Also, trade liberalization may increase productivity through 
technology diff usion by allowing domestic producers to learn from imported fi nished goods as well 
as from exporting.
Given the apparent ambiguity in the theoretical literature summarized above, the relationship 
between trade liberalization and productivity appears an empirical matter. However, the available 
empirical evidence on the issue has been far from conclusive.35 Unlike other regions, there exists 
a paucity of empirical research on how trade reforms have impacted fi rm performance in SSA. 
35 In recent year in particular, considerable attempts have been made to investigate the channels through which trade liberalisation 
affects fi rm productivity in developing countries. Good examples are the studies of Pavcnik (2002), Topalova (2004), Amiti and 
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Th is is in part due to the non-availability of reliable fi rm-level panel data. In this chapter, we 
match manufacturing fi rm-level panel data with commodity-level disaggregated data on import 
tariff s to examine the eff ects of trade liberalization on fi rm performance in one of Africa’s most 
devout reformers: Ghana – Africa’s sometime adjustment star pupil. We investigate the eff ects 
of import tariff  reductions on total factor productivity (TFP) of Ghanaian manufacturing fi rms 
over the period 1993-2002.
Th e results from the chapter contribute to the ongoing theoretical and empirical debate on trade 
openness, productivity and growth. We fi nd relatively large positive eff ects of tariff  reductions on 
total factor productivity, a result that is robust to various alterations of the base model, including 
treating tariff s as endogenous and employing diff erent estimation techniques. We note that these 
eff ects seem consistent with the hypothesis that trade liberalization has increased productivity 
in the domestic market. Th ese results indicate that fi rms that are overprotected, as illustrated 
by high import tariff s pertaining to the industries in which they operate, have a lower level of 
TFP than fi rms that are exposed to competition. We fi nd also a strong eff ect of export intensity 
on productivity, both on its own and in conjunction with lower tariff s. Exporters appear to take 
more advantage of foreign competition than non-exporters and appear more sensitive to tariff s.
Th e remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background 
information on trade policy reforms and manufacturing performance in Ghana. Section 3 presents 
our empirical approach to productivity measurement and the examination of how trade policy 
aff ects measured productivity. Section 4 discusses the data used in the econometric analysis. Th e 
results are summarized in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background: Trade Policy Reforms and Manufacturing    
 Performance
a. Trade policy reform in Ghana
Prior to gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Ghana operated a liberal external 
payments regime. Th is was followed after independence by the pursuit of an import- substitution 
industrialisation strategy by Ghana’s fi rst president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. However, following 
years of economic stagnation during the 1960s and 70s, the then president, J.J. Rawlings, had no 
choice than to agree to the World Bank/IMF prescribed economic recovery programme (ERP) 
in April 1983. Indeed, Ghana was categorized as a relatively successful adjuster for implementing 
what came to be called the Structural Adjustment Programme. Th ese reforms, which were aimed 
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at removing distortions in the economy, included trade and exchange rate liberalization. Trade 
policy under the programme included tariff  adjustments, import liberalization, liberalization of 
foreign exchange, deregulation of domestic market prices and controls and institutional reforms 
that particularly aff ected revenue-generating bodies such as the Customs, Excise and Preventive 
Service (CEPS).
In the last fi ve decades, Ghana’s trade policy has evolved from a fairly liberal one in the 
1950s through a signifi cantly controlled regime in the 1970s to the priod in which the economy 
underwent major trade and economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s followed by the liberalised 
trade regime currently in place. Signifi cant trade liberalization began with the adjustment of 
tariff  rates in 1983, downwards from 35 percent, 60 percent and 100 percent to 10 percent, 20 
percent, 25 percent and 30 percent. Tariff s were further simplifi ed and lowered to 0 percent, 25 
percent and 30 percent the following year to create a uniform pattern of protection although 
some import controls remained in place. Further reductions occurred in 1986 when the higher 
rates were lowered to 20-25 percent. Between 1987 and 1991 further changes were made to 
the tariff  structure. Th e tariff  on luxury goods was lowered in 1988 but this was replaced with a 
super sales tax in 1990 which ranged from 50 percent to 500 percent. Imports of fruits such as 
bananas, plantain, pineapples and guavas were subject to a tax of 500 percent while vegetables 
such as onions, potatoes and beans were subject to an import tax of 100 percent. However, this 
was reduced to the range of 10 to 100 percent in 1991.
Further liberalisation occurred with the lowering of the import tax rate on raw materials and 
capital goods by 5 percentage points in 1990. Th e sales tax on imported basic consumer goods 
was also reduced between 1989 and 1994. However protective duty rates were introduced for 
specifi ed goods in 1990 and in 1994 to help some import-substituting industries such as those 
producing vegetable oil and soap, which were being subjected to intense competition. In 1994 
import duties on all goods which were imported under exemption were raised to 10 percent and 
goods classifi ed as standard saw an increase from 20 percent to 25 percent. With all the reforms 
in the 1990s, Ghana’s simple average tariff  fell to 13 percent in January 2000 from a high of 17 
percent in 1992. However, in April 2000 a ‘special import tax’ of 20 percent was re-introduced 
covering some 7 percent of tariff  lines. Th is raised the tariff  on many consumer goods to 40 
percent - well above the previous rate of 25 percent and consequently raised the average tariff  
to 14.7 percent. In 2002, the ‘special import tax’ was abolished in an eff ort to bring the tariff  
structure into harmony with ECOWAS and WTO provisions. Ghana’s current tariff  structure 
comprises four bands of 0, 5, 10 and 20 percent. Finished/consumer goods attract the highest 
rate of 20 percent while raw materials and intermediate goods are either zero-rated or attract 
a tariff  of 10 percent. Th is applies to all goods except for some petroleum products which face 
specifi c tariff s. Th e average applied tariff  is now 12.7 percent, down from 14.7 percent in 2000.
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b. Ghana’s manufacturing sector
Th e Ghanaian manufacturing sector has undergone tremendous changes and has been subjected 
to various policy prescriptions since independence in an attempt to make it the engine of 
growth and economic prosperity. At independence, Ghana had a relatively underdeveloped and 
very narrow manufacturing sector accounting for only 0.8 percent of GDP. Under an import-
substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy, the manufacturing sector between the early 1960s 
and the early 1970s saw tremendous changes, with the state taking an important and growing 
role in the process. According to Steel (1972), by 1962 state-owned fi rms were producing about 
12 percent of manufacturing output and this increased to about 20 percent in 1966. At the 
beginning of the 1970s the ISI strategy had begun to fail and by 1983, the sector was in a bad 
shape with negative growth rates.
Th e ERP, initiated in 1983 to get the Ghanaian economy out of its predicament, seems to 
have had a mixed impact on the manufacturing sector. Th e reform eff ort in Ghana which begun 
in 1983 sought to arrest and reverse the economic turmoil of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 
Industrial strategy over this period shifted from an import-substitution and over-protected 
strategy to an outward-oriented, less protected or liberalized strategy. Th e liberalized strategy 
emphasized two main areas: fi rst, the development of a more internationally competitive 
industrial sector with emphasis on local resource-based industries with the capacity for increased 
exports and effi  cient import substitution and secondly, the introduction of measures that would 
attract entrepreneurs and investors, into all major sub-sectors, with special emphasis on the 
development of appropriate technologies in small- and medium-scale manufacturing industries 
(Asante and Addo, 1997).
Th e manufacturing sector initially responded positively to the various policy measures adopted 
under the reforms after several years of continuous decline. Th e period following the introduction 
of the ERP also saw the emergence of a new crop of dynamic entrepreneurs. Th is culminated in 
increased growth in manufacturing output to an average of about 5 percent per annum between 
1984 and 1987 (Figure 1). Indeed, one of the initial benefi ts of liberalization that accrued to 
Ghana’s manufacturing sector was the improved utilization of installed capacity. Th is was a 
direct result of foreign exchange reforms that were pursued as part of the adjustment process. 
Exchange rate liberalization in Ghana initially eased foreign exchange pressures that had built 
up during the early 1960s to late 1970s. Th e reduced foreign exchange pressure made available 
and accessible the foreign exchange required to import the needed inputs (i.e. raw materials, 
equipment, spare parts etc.) for effi  cient and eff ective utilization of the installed capacity of many 
import-competing industries.
On the other hand, other manufacturing industries such as textiles, garments and electrical 
did not perform well because of stiff  competition from imports. In 1988, the growth rate of the 
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industrial sector and the manufacturing sub-sector started slowing down. In the late 1990s, the 
performance of the manufacturing sub-sector was mixed with an annual average growth rate 
of 4.5 percent from 1995 to 2000 (Figure 1). During the latter part of the 1990s, the decline 
in the manufacturing sub-sector’s growth rate was attributed to the increase in crude oil prices, 
high domestic interest rates, signifi cant depreciation in the value of the cedi and the domestic 
energy crisis that hit the economy in 1998. In addition, manufacturing industries in the textile 
and garments sub-sectors experienced substantial declines in output as a result of the intense 
competition that they were exposed to from cheaper imports. Th e decade 1995-2004 saw the 
manufacturing sector growing at 4.4 percent on average.
Figure 1: Growth in Industry and Manufacturing , 1983-2002 (%)
 Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, GSS
3. Econometric Analysis
Our baseline specifi cation is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function which links output 
with inputs and the fi rm’s productivity as follows:
    ijt m ijt l ijt k ijt ijt ijty m l k wβ β β η= + + + +        (1)
where ijty  denotes log real output, ijtm is log intermediate materials, ijtk  is log physical capital, 
ijtl  is log employment, ijtw  is total factor productivity (TFP), ijtη  is a random disturbance, mβ , lβ
, and kβ  are input elasticities, and , ,i j t  denote fi rm, sector and time, respectively. If we assume 
that the share of intermediate input in output is constant, the output production function can be 
rewritten as a value-added specifi cation. We report results for both specifi cations below.
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Firm productivity is an unobservable fi rm characteristic, which can be recovered from estimating 
the production function (1) using actual input quantities. Th e basic problem in estimating (1) 
is that the input variables are in general correlated with the unobserved productivity shock, 
ijtw  but might not be observed by the econometrician, leading to the well-known simultaneity 
problem in production function estimation.36 Several solutions have been proposed to address this 
econometric problem. In the most recent best-practices, fi rm-level TFP is calculated following 
the innovations espoused by Olley and Pakes (1996) that correct the simultaneity bias arising 
from the fact that fi rms choose their levels of input once they know their levels of productivity.37 
Th e method also corrects the selection bias induced by the fact that fi rms choose to stay or exit 
the market depending on their levels of productivity, which in turn depend on the levels of 
their fi xed factor input, namely capital stock. Th e authors propose to overcome the simultaneity 
problem by using the fi rm’s investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks.
Other best-practice methods such as the within-group and GMM-type estimators (e.g., 
Arellano and Bond, 1991) have also been extensively employed to correct for simultaneity biases 
but it is believed that (if properly done) the Olley-Pakes estimator has several advantages as it 
does not assume that the fi rm-specifi c productivity component ijtw  “reduces to a ‘fi xed’ (over time) 
fi rm eff ect………..and hence is a less costly solution to the omitted variable and/or simultaneity 
problem” (Frazer, 2005:592).38 Th e problem with the Olley-Pakes estimator is that the procedure 
requires strictly positive investment, meaning that all observations with zero investment have 
to be dropped from the data. Th is condition may imply a considerable drop in the number of 
observations because often, fi rms do not have positive investment in every year.39 More recently, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose an estimation methodology that corrects the simultaneity 
bias using intermediate input expenditures, such as material inputs, as a proxy. Th is is especially 
useful as there are many fi rm-level datasets containing signifi cantly less zeroobservations in 
intermediate inputs than in fi rm-level investment.
36 There are problems with estimating equation (2) with OLS; the method could be biased and would yield biased estimates of 
TFP if it turns out that the productivity shock in (2) is not orthogonal to the factor inputs as is implicit in OLS. See Marschak 
and Andrews (1944); Olley and Pakes (1996); Griliches and Mairesse (1998); and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
37 For example, if more productive fi rms are more likely to hire more workers and invest more capital due to higher current and 
anticipated future profi tability, estimation methods such as OLS will not be consistent and thereby result in biased coeffi cient 
estimates; the estimated input coeffi cients would be higher than their true values.
38 Others have raised doubts about the appropriateness of the estimator’s ” internal” instruments (past levels for current 
differences and past differences for current levels) as they are likely to possess little resolving power (see Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1998).
39 For example, in the specifi c case of the data set under examination, about 32 percent of observations has zero investment 
while a further 44 percent has “missing” investment and therefore much information would be lost in dropping these 
observations, as required by the Olley-Pakes technique.
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For a start, we follow Bigsten, Gebreeyesus and Söderbom (2009) and Dovis and Milgram-
Baleix (2009) and use the “direct approach” to estimating production functions to estimate 
(1). To account for the simultaneity of input choices and unobserved productivity, we use the 
System-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). We use twice lagged inputs and output as 
instruments in the diff erenced equation and lagged fi rst-diff erences of inputs are instruments in 
the level equation. For comparison, we also estimated (1) with OLS and Fixed-eff ects estimators. 
Th e results of these regressions are reported in Tables 4 and 5. To assess the robustness of the 
fi ndings, we apply a methodology that is similar to the one used by Dovis and Milgram-Baleix 
(2009), Fernandes (2007), Amiti and Konings (2007), Topalova (2004), and Pavcnik (2002) 
to study the correlation between total factor productivity and tariff s --- a two-step estimation 
procedure as proposed by Olley and Pakes. Since the Levinsohn-Petrin technique imposes less 
stringent data requirements than the Olley-Pakes approach, we follow several recent studies by 
choosing to adopt the former for the estimations in this chapter.40
In the fi rst step, we estimate the production function (1) to obtain a measure of total factor 
productivity. We use the Levinsohn-Petrin method to estimate (1) to correct for the presence of 
selection and simultaneity biases in the input coeffi  cients required to construct the measure of 
TFP.41 In the second stage, we relate TFP to 3-digit industry tariff s and a set of fi rm characteristics 
believed to explain fi rm productivity. To explain TFP at the fi rm level, we use the following 
framework:
0 1 1ijt ijt ijt jt t j ij ijtTFP TFP X Tα α β θ τ γ δ ε− ′= + + + + + + +      (2)
where ijtTFP  is total factor productivity at the fi rm level, ijtX  is a vector of fi rm characteristics, 
jtT is the tariff  variable, tτ is a time-specifi c eff ect which takes into account macroeconomic 
shocks common to all fi rms, jγ is a sector-level fi xed eff ect, ijδ is a fi rm-level fi xed eff ect, ijtε
is unobserved time varying productivity, and ,α  β  and θ  are parameters to be estimated. We 
use the System-GMM method proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to deal with the possible 
endogeneity of observable fi rm characteristics. Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using 
the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments under the assumptions 
that there is no serial correlation in the error term ijtε  and the right-hand side variables. Th us, 
the GMM estimation procedure simultaneously addresses the problems of correlation and 
endogeneity. Th e consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption 
that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. By 
construction, the test for the null hypothesis of no fi rst-order serial correlation should be rejected 
40 See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for further details on the methodology. We implement this procedure using the “levpet” 
command in STATA, which was written by Levinsohn, Petrin and Brian Poi (2004).
41 The coeffi cients of the variable and fi xed factor inputs are estimated at this stage. The dependent variable we use is value 
added (rather than gross revenue) and the GMM estimator is used.
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under the identifying assumption that the error is not serially correlated; but the test for the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, should not be rejected. We use two diagnostics 
tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions, and whether the diff erenced residuals are second-order serially 
correlated. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests gives support to our model. We 
also control for unobservable characteristics that may explain current intra-fi rm productivity 
by taking into account the lagged value of TFP. Th e results from this estimation procedure are 
reported in Table 6.
4. Data Description
Th e data that is used in this chapter is from the World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise 
Development (RPED) dataset. Th e data is available from the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies at Oxford University. It is a panel survey of Ghanaian manufacturing fi rms covering 
the period from 1991 to 2002 and includes value of gross production, wage bill, number of 
employees, value of total raw materials, energy expenses, 4-digit industry dummies, value of 
fi xed assets, and investment among other variables. We focus on the 1993-2002 period, since 
data on import tariff s are available only after 1992 for most of the fi rms. Box 1 provides more 
information about the data while Table A1 in the Appendix gives the defi nitions of all variables 
used in the analyses. Th e fi rm-level data is matched with commodity-level disaggregated data 
on import tariff s to examine the eff ects of trade liberalization on fi rm performance during the 
1993-2002 period. Th is period is characterised by Ghana’s increasing openness to trade; the 
signifi cant phase of trade liberalisation in Ghana was undertaken during the 1980s, while the 
process to dismantle trade barriers in the framework of adhesion to WTO and ECOWAS 
protocols concluded in the early 2000s.
Table 1 shows total real output, real value added and real inputs from 1993 to 2002. A large 
degree of fi rm heterogeneity is found in inputs and outputs. Both real total output and real value 
added increased by more than twice over the period. Real output per worker and real value added 
per worker also increased by 17 percent and 55 percent respectively over this period, suggesting 
that Ghana experienced a high productivity gain. Th e productivity gains seem to have refl ected in 
fi rms becoming relatively more capital intensive – real mean capital stock increased by more than 
150 percent while employment increased by about 45 percent over the decade. Tariff s declined 
from an average of 20 percent in 1993 to 17 percent in 2002 while imports increased by just 5 
percent during the period. Tariff s for 1993 and 2002 by industry are displayed in Table 2. For 
the period under study, Ghanaian MFN tariff s diminished slightly in all industries except for 
chemical products which remained at the same level.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1993 2002 % Change
Value Added 5,720 12,900 126
Output/Worker 182 212 17
Value added/Worker 60 93 55
Capital Stock 11,600 29,500 154
Employment 46 67 45
Intermediate Input 5,900 8,690 47
Tariff 20 17 13
Imports 1,460 1,528 5
Source: Authors’ calculations from RPED data.
Note: Output, value added, intermediate input and capital stock in real Ghana cedis.
Table 2: Nominal MFN Tariff s and Imports
Tariff (%) Imports (000$)
Manufacture of: 1993 2002 1993 2002
Textile & Apparel 22 19 998 619
Wood & Wood products 24 19 111 114
Basic metals 20 17 1,897 1,433
Machinery & Equipment 23 16 2,784 2,369
Chemicals 19 19 1,697 1,668
Food & Beverages 13 12 2,156 2,893
Average 20 17 1,460 1,528
Source: Tariff  data are obtained from Ghana’s Ministry of Trade; import data are from WITS
5. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of the estimation procedure described in Section 3, as well 
as results from OLS and fi rm fi xed-eff ects. Table 4 reports results obtained from estimating a 
direct production function with real total output as the dependent variable. Th e productivity of 
a fi rm is determined by a set of regressors that may explain heterogeneity of fi rm performance. 
Th ese include fi rm characteristics as well as the characteristics of the external environment in 
which the fi rm operates that can aff ect performance. Table 4 presents fi ve diff erent specifi cations 
of the determinants of fi rm productivity. Th e fi rst and second columns present results from 
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the estimation of the production function (1) by OLS and fi rm fi xed-eff ects respectively. We 
introduced our trade policy measure, tariff , as an additional variable to test the correlation between 
trade protection and fi rm productivity. Specifi cation 3 expands the base model with additional 
covariates and estimation is done by the SYS-GMM to deal with the potential endogeneity of 
the input variables and tariff s. If more employees are hired and more raw materials are consumed 
in periods of high productivity, OLS estimates of inputs’ coeffi  cients would be upwardly biased. 
In all specifi cations, we treat the input variables as endogenous using the lagged levels dated t−2 
and before as instruments for the fi rst-diff erenced equations and the lagged fi rst-diff erences as 
instruments for the levels equations.
Next, we investigate if our results are robust to treating the tariff  variable as endogenous. It is 
conceivable that the policy maker may increase trade protection in response to lobbying pressures 
from fi rms in industries with lower productivity.42 In such a case, tariff s become endogenous and 
one needs to resort to instrumental variable regressions to get consistent estimates for the tariff  
coeffi  cient. In specifi cation 4, we replace the contemporaneous tariff s with lagged tariff s as a way 
of partly mitigating the potential bias. Th en, in specifi cation 5, we address the problem directly 
by estimating a specifi cation where tariff s are instrumented by the Blundel and Bond procedure 
using the lagged levels dated t−2 and before as instruments for the fi rst-diff erenced equations. 
For the levels equations we use the lagged fi rst-diff erences as instruments. Th e validity of the 
instruments is checked by the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. Th e estimated models 
also satisfy the absence of second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. In all cases, the m2 test 
does not indicate problems with the specifi cation or validity of instruments.
Th e combined results from Table 4 confi rm our a priori expectations. Th e inputs’ coeffi  cients 
are precisely estimated at the 1 percent confi dence level. Th e export share and fi rm age variable 
are included in the estimations because exporters and older fi rms are generally expected to be 
relatively more productive than average. Th e export share has a positive and signifi cant impact 
even at the 1 per cent level. Th is is in line with the vast literature, which has shown that exporters 
are typically more productive than non-exporters (see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, for a survey). 
Firm age also has a positive sign, indicating that fi rms that have operated in Ghana for a longer 
have higher productivity, compared to those that have been around for just a while. Concerning 
the eff ect of trade policy, the results provide robust evidence that indicate a large, negative and 
statistically signifi cant eff ect of tariff s on productivity, suggesting that trade liberalization may 
have increased productivity in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector.
42 Jones et al (2008) argue that such political economy mechanisms have played a limited role in explaining the pattern of 
protection and tariff reform in Africa during the 1990s. In that case, it would seem reasonable to argue that trade policy 
reforms were essentially exogenous.
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Table 3: Tariff s and Firm-level Productivity – Output Regressions
OLS Fixed-Effects SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM




Employment 0.231*** 0.177*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.117***
(0.0154) (0.0246) (0.00376) (0.00312) (0.00382)
Capital Stock 0.0938*** 0.00529 0.0982*** 0.0977*** 0.100***
(0.00661) (0.0222) (0.00217) (0.00272) (0.00185)
Raw Materials 0.756*** 0.699*** 0.458*** 0.454*** 0.470***
(0.00837) -0.0112 (0.00204) (0.00131) (0.00176)
Tariff -0.104*** 0.00843 -0.152*** -0.0955***




Export Share 0.00156*** 0.00164*** 0.00129***
(0.000112) (0.00012) (0.00009)
Firm Age 0.00445*** 0.00443*** 0.00399***
(0.000215) (0.00022) (0.00025)
Accra 0.151*** 0.141*** 0.151***
(0.00799) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Kumasi 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.162***
(0.00866) (0.00935) (0.00911)
Takoradi 0.0679*** 0.0494*** 0.0621***
(0.0105) (0.0124) (0.0113)
Constant 2.354*** 5.138*** 1.227*** 1.344*** 1.304***
(0.117) (0.399) (0.0339) (0.0309) (0.0367)
Year Effects  yes  yes yes yes yes
Observations  1,539  1,539 1,255 1,255 1,255
R-squared  0.97  0.79
m2 0.793 0.819 0.759
Sargan 0.410 0.286 0.473
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Notes:
1. Dependent variable is log real output. All inputs and tariff  are in logs.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Signifi cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
3. Th e Sargan test is for the validity of the set of instruments.
4. Th e test for 2nd (m2) - order serial correlation is asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables (see Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). Th e p-values report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation, where the 
fi rst diff erencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the time-varying component of the error term in levels is a 
serially uncorrelated disturbance.
Table 5 presents results for the value added (rather than output) specifi cation of equation 
(1). Th e resulting tariff  eff ects are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4. In both tables, most 
parameter estimates take on values within reasonable ranges, when compared to other productivity 
studies for African countries. In specifi cation 6, we estimate an alternative specifi cation allowing 
for a non-linear relation between productivity and export intensity. We hypothesize that the 
eff ect of trade policy on productivity may diff er according to the degree of export intensity of 
the fi rm. Exporting fi rms may benefi t more from trade liberalization as they are more subject to 
foreign competition (in foreign markets) and may be more exposed to advanced technologies. 
We test this hypothesis by introducing an interaction between tariff s and the export-to-output 
variables to allow productivity responses to vary between exporting and non-exporting fi rms. We 
are assuming that the productivity responses to trade liberalization may depend on the mode 
of globalization of the fi rm. Th e results of this estimation reported in column 6 confi rm the 
previous fi nding of a negative and statistically signifi cant coeffi  cient on tariff , suggesting that in 
general, a cut in tariff s increases productivity. Th e results further indicate a strong eff ect of export 
intensity on productivity, both on its own and in conjunction with lower tariff s. Th e coeffi  cient 
on the interactive term is negative and statistically signifi cant, suggesting that greater openness is 
likely to be associated with signifi cantly higher productivity for exporting fi rms. Th is means that 
high exporters found in low-tariff  sectors enjoy relatively higher productivity than low exporters 
and non-exporting fi rms. Hence, further trade liberalization will increase their productivity 
disproportionately, ceteris paribus. Th ese fi ndings are generally consistent with studies that have 
documented a positive relationship between exporting and productivity in African manufacturing 
industries (Bigsten et al, 2004; Biesebroeck, 2005; Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2009).
Finally, in column 7, we introduce squared tariff  in the model in order to test for nonlinearities. 
Th e estimated coeffi  cients on both tariff s and its squared term are negative and statistically 
signifi cant, suggesting that higher tariff s are particularly adverse for productivity.
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Table 4: Tariff s and Firm-level Productivity – Value- added Regressions
OLS FE SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Value added
1t−
0.581*** 0.579*** 0.607*** 0.609*** 0.579***
(0.00919) (0.011) (0.00388) (0.00419) (0.00908)
Employment 0.887*** 0.558*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.426*** 0.392*** 0.320***
(0.0395) (0.069) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.00663) (0.00749) (0.0246)
Capital Stock 0.238*** 0.0474 0.135*** 0.130*** 0.0613*** 0.0766*** 0.149***
(0.0184) (0.0643) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.00669) (0.0074) (0.0152)
Tariff -0.763*** -0.284 -0.148*** -0.194*** -0.135*** -0.878***
(0.0992) (0.174) (0.0304) (0.00697) (0.00838) (0.129)
Export Share 0.00194** 0.00231*** 0.00153*** 0.0189*** 0.00512**












Firm Age 0.00327*** 0.00357*** 0.00291*** 0.00316*** 0.00306***
(0.00115) (0.00112) (0.000652) (0.000628) (0.00119)
Accra 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.353*** 0.361*** 0.277***
(0.0522) (0.0526) (0.016) (0.0273) (0.0506)
Kumasi 0.375*** 0.368*** 0.391*** 0.387*** 0.360***
(0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.0534)
Takoradi 0.190*** 0.195*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.133**
(0.0703) (0.071) (0.0269) (0.0417) (0.0646)
Constant 8.147*** 13.28*** 2.775*** 2.905*** 3.165*** 3.055*** 2.001***
(0.254) (1.081) (0.263) (0.242) (0.0936) (0.0955) (0.281)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry ef-
fects
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162
R-squared 0.741 0.101
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OLS FE SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
m2 0.862 0.864 0.847 0.868 0.862
Sargan 0.198 0.177 0.561 0.628 0.217
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is log real value added. All inputs and tariff  are in logs.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Signifi cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
3. Th e Sargan test is for the validity of the set of instruments.
4. Th e test for 2nd (m2) - order serial correlation is asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables (see Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). Th e p-values report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation, where the 
fi rst diff erencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the time-varying component of the error term in levels is a 
serially uncorrelated disturbance.
We now turn to the results from the two-step estimation procedure described in Section 3. Table 
6 reports the estimation results from several specifi cations where we relate TFP obtained through 
the Levinsohn and Petrin technique to 3-digit industry tariff s and a set of fi rm characteristics 
believed to explain fi rm productivity. Th e highly signifi cant coeffi  cients of the import tariff s display 
the expected signs, confi rming our previous fi ndings. Again from the relevant specifi cation, we 
fi nd that the eff ects of tariff s are higher for the fi rms that are more globalized (export a larger 
share of output). In all specifi cations, productivity increases with the age of the fi rm and the share 
of output that is exported. Th e eff ect of tariff s on fi rm productivity is always negative and precisely 
estimated at the 1 percent confi dence level or better. Tariff s are measured in fractional terms 
so a percentage point reduction in nominal tariff s changes productivity by θ percent. Th us, the 
coeffi  cient in column 5 implies that a reduction in tariff s by say 10 percentage points would result 
in an increase in fi rm productivity of about 1.2 percent. Th e results in column 7 again confi rm 
the nonlinearities in the tariff -productivity relationship. Th e estimated coeffi  cients on both tariff s 
and their squared term confi rm that higher tariff s are particularly distortionary. Th e overall results 
provide robust support for the hypothesis that fi rms operating in industries less protected from 
foreign competition exhibit higher productivity, ceteris paribus.
Table 5: Tariff s and Total Factor Productivity
VARIABLES OLS FE SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TFP 1t−
0.735*** 0.738*** 0.662*** 0.661*** 0.633***
(0.0335) (0.0343) (0.0199) (0.019) (0.00584)
Tariff -0.953*** -0.317* -0.340*** -0.125** -0.128** -0.493***
(0.108) (0.175) (0.0939) (0.0543) (0.0529) (0.06)
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VARIABLES OLS FE SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Export Share 0.00185* 0.00190* 0.00231*** 0.0142*** 0.00492***










Firm Age 0.00265 0.00224 0.00564*** 0.00572*** 0.00595***
(0.00291) (0.00294) (0.00186) (0.00183) (0.00129)
Accra 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.248*** 0.262*** 0.256***
(0.0648) (0.0638) (0.0508) (0.0573) (0.035)
Kumasi 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.278*** 0.291*** 0.265***
(0.0655) (0.0633) (0.053) (0.0577) (0.0383)
Takoradi 0.109 0.114 0.112 0.141 0.156**
(0.123) (0.122) (0.0872) (0.0875) (0.0627)
Constant 8.317*** 9.641*** 1.629*** 1.726*** 2.509*** 2.500*** 2.565***
(0.212) (0.306) (0.319) (0.311) (0.227) (0.224) (0.106)
Year Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Effects no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149
R-squared 0.066 0.049
m2 0.695 0.692 0.715 0.727 0.731
Sargan 0.490 0.606 0.599 0.713 0.384
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is ln( )itTFP from the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. All inputs and tariff  are in logs.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Signifi cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
3. Th e Sargan test is for the validity of the set of instruments.
4. Th e test for 2nd (m2) - order serial correlation is asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables (see Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). Th e p-values report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation, where the 
fi rst diff erencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the time-varying component of the error term in levels is a 
serially uncorrelated disturbance.
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6. Conclusion
Th e role of trade policy in forging economic growth and development has been an enduring 
area of research for economists since the industrial revolution of the 17th century. How does 
trade liberalization aff ect fi rm-level productivity? Th is is one of the most important questions 
in international economics, one that has generated a vast theoretical and empirical literature. 
Yet, the question remains controversial. Th is chapter empirically investigates the eff ects of 
trade liberalization on fi rm-level productivity in Ghana. We fi nd, in the case of Ghanaian 
manufacturing, that it does aff ect fi rm-level productivity. We examine Ghanaian trade policy 
from 1993 to 2002, a period during which trade liberalization alternates with increased trade 
protection in varied ways across industries, to investigate the link between trade policy and fi rm 
productivity. Using a reasonably rich panel of manufacturing fi rms, we fi nd a strong negative 
impact of nominal tariff s on fi rm productivity controlling for observed and unobserved fi rm 
characteristics and industry heterogeneity. Th e results from the chapter contribute to the ongoing 
theoretical and empirical debate on trade openness, productivity and growth. We fi nd relatively 
large positive eff ects of tariff  reductions on total factor productivity, a result that is robust to 
various alterations of the base model, including treating tariff s as endogenous and employing 
diff erent estimation techniques. We note that these eff ects seem consistent with the hypothesis 
that trade liberalization has increased productivity in the domestic market. Th ese results indicate 
that fi rms that are overprotected, as illustrated by high import tariff s pertaining to the industries 
in which they operate, have a lower level of TFP than fi rms that are exposed to competition.
We fi nd also a strong eff ect of export intensity on productivity, both on its own and in 
conjunction with lower tariff s. Exporters appear to take more advantage of foreign competition 
than non-exporters and appear more sensitive to tariff s. Th e negative impact of trade protection 
on productivity is stronger for exporting fi rms (or fi rms that export larger shares of their output) 
relative to non-exporting fi rms. Th e use of lagged tariff s and instrumental variable estimation 
techniques and the evidence on the political economy of tariff  determination in Ghana allow us 
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Appendix
Table A1: List of Variables and Defi nitions - RPED Panel Data
Variable Name Variable Description
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology
Output Real value of fi rm’s total production during previous year
Physical Capital Stock Real value of fi rm’s total physical capital stock
Intermediate Input Real value of fi rm’s raw material cost
Employment Firm’s total employment level
Firm Age Age of fi rm
Export Share Share of exports in fi rm’s total output
Tariff Nominal MFN tariff at the 3-digit level
Location A dummy for each of the following regions: Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi. The 
omitted region is Cape Coast.
Box 1: RPED Manufacturing Panel Survey
The World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise Development (RPED) survey is a comprehensive panel dataset from 
surveys of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector conducted in seven rounds between 1991 and 2002. The data was 
collected by a team from the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford, the University of 
Ghana, Legon, and the Ghana Statistical Service. The fi rst sample of fi rms was drawn randomly from the Census of 
Manufacturing Activities conducted in 1987. The fi rms were categorized based on sector and location. In total, there 
are nine sectors including textiles and garments and metal works. They were also categorized by location: Accra, Cape 
Coast, Kumasi and Takoradi, all of which constitute major industrial centres in Ghana. The coverage of this dataset is quite 
extensive as most of the major manufacturing sectors at the time under investigation are represented. When fi rms exited 
from the sample, they were replaced with fi rms of the same size category, sector, and location, so that approximately 
(but not exactly) 200 fi rms were sampled in each year. The dataset has the advantage of containing a reasonably large 
number of fi rms, by African standards, over a long period of time and information on many fi rm characteristics. The data 
collected span all major investment climate topics, ranging from infrastructure and access to fi nance to corruption and 
crime. Detailed productivity information includes fi rm fi nances, costs such as labour and materials, sales, and investment. 
For more information, including details on the sampling procedure, visit http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/
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1. Introduction
Developing countries have witnessed major macroeconomic shocks that have had signifi cant 
impact on the level of poverty and the distribution of incomes. In order to understand the 
linkages between macroeconomic shocks and their impact at the micro level, Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) models are required. CGE models are preferred to the partial 
equilibrium models because they can explain the inter linkages among the various sectors of the 
economy and the agents present in the model. Th e eff ects of trade liberalization on poverty and 
income distribution can be examined by using Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) and CGE 
models. Th e SAM is a comprehensive, disaggregated, consistent and complete data system that 
captures the interdependence that exists within a socio-economic system. CGE models have 
been widely used to simulate the impact of macroeconomic policies on income distribution 
and poverty. One can identify three types of CGE models that try to address this question. 
Th e fi rst type considers only the representative agent and provides information on inequalities 
between groups without giving any results in terms of poverty. Th is strand of literature includes 
Adelman and Robinson (1979) for Korea; Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982) and Gunning 
(1983) for Kenya; Th orbecke (1991) for Indonesia; Morrisson (1991) for Morocco; Chia, 
Wahba and Whalley (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire, and Obi (2003) for Nigeria. Th e second type 
of modelling is grounded on the previous one but includes information on intra group income 
distributions and endogenises poverty. Th is strand of literature includes de Janvry, Sadoulet and 
Fargeix (1991), Decaluwe, Patry, Savard and Th orbecke (1999); Azis and Th orbecke (2001); Aka 
(2006), and Bhasin and Annim (2005). Th e third type of modelling is based on the second type 
but endogenises both the intra-group income distribution and poverty. Th is strand of literature 
includes Cogneau and Robillard (1999), Decaluwe, Dumont and Savard (1999), and Chitiga, 
et al (2005). Th e present study uses the second type of modelling approach. However, it should 
be mentioned that this approach by itself will not be able to capture all channels by which trade 
liberalization will impact on poverty and income distribution because the model being used is a 
static model.
It is generally believed that expanded trade holds the key to prosperity for developing 
countries. According to this view, if the industrialised countries would eliminate their trade 
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countries, pulling hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. According to the World Bank 
(2002), a reduction in world barriers to trade could accelerate growth, provide stimulus to new 
forms of productivity-enhancing specialization, and lead to a more rapid pace of job creation 
and poverty reduction around the world. Weisbrot and Baker (2002) have argued that most of 
the projected gains from trade liberalization do not come from the removal of trade barriers in 
the industrialized countries . Th e biggest source of gains to developing countries is the removal 
of their own barriers to trade. In principle, these gains would be available whether or not the 
industrialized countries also followed a path of trade liberalization. Th ey also look at the reasons 
why developing countries may choose not to liberalize, in spite of the potential gains. Th e two 
most important considerations are the loss of revenue due to tariff  reductions, and the economic 
and social disruptions caused by rapid displacement of workers from agriculture. Th is raises the 
question of what type of fi scal reforms should be adopted by developing countries to liberalize 
their trade and reap the benefi ts of trade. According to Baker and Weisbrot (2001), this type of 
fi scal reform could be where the lost tariff  revenue is replaced by an increase in non-distortionary 
lump sum taxes. Th e other alternative is to fi nance trade liberalization through foreign capital 
infl ows.
Foreign capital infl ows comprise remittances from abroad, foreign aid, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio investment and commercial bank lending. Since the CGE model 
is a real model, we consider only the real components of foreign capital infl ows, e.g. foreign 
remittances, foreign aid and foreign direct investment. Th e fi nancial infl ows e.g. portfolio 
investment and commercial bank lending are not considered in the CGE model. Remittances 
from the rest of the world to households directly aff ect their incomes and can reduce poverty 
(Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993; Siddiqui and Kemal, 2002a; Taylor, Mora and Adams, 2005; 
Adams, 2005; and Bhasin and Obeng, 2006). Foreign aid can reduce poverty through its impact 
on household income via public current spending and capital expenditures (Anderson and Evia, 
2003). It is argued that a direct link between FDI and poverty reduction does not exist, while 
three indirect links are possible. First, FDI-induced increases in national income off er a potential 
benefi t to the poor. Secondly, well-developed linkages between foreign fi rms and local suppliers 
may generate employment opportunities for the poor. Th irdly, FDI may lead to higher wages. 
FDI can aff ect household income and reduce poverty through additional private and public 
investment (Siddiqui and Kemal, 2002b; and Arbenser, 2004).
Trade liberalization in Ghana was characterized by the removal of quantitative restrictions 
on the current (import licences and banned items) and capital accounts (restrictions on the 
repatriation of profi ts), simplifi cation of the tariff  structure, and lowering the level and range of 
tariff s. However, in the present study we defi ne trade liberalization as the removal of import and 
export tariff s on agricultural and industrial goods as well as the removal of restrictions on the 
capital account of the balance of payments. Moreover, the trade liberalization is unilateral and 
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partial sector-wise because only one form of trade-related tariff  on agricultural and industrial 
goods is eliminated at a point of time.
Despite the adoption of trade-related reforms and fi scal reforms in Ghana, growth has not 
accelerated and poverty remains widespread and pervasive, particularly in the rural areas. Trade 
and fi scal reforms are recognised as a potent tool for enhancing growth, redistributing income and 
reducing poverty. It is generally believed that trade liberalization is poverty alleviating in the long 
run and may be poverty enhancing in the short run. Moreover, the impact of trade liberalization 
on the poor also depends on the sectors in which trade reforms take place. Multilateral agencies 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been making their 
funding operations in developing countries conditional on the progress achieved nationally 
with respect to poverty reduction policies and trade liberalization measures. Th is requires an 
assessment and the quantifi cation of the impact of economic policies on the poor.
Trade liberalization envisages a fall in tax revenue that can be compensated by foreign savings 
or domestic savings. Foreign capital infl ows generally come to the developing countries with 
conditionality. If the developing country does not want to accept the conditional funding then it 
may have to fi nance trade liberalization through domestic resources. One of the ways is to raise 
the value-added tax (VAT) to fi nance trade liberalization. Th is chapter tries to provide answers 
to the following questions. What is the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty 
and income distribution in Ghana? Is it poverty alleviating or poverty enhancing? What is the 
contribution of trade liberalization to poverty? What is the contribution of foreign capital infl ows 
to poverty? What is the contribution of value-added tax to poverty? What is their combined 
eff ect on poverty and income distribution?
Th e basic objective of the chapter is to assess the impact of partial sector-wise trade 
liberalization on poverty and income distribution of households in Ghana. Specifi cally, this is 
achieved by considering three scenarios. Elimination of import and export tariff s on agricultural 
and industrial goods (fi nal goods as well as inputs) is considered in the fi rst scenario. In the 
second scenario, partial sector-wise trade liberalization is combined with foreign capital infl ows. 
In the third scenario, partial sector-wise trade liberalization is combined with value-added tax.
2. Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in Ghana
Import controls were introduced in Ghana through import licences and the policy of import 
controls was continued from 1961-1983. During the period 1961-69, a mixed policy was adopted 
with respect to foreign capital infl ows and as a result, Ghana was successful in attracting foreign 
direct investment and foreign aid. However, during the period 1969-83, restrictive policy was 
adopted with respect to foreign capital infl ows and as a result Ghana was not successful in 
attracting FDI and Foreign Aid. Ghana pursued a more liberalized policy on the current as 
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well as capital accounts of the balance of payments after 1983 and was successful in attracting 
foreign resources. After 1986, most of the quantitative restrictions, including import licensing, 
were eliminated along with the simplifi cation of the tariff  structure and reduction in the level 
and range of tariff s in Ghana.
Poverty in Ghana has many dimensions. Poor communities are characterised by low-income, 
malnutrition, ill health, illiteracy, and insecurity. Th ere is also a sense of powerless and isolation. 
Th ese diff erent aspects interact and keep households and communities in persistent poverty. 
Using the Ghana Living Standards Surveys data, the Ghana Statistical Service (2000) classifi ed 
the incidence, the depth, and severity of poverty into two broad groups, rural and urban. Each 
of these groups was in turn subdivided into forest, coastal and savannah regions, with the 
capital, Accra, standing alone. It also gave the contribution of ecological zones to total poverty 
in the country. Both the food energy intake and the cost of basic needs methods were used in 
determining the poverty lines in the construction of the poverty profi le. Upper and lower poverty 
lines were set, with the lower line as the extreme or critical poverty line. A comparison was also 
made between poverty in 1991/92 and 1998/99. Th e overall trend in poverty during the 1990s 
broadly favourable in Ghana. Taking the upper poverty line of GHc 90, the percentage of the 
Ghanaian population defi ned as poor fell from almost 52 percent in 1991-92 to just fewer than 
40percent in 1998-99. At the national level, the incidence of consumption poverty fell by 12.2 
percent over this seven-year period. It was found that poverty is substantially higher in rural 
areas than urban areas and is disproportionately concentrated in the rural savannah. Th e decline, 
however, is not evenly distributed according to ecological zones and regions.
Th e incidence of poverty in Ghana is still very high and there is a need to reduce poverty. In 
the present study, the monetary poverty line of GHc 66.53 per annum was obtained from the 
consumption basket of the bottom 20percent of the distribution of individuals by their standard 
of living, which provided 2,900 kilocalories per equivalent adult per day. Th e commodities that 
were included in this consumption basket numbered about 120 and come from the agricultural, 
industrial and services sectors.
3. Literature Review
According to Bourguignon (2002 and 2004) absolute poverty reduction could be achieved 
through two eff ects: (i) the growth eff ect, i.e. the eff ect of the growth rate of the mean income of 
the population; and (ii) the distribution eff ect, i.e., the change in income distribution. In order to 
analyze and understand the impact of openness on poverty and income distribution, both these 
links have to be scrutinized. Th e fi rst link is from openness to growth. Th e main manifestation 
of openness is through trade and capital movement liberalization which in turn is presumed to 
aff ect growth directly through three sub-channels: exports, imports and capital infl ows. Trade 
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liberalization policies encourage exports which benefi t export industries and contribute to GDP 
growth. A second sub-channel links increased imports to growth. A country that switches from a 
regime of import substitution to one of trade liberalization will, in the short run, hurt previously 
protected domestic industries, and suff ers from a fall in fi scal revenues as a result of lower tariff s. 
However, the initial negative consequences on output are likely to be more than compensated 
through a more effi  cient allocation of resources and benefi ts of competition, leading to a higher 
growth path. Th e third sub-channel operates through the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio and other capital fl ows on domestic output and growth. If FDI takes the 
form of ‘Greenfi eld’ investment as opposed to investment through merger and acquisition, much 
of the capital infl ow from transnational corporations (TNCs) tends to be converted directly into 
factories producing new products.
According to Winters et al. (2004), trade liberalization could impact poverty through 
economic growth, households and markets, wages and employment, and government revenue and 
spending. Trade liberalization and openness stimulate long-run growth and incomes, sustained 
growth requires increases in productivity, and macroeconomic volatility may have adverse eff ects 
on growth. Trade liberalization could aff ect poverty through changes in the sources of incomes 
of households, consumption and investment decisions, transmission of price changes, response 
of markets, spillover benefi ts, and the vulnerability of households. Th e other channel through 
which trade liberalization can impact poverty is through wages, employment, and transitional 
unemployment. Lastly, trade liberalization aff ects poverty through changes in government 
revenue and spending.
Th e second link is between income distribution and poverty. Th e income distribution eff ects 
induced by a shift in relative product prices in the process of the opening up of trade are well-
known, as postulated in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade. Th e losers 
(especially the poor residing in either urban or rural areas) may be vulnerable to these induced 
eff ects in addition to changes in absolute and relative prices of wage goods (Williamson, 2002). 
Th us, trade liberalization can aff ect poverty directly through relative price changes in factor 
markets and goods markets. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as applied to within-
country inequality, developing countries well endowed with unskilled labour should experience a 
decline in income inequality through an increased demand for unskilled labour, while unskilled 
labour in developed countries would lose out, with an adverse eff ect on equity.
CGE models have been used extensively to investigate the eff ects of policy change within an 
economy since they take into account interactions and interdependencies within the economy. 
Bussolo and Round (2003) have used a CGE model and the 1993 SAM for Ghana to investigate 
the possible eff ects of a range of budget-neutral redistributive income transfers on poverty. Th e 
classifi cation of households was based on agriculture-non-agriculture, savannah, forest and 
Coast. Four fi nancing schemes for the short-run and long-run factor market adjustment rules 
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were simulated. Th e results indicated that poverty outcomes were diff erent according to which 
of the four rules, i.e. income taxation, corporate taxation, indirect taxes, and tariff s, were chosen 
in the period under consideration. In this respect, the authors found tariff s as the fi nancing 
scheme with the largest reduction in poverty, followed by indirect taxes, corporate taxes and 
household direct taxes in that order under the long-run factor market closure rule. Th e short- 
run outcomes were not very clear, except that there appeared to be an increase in overall poverty 
under the corporate tax fi nancing rule. Th e reduction in the incidence of poverty ranged from 
0.4 percentage points to 4.8 percentage points and the increase in the incidence of poverty 
ranged from 1.3 percentage points to 7.6 percentage points due to an increase in tariff s. On the 
other hand, the reduction in the incidence of poverty ranged from 0.7 percentage points to 11.3 
percentage points and the increase in the incidence of poverty ranged from 6.1 percentage points 
to 16.4 percentage points due to an increase in indirect taxes.
Arbenser (2004) examined the impact of FDI on incomes of households in Ghana using 
the 1993 SAM. In the model, the author disaggregated households into four groups, namely, 
household urban skilled, household urban non-skilled, household rural agriculture and household 
rural non-agriculture. Th ree counterfactual simulations were carried out: simulation 1 consisted 
of 50 percent increase in FDI infl ows with an endogenous foreign exchange rate and fi xed 
current account balance. Th e second simulation involved 50 percent cut in tariff s with fl exible 
government savings and mobile factors. Th e third simulation was a mixture of simulations 1 
and 2. Arbenser (2004) shows that increase in FDI infl ows raise the household income by more 
than 1.3 percent; urban skilled households register the highest percentage increase in income 
followed closely by rural agricultural households , and the lowest income gain accrues to urban 
non-skilled households . It also establishes that increase in FDI infl ows and a reduction of tariff  
levels are complementary policies that enhance household welfare.
Bhasin and Annim (2005) used the 1999 SAM for Ghana and static CGE model to 
analyze the impact of the elimination of trade taxes accompanied by an increase in VAT on the 
incidence, depth, and severity of poverty and income distribution of fi ve categories of households: 
agriculture farmers, private sector employees, public sector employees, non-farm self employed 
and non-working. Th ey analyzed the impact of two shocks on poverty and income distribution. 
Th e fi rst shock takes the form of elimination of trade-related import taxes on goods and services 
accompanied by an increase in VAT by 100 percent. Th e second shock involves the elimination 
of export taxes on goods and services accompanied by an increase in VAT by 100 percent. 
Th e chapter shows that the fi rst shock reduces the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty, 
and improves the income distribution of households. In the fi rst simulation, reduction in the 
incidence of poverty ranges from 0.71 percentage points to 1.50 percentage points, the depth of 
poverty ranges from 0.25 percentage points to 0.67 percentage points, and the severity of poverty 
ranges from 0.25 percentage points to 0.38 percentage points. Th e mean income improvement 
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ranges from 1.31 percent to 3.86 percent. Although this result may appear to be unconventional, 
it is obtained because of the closure rule that allows a transfer of VAT revenue to households 
in Ghana through poverty alleviation programmes. Bhasin and Annim (2005) also show that 
the second type of shock increases the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty, and worsens 
income distribution of households. In the second simulation, theincrease in the incidence of 
poverty ranges from 0.18 percentage points to 0.22 percentage points, the depth of poverty 
ranges from 0.04 percentage points to 0.11 percentage points, and the severity of poverty ranges 
from 0.03 percentage points to 0.09 percentage points. Th e mean income reduction ranges from 
3.81 percent to 4.08 percent.
Chitiga, et al (2005) used a CGE model and a SAM for 1995 to study the impact of trade 
liberalization on poverty in Zimbabwe. Th e model contained 16 production sectors, four factors 
of production, namely skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital and land and 14,006 households 
categorized by location and skill. Th e authors employed a micro-simulation approach where 
household data was incorporated into the CGE model and simulated with individual households. 
Th e simulation that was conducted involved total removal of import tariff s. Th e complete removal 
of tariff s reduced overall poverty in the economy, falling more in the urban than in the rural 
areas, while inequality hardly changed. Th e decrease in the incidence of poverty ranges from 
0.01 percent to 0.02 percent, the depth of poverty ranges from 0.003 percent to 0.01 percent, 
and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.002 percent to 0.01 percent. Th e Gini index shows that 
the decrease in inequality ranges between 0.002 percent and 0.003%.
Aka (2006) used a CGE model to analyze the eff ects of removing trade taxes and instituting 
some fi scal reform on inequality and poverty in Cote d’lvoire. Th e author used an aggregated 
SAM with three tradable sectors and a non-tradable sector, nine groups of households based on 
the ENV 1998 survey data and SCN 1993 Cote d’Ivoire national accounts. Four simulations 
were carried out; the fi rst simulation considered the elimination of taxes on agricultural exported 
goods; the second simulation involved the elimination of taxes on agricultural exported goods 
combined with an increase of 20 percent in indirect taxes; the third simulation considered the 
elimination of taxes on agricultural exported goods combined with the elimination of taxes on 
imported goods, and the fourth simulation involved the third simulation with an increase of 20 
percent in indirect taxes. Poverty increases for all categories of households in simulations one 
and two. Th e increase in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.31 percentage points to 4.05 
percentage points, the depth of poverty ranges from 0.63 percentage points to 1.69 percentage 
points, and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.48 percentage points to 0.92 percentage points 
in simulations one and two. In simulations 3 and 4, poverty decreases for all the groups, except 
for other food crop farmers and agricultural workers. Th e decrease in the incidence of poverty 
ranges from 0.01 percentage points to 1.48 percentage points, the depth of poverty ranges from 
0.19 percentage points to 0.53 percentage points, and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.14 
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percentage points to 0.27 percentage points in simulations 3 and 4. Th e Gini index shows that 
inequality increases for all the socioeconomic groups in these simulations.
4. Features of the Model and Methodology
Th e general equilibrium model presented here is based on the works of Decaluwe, Patry, Savard, 
and Th orbecke (1999); Siddiqui and Kemal (2002b); Aka (2006) and Bhasin and Annim 
(2005). Th is model represents a small open economy that has no infl uence on international 
markets. Th e model is developed in such a way that it is consistent with the Social Accounting 
Matrix of Ghana (SAM) for the year 1999 and Ghana Living Standards Survey 4 for the year 
1999. Th e integrated SAM for 1999 is adopted from Bhasin and Annim (2005). Th e CGE 
model for Ghana is presented in Appendix A. In the CGE model, there are 51 basic equations, 
comprising 10 equations for production and trade block; 16 equations for income, taxes, savings, 
and investment block; 8 equations for demand for commodities block; 12 equations for prices; 
and 5 equations for equilibrium conditions and macroeconomic closures. Since there are three 
production activities and fi ve categories of households, the total numbers of equations to be 
solved are 147. Th ere are 147 endogenous variables and 33 exogenous variables. Th e model is just 
identifi ed as containing as many endogenous variables as equations.
Th e model is calibrated to a 1999 dataset. Th e GAMS software is used to check for the 
consistency of the data with the equilibrium conditions and to perform the simulations. Th e 
benchmark equilibrium must be replicated with the use of calibrated parameters and base-year 
data. Th e pre-shock values for the variables are obtained from the solution of the specifi ed model. 
Th e post-shock eff ects of these simulations are used to fi nd the eff ects on the poverty line and 
the incomes of households. Th e DAD software is used to evaluate the poverty measures and 
PCGIVE software is used to plot the income distribution of households before and after the 
exogenous shocks. Th e pre-shock and post-shock poverty levels are obtained using Foster, Greer 














is the income of household h ,
 
k is a poverty-aversion parameter, z is the endogenously 
determined poverty line. Th e incidence of poverty is indicated by k= 0. Th e depth of poverty is 
indicated by k= 1,and the severity of poverty is indicated by k= 2.
Since CGE models are fully calibrated on the basis of an initial year SAM that provides a 
set of consistent initial conditions and the SAM does not contain information on intra socio-
economic household group income distribution, it is advisable to generate the intra group 
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income distribution in the same base year as that of the SAM to calibrate the general equilibrium 
model. Several approaches have been used in the literature to describe and defi ne intra-group 
distribution of income in a CGE framework. For example, de Janvry et al. (1991) used both a 
lognormal and a Pareto distribution function to depict income distribution. Decaluwe, Patry, 
Savard, and Th orbecke (1999) and Aka (2006) used the Beta distribution to represent the intra 
-group income distribution. Unlike the lognormal, the Beta function is much more fl exible when 
it comes to the asymmetric forms it can adopt. However, since we know very little about the 
probability density functions of the incomes of households, density functions may be interpolated 
to give a clearer picture of the implied distributional shape. To estimate the density functions 
without imposing too many assumptions about its properties, a non-parametric approach is used 
in PCGIVE based on a kernel estimator of density function f(Y
h
 ).










where K{} is the kernel function and u is a ‘window width’ or smoothing parameter and corresponds 
to the width of histogram bars. Th e kernel K used is the Normal or Gaussian kernel.
5. Analysis of Simulation Results
In the fi rst simulation, we eliminate the trade-related import tariff  on agricultural goods (fi nal 
goods as well as inputs). In the second simulation, we eliminate the trade-related import tariff  
on agricultural goods that is compensated for by an increase in foreign capital infl ows by 0.63 
percent, which are redistributed to households in the form of transfer payments in proportion 
to their share in the transfer payments. Th e reduction in government income is compensated 
by an equivalent amount of foreign capital infl ows and that gives us 0.63 percent. In the third 
simulation, we eliminate the trade-related import tariff  on agricultural goods and increase the 
value-added tax by 50 percent and this tax revenue is redistributed to households in the form 
of transfer payments in proportion to their share in total transfer payments. Th e reduction in 
government income is compensated for by an increase in VAT by 50 percent. Table 1 indicates 
the eff ects of these simulations on macroeconomic variables.
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In these simulations, elimination of import tariff s on agricultural goods leads to a reduction 
in the prices of imported agricultural goods. As a result, imports of agricultural goods become 
cheaper and consumers substitute imported agricultural goods for the domestically produced 
agricultural goods, thereby causing the demand for agricultural imports to increase. Since the 
industrial goods and services are used in the production of agricultural goods (input-output 
linkages), it is likely that the imports of industrial goods and services (wholesale and retail trade 
services) will increase along with the increase in imports of agricultural goods even though there 
are no cuts in the import tariff s on industrial goods and services. Th e reduction in domestic 
costs caused by cuts in agricultural import tariff s increases the profi tability of the agricultural 
sector. Th is leads to increased production of agricultural goods, thereby causing the exports of 
agricultural goods to increase in the fi rst two simulations. Due to the production linkages between 
the agriculture and services sectors, the production of services also increases in the second and 
third simulation. However, due to the increased domestic supply of services and the non-tradable 
nature of some services, exports of services decline. Since the agricultural and services sectors are 
expanding in the second and third simulations, this increases the demand for labour and capital 
in these two sectors. As labour and capital move away from the industrial sector, production in 
the industrial sector declines, thereby causing the exports of industrial goods to decline. Due to 
this sectoral reallocation of labour and capital, returns to labour and capital increase. Th e incomes 
of all types of households increase because of an increase in factor prices, reallocation of existing 
resources and infl ows of foreign direct investment, and remittances received from abroad and 
transfer payments received from the government that arise due to foreign aid or additional tax 
revenue. Th e cut in import tariff s on agricultural goods reduces the prices of composite goods in 
the agricultural sector and increases the prices of composite goods in the industrial and services 
sectors. However, the net eff ect of these changes in the prices of composite goods is to reduce 
the poverty line by 2.83 percent, 2.66 percent, and 2.54 percent in the fi rst, second and third 
simulations, respectively. Changes in households’ incomes and poverty line determine the net 
eff ect on the incidence, depth, and severity of households’ poverty.
Table 2 presents information on the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty for the base 
year and variations in these measures for the simulations relating to import tariff s on agricultural 
goods. In the base year, the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty is highest among the private 
sector employees. Th e incidence, depth, and severity of poverty is lowest among agricultural 
households. In these simulations, changes in the prices of composite goods reduce the poverty 
line and incomes of all households increase. Th is causes the incidence, depth, and severity of 
poverty for all categories of households to be reduced. Th e maximum reduction in the incidence 
of poverty is noticed for the non-farm self-employed, whereas the maximum reduction in the 
depth and severity of poverty is observed for the private sector employees. Th e lowest reduction 
in the incidence of poverty is for the public sector employees, whereas the lowest reduction in the 
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depth of poverty is observed for the agricultural households in the fi rst simulation, and public 
sector employees in the second and third simulations. Th e lowest reduction in the severity of 
poverty is noticed for agricultural households in the fi rst simulation, and public sector employees 
in the second and third simulations. Th e diff erence between the base and the fi rst simulation 
captures the eff ect of elimination of import tariff s of agricultural goods on poverty. Th e diff erence 
between the fi rst simulation and the second simulation captures the eff ect of foreign capital 
infl ows on poverty. Th e diff erence between the fi rst simulation and the third simulation captures 
the eff ect of value-added tax on poverty. Th ese eff ects vary across households.
Table 2: Poverty Measures for the Base Year and Simulations for Import Tariff s on 
Agricultural Goods
Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
Incidence of Poverty
(alpha=0) base 17.29% 19.28% 25.36% 21.04% 20.00%
Simulation 1 16.52% 18.75% 24.31% 19.67% 19.36%
(-0.77%) (-0.53%) (-1.05%) (-1.37%) (-0.64%)
Simulation 2 16.35% 18.57% 24.10% 19.48% 18.94%
(-0.94%) (-0.71%) (-1.26%) (-1.56%) (-1.06%)
Simulation 3 16.11% 18.57% 24.10% 19.41% 18.94%
(-1.18%) (-0.71%) (-1.26%) (-1.63%) (-1.06%)
Depth of Poverty
(alpha=1) base 7.15% 9.02% 9.85% 8.56% 7.99%
Simulation 1 6.82% 8.66% 9.33% 8.15% 7.59%
(-0.33%) (-0.36%) (-0.52%) (-0.41%) (-0.40%)
Simulation 2 6.64% 8.55% 9.20% 8.03% 7.42%
(-0.51%) (-0.47%) (-0.65%) (-0.53%) (-0.57%)
Simulation 3 6.54% 8.49% 9.12% 7.96% 7.32%
(-0.61%) (-0.53%) (-0.73%) (-0.60%) (-0.67%)
Severity of Poverty
(alpha=2) base 4.16% 5.30% 5.41% 4.96% 4.30%
Simulation 1 3.97% 5.09% 5.11% 4.73% 4.06%
(-0.19%) (-0.21%) (-0.30%) (-0.23%) (-0.24%)
Simulation 2 3.87% 5.02% 5.04% 4.66% 3.96%
(-0.29%) (-0.28%) (-0.37%) (-0.30%) (-0.34%)
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Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
Simulation 3 3.81% 4.98% 4.99% 4.62% 3.90%
(-0.35%) (-0.32%) (-0.42%) (-0.34%) (-0.40%)
Mean base (GH Cedis) 276.57 253.41 220.65 236.01 239.84
Income Simulation 1 278.12 254.93 222.00 237.42 241.23
(0.56%) (0.60%) (0.61%) (0.60%) (0.58%)
Simulation 2 283.72 258.15 224.36 240.35 245.21
(2.58%) (1.87%) (1.68%) (1.84%) (2.24%)
Simulation 3 287.05 260.05 225.79 242.10 247.59
(3.79%) (2.62%) (2.33%) (2.58%) (3.23%)
Poverty base (GH Cedis) 66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53
Line Simulation 1 64.64 64.64 64.64 64.64 64.64
(-2.83) (-2.83) (-2.83) (-2.83) (-2.83)
Simulation 2 64.76 64.76 64.76 64.76 64.76
(-2.66%) (-2.66%) (-2.66%) (-2.66%) (-2.66%)
Simulation 3 64.84 64.84 64.84 64.84 64.84
(-2.54%) (-2.54%) (-2.54%) (-2.54%) (-2.54%)
Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of imported agricultural goods alone is a poverty 
alleviating policy. Th e decline in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.53 percentage points 
to 1.37 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.33 percentage points to 0.52 
percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.19 percentage points to 0.30 
percentage points. Th is fi nding is similar to Chitiga et al. (2005). Th e partial unilateral trade 
liberalization of imported agricultural goods with an increase in foreign capital infl ows is also 
a poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of foreign capital infl ows to the reduction in the 
incidence of poverty ranges from 0.17 percentage points to 0.42 percentage points; the depth of 
poverty ranges from 0.11 percentage points to 0.18 percentage points; and the severity of poverty 
ranges from 0.07 percentage points to 0.10 percentage points. Th is fi nding is in conformity with 
the studies by Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993; Siddiqui and Kemal, 2002a; Taylor, Mora and 
Adams, 2005; Adams, 2005; and Bhasin and Obeng, 2006; Anderson and Evia, 2003; Siddiqui 
and Kemal, 2002b; and Arbenser, 2004, which examine diff erent components of foreign capital 
infl ows. Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of imported agricultural goods with an increase 
in value-added tax is also a poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of VAT to the reduction 
in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.18 percentage points to 0.42 percentage points; the 
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depth of poverty ranges from 0.17 percentage points to 0.28 percentage points; and the severity 
of poverty ranges from 0.11 percentage points to 0.16 percentage points. Th is fi nding is in line 
with the fi nding of Bhasin and Annim (2005) and Aka (2006). Th e new fi nding of this chapter 
is that fi nancing of partial (reduction in import tariff s on agricultural goods) unilateral trade 
liberalization through domestic resources could have a greater impact on poverty alleviation than 
through foreign resources.
In the fourth simulation, we eliminate the trade-related export tariff  on agricultural goods (fi nal 
goods as well as inputs). In the fi fth simulation, we eliminate the trade-related export tariff  on 
agricultural goods that is compensated for by an increase in the foreign capital infl ows by 0.87 
percent, which are redistributed to the households in the form of transfer payments in proportion 
to their share in the transfer payments. In the sixth simulation, we eliminate the trade-related export 
tariff  on agricultural goods and increase the value-added tax by 50 percent and this tax revenue is 
redistributed to households in the form of transfer payments in proportion to their share in total 
transfer payments. Table 3 indicates the eff ects of these simulations on macroeconomic variables.
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Th e eff ect of the imposition of an export tax is to reduce the domestic price of exports in 
relation to the world price of exports. In these simulations, export tariff s on agricultural goods 
are eliminated and this raises the domestic price of agricultural exports to equal the world price 
of agricultural exports. A higher domestic price for agricultural exports increases the profi tability 
of agricultural goods. Th is leads to increased production of agricultural goods, thereby causing 
the exports of agricultural goods to increase. Increased production of agricultural goods creates 
more demand for imported agricultural goods (consumer goods such as rice, sugar, etc). Since 
industrial goods and services are used in the production of agricultural goods (input-output 
linkages), imports of industrial goods (pesticides and other agro-chemical products) and services 
(wholesale and retail trade services) increase along with the increase in imports of agricultural 
goods in the fi fth and sixth simulations. However, in the fourth simulation, imports of industrial 
goods decrease and imports of services increase. Due to the production linkages between the 
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agriculture and services sectors, the production of services also increases in the fi fth and sixth 
simulations but not in the fourth simulation. However, due to the increased domestic supply 
of services and the non-tradable nature of some services, exports of services decline. Since the 
agricultural and services sectors are expanding, this increases the demand for labour in the 
agricultural sector and demand for capital in the agriculture and service sectors. As labour and 
capital move away from the industrial sector, production in the industrial sector declines, thereby 
causing the exports of industrial goods to decline. Due to this sectoral reallocation of labor and 
capital, returns to labour increase and returns to capital decrease. Th e incomes of all types of 
households increase because of changes in factor prices, reallocation of existing resources and 
infl ow of foreign direct investment, and remittances received from abroad and transfer payments 
received from the government that arise due to foreign aid and additional tax revenue . Th e cut 
in export tariff s on agricultural goods increases the prices of composite goods in all the three 
sectors that increase the poverty line by 0.61 percent, 0.87 percent, and 0.95percent in the fourth, 
fi fth and sixth simulations, respectively. Again, changes in household’incomes and poverty line 
determine the net eff ect on the incidence, depth, and severity of household poverty.
Table 4: Poverty Measures for the Base Year and Simulations for Export Tariff s on 
Agricultural Goods
Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
Incidence of Poverty
(alpha=0) base 17.29% 19.28% 25.36% 21.04% 20.00%
Simulation 4 16.96% 19.11% 24.74% 20.39% 19.79%
(-0.33%) (-0.17%) (-0.62%) (-0.65%) (-0.21%)
Simulation 5 16.42% 18.75% 24.31% 19.87% 19.15%
(-0.87%) (-0.53%) (-1.05%) (-1.17%) (-1.85%)
Simulation 6 16.38% 18.75% 24.31% 19.67% 19.15%
(-0.91%) (-0.53%) (-1.05%) (-1.37%) (-1.85%)
Depth of Poverty
(alpha=1) base 7.15% 9.02% 9.85% 8.56% 7.99%
Simulation 4 7.00% 8.84% 9.59% 8.35% 7.80%
 (-0.15%) (-0.18%) (-0.26%) (-0.21%) (-0.19%)
Simulation 5 6.76% 8.70% 9.41% 8.19% 7.58%
(-0.39%) (-0.32%) (-0.44%) (-0.37%) (-0.41%)
Simulation 6 6.70% 8.65% 9.36% 8.14% 7.51%
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Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
(-0.45%) (-0.37%) (-0.49%) (-0.42%) (-0.48%)
Severity of Poverty
(alpha=2) base 4.16% 5.30% 5.41% 4.96% 4.30%
Simulation 4 4.08% 5.22% 5.26% 4.85% 4.19%
(-0.08%) (-0.08%) (-0.15%) (-0.11%) (-0.11%)
Simulation 5 3.94% 5.12% 5.16% 4.75% 4.05%
(-0.22%) (-0.18%) (-0.25%) (-0.21%) (-0.25%)
Simulation 6 3.90% 5.09% 5.13% 4.72% 4.01%
(-0.26%) (-0.21%) (-0.28%) (-0.24%) (-0.29%)
Mean base (GH 
Cedis) 
276.57 253.41 220.65 236.01 239.84
Income Simulation 4 334.68 259.34 265.84 241.53 245.21
(2.20%) (2.34%) (2.38%) (2.34%) (2.24%)
Simulation 5 343.79 263.75 269.69 245.52 250.66
(4.98%) (4.08%) (3.86%) (4.03%) (4.51%)
Simulation 6 346.51 265.07 270.83 246.74 252.31
(5.81%) (4.60%) (4.30%) (4.55%) (5.20%)
Poverty base (GHc) 66.53 66.53  66.53 66.53  66.53
Line Simulation 4 66.93 66.93 66.93 66.93 66.93
(0.61%) (0.61%) (0.61%) (0.61%) (0.61%)
Simulation 5 67.10  67.10 67.10 67.10 67.10
(0.87%) (0.87%) (0.87%) (0.87%) (0.87%)
Simulation 6 67.16 67.16 67.16 67.16 67.16
(0.95%) (0.95%) (0.95%) (0.95%) (0.95%)
Table 4 presents information on the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty for the base 
year and variations in these measures for the simulations relating to export tariff s on agricultural 
goods. In these simulations, changes in the prices of composite goods increase the poverty lines 
and incomes of all households increase. Th ese changes cause the incidence, depth, and severity 
of poverty for all categories of households to decrease. Th e maximum reduction in the incidence 
of poverty is noticed for the non-farm self employed, whereas the maximum reduction in the 
depth and severity of poverty is observed for private sector employees. Th e smallest reduction 
in the incidence and severity of poverty is observed for public sector employees, whereas the 
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smallest reduction in the depth of poverty is for agricultural households in the fourth simulation 
and public sector employees in the fi fth and sixth simulations. Th e diff erence between the base 
and the fourth simulation captures the eff ect of the elimination of export tariff s on agricultural 
goods on poverty. Th e diff erence between the fourth simulation and the fi fth simulation captures 
the eff ect of foreign capital infl ows on poverty. Th e diff erence between the fourth simulation and 
the sixth simulation captures the eff ect of value-added tax on poverty. Th ese eff ects vary across 
households.
Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of exported agricultural goods alone is a poverty 
alleviating policy. Th e decline in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.17 percentage points 
to 0.65 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.15 percentage points to 0.26 
percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.08 percentage points to 0.15 
percentage points. Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of exported agricultural goods with 
an increase in foreign capital infl ows is also a poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of 
foreign capital infl ows to the reduction in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.36 percentage 
points to 1.64 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.14 percentage points to 
0.24 percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.10 percentage points to 0.14 
percentage points. Th is fi nding is in conformity with the study by Bhasin and Obeng (2006). Th e 
partial unilateral trade liberalization of exported agricultural goods with an increase in value-
added tax is also a poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of VAT to the reduction in the 
incidence of poverty ranges from 0.36 percentage points to 1.64 percentage points; the depth 
of poverty ranges from 0.19 percentage points to 0.30 percentage points; and the severity of 
poverty ranges from 0.13 percentage points to 0.18 percentage points. Th is fi nding is diff erent 
from the fi ndings of Bhasin and Annim (2005) and Aka (2006). However, this fi nding is in 
conformity with Bussolo and Round (2003).
In the seventh simulation, we eliminate the trade-related import tariff  on industrial goods 
(fi nal goods as well as inputs). In the eighth simulation, we eliminate the trade-related import 
tariff  on industrial goods that is compensated for by an increase in foreign capital infl ows by 
0.64 percent, which are redistributed to the households in the form of transfer payments in 
proportion to their share in the transfer payments. In the ninth simulation, we eliminate the 
trade related import tariff  on industrial goods and increase the value-added tax by 50 percent and 
this tax revenue is redistributed to the households in the form of transfer payments in proportion 
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Th ese simulations lead to a reduction in the prices of imported industrial goods. As a result, 
imports of industrial goods become cheaper and consumers substitute imported industrial goods 
for domestically produced industrial goods, thereby causing the demand for industrial imports 
to increase. Since agricultural goods and services are used in the production of industrial goods 
(input-output linkages), it is likely that imports of agricultural goods and services (wholesale 
and retail trade services) will increase along with the increase in imports of industrial goods even 
though there are no cuts in the import tariff s on agricultural goods and services. Th e reduction in 
domestic costs caused by cuts in industrial import tariff s increases the profi tability of the industrial 
sector (provided that the revenue eff ect off sets the cost eff ect). Th is leads to increased production 
of industrial goods, thereby causing exports of industrial goods to increase. Due to the production 
linkages between the industrial and services sectors, the production and export of services also 
increases. Since the industrial and services sectors are expanding, this increases the demand for 
labour and capital in the industrial sector, whereas the demand for labour increases and the demand 
for capital decreases in the services sector. As labour and capital move away from the agricultural 
sector, agricultural production declines, thereby causing exports of agricultural goods to decline. 
Due to this sectoral reallocation of labour and capital, returns to labour and capital increase. Th e 
incomes of all types of households increase because of an increase in factor prices, reallocation of 
existing resources and infl ows of foreign direct investment, remittances received from abroad and 
transfer payments received from the government that arise due to foreign aid and additional tax 
revenue. Th e cut in import tariff s on industrial goods reduces the prices of composite goods in the 
industrial sector and increases the price of composite goods in the agricultural sector. However, 
the net eff ect of these changes in the prices of composite goods is to reduce the poverty lines by 
0.26 percent and 0.07 percent in the seventh and eighth simulation, respectively, and increase the 
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poverty line by 0.07 percent in the ninth simulation. Changes in household incomes and poverty 
lines determine the net eff ect on the incidence, depth, and severity of household poverty.
Table 6: Poverty Measures for the Base Year and Simulations for Import Tariff s on 
Industrial Goods
Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed Employed
Incidence of Poverty
(alpha=0) base 17.29% 19.28% 25.36% 21.04% 20.00%
Simulation 7 17.20% 19.28% 25.16% 20.65% 20.00%
(-0.09%) (-0.00%) (-0.20%) (-0.39%) (-0.00%)
Simulation 8 16.62% 18.93% 24.74% 20.13% 19.36%
(-0.67%) (-0.35%) (-0.62%) (-0.91%) (-0.64%)
Simulation 9 16.42% 18.93% 24.31% 19.93% 19.36%
(-0.87%) (-0.35%) (-1.05%) (-1.11%) (-0.64%)
Depth of Poverty
(alpha=1) base 7.15% 9.02% 9.85% 8.56% 7.99%
Simulation 7 7.07% 8.92% 9.71% 8.45% 7.88%
(-0.08%) (-0.10%) (-0.14%) (-0.11%) (-0.11%)
Simulation 8 6.89% 8.81% 9.58% 8.32% 7.71%
(-0.26%) (-0.21%) (-0.27%) (-0.24%) (-0.28%)
Simulation 9 6.76% 8.73% 9.48% 8.23% 7.58%
(-0.39%) (-0.29%) (-0.37%) (-0.33%) (-0.41%)
Severity of Poverty
(alpha=2) base 4.16% 5.30% 5.41% 4.96% 4.30%
Simulation 7 4.11% 5.28% 5.33% 4.90% 4.24%
(-0.05%) (-0.02%) (-0.08%) (-0.06) (-0.06%)
Simulation 8 4.01% 5.20% 5.25% 4.83% 4.13%
(-0.15%) (-0.10%) (-0.16%) (-0.13%) (-0.17%)
Simulation 9 3.93% 5.14% 5.19% 4.78% 4.06%
(-0.23%) (-0.16%) (-0.22%) (-0.18%) (-0.24%)
Mean base (GH Cedis) 276.57 253.41 220.65 236.01 239.84
Income Simulation 7 278.37 255.16 222.20 237.63 241.49
(0.65%) (0.69%) (0.70%) (0.69%) (0.69%)
Simulation 8 284.04 258.43 224.60 240.61 245.52
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Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed Employed
(2.70%) (1.98%) (1.79%) (1.95%) (2.37%)
Simulation 9 288.18 260.81 226.39 242.78 248.47
(4.20%) (2.92%) (2.60%) (2.87%) (3.60%)
Poverty base (GH Cedis) 66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53
Line Simulation 7 66.35 66.35 66.35 66.35 66.35
(-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26)
Simulation 8 66.48 66.48 66.48 66.48 66.48
(-0.07%) (-0.07%) (-0.07%) (-0.07%) (-0.07%)
Simulation 9 66.57 66.57 66.57 66.57 66.57
(0.07%) (0.07%) (0.07%) (0.07%) (0.07%) 
Table 6 presents information on the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty for the base 
year and variations in these measures for the simulations relating to import tariff s on industrial 
goods. In these simulations, the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty for all categories of 
households are reduced. Th e maximum reduction in the incidence of poverty is noticed for the 
non-farm self-employed, whereas the maximum reduction in the depth and severity of poverty is 
observed for private sector employees in the seventh simulation and non-working in the eighth 
and ninth simulations. Th e lowest reduction in the incidence and severity of poverty is noticed 
for public sector employees, whereas the lowest reduction in the depth of poverty is noticed for 
agricultural households in the seventh simulation and public sector employees in the eighth 
and ninth simulations. Th e diff erence between the base and the seventh simulation captures 
the eff ect of the elimination of import tariff s on industrial goods on poverty. Th e diff erence 
between the seventh simulation and the eighth simulation captures the eff ect of foreign capital 
infl ows on poverty. Th e diff erence between the seventh simulation and the ninth simulation 
captures the eff ect of value-added tax on poverty. Th ese eff ects vary across households. Moreover, 
it is observed that fi nancing of partial (reduction in import tariff s on industrial goods) trade 
liberalization through domestic resources could have a greater impact on poverty alleviation than 
through foreign resources because of greater linkages via domestic transmission than through 
foreign capital infl ows.
Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of imported industrial goods alone is a poverty 
alleviating policy. Th e decline in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.00 percentage points 
to 0.39 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.08 percentage points to 0.14 
percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.02 percentage points to 0.08 
percentage points. Th is fi nding is similar to Chitiga et al. (2005). Th e partial unilateral trade 
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liberalization of imported industrial goods with increase in foreign capital infl ows is also a 
poverty alleviating policy. Th e contribution of foreign capital infl ows to the reduction in the 
incidence of poverty ranges from 0.35 percentage points to 0.64 percentage points; the depth 
of poverty ranges from 0.11 percentage points to 0.18 percentage points; and the severity of 
poverty ranges from 0.07 percentage points to 0.11 percentage points. Th e partial unilateral 
trade liberalization of imported industrial goods with increase in value-added tax is also a 
poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of VAT to the reduction in the incidence of poverty 
ranges from 0.35 percentage points to 0.85 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 
0.19 percentage points to 0.31 percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.12 
percentage points to 0.18 percentage points. Th is fi nding is in line with the fi nding of Bhasin 
and Annim (2005) which showed that the reduction in import tariff s on goods and services 
along with an increase in VAT by 100 percent reduces the incidence of poverty between 0.71 
percentage points and 1.50 percentage points, the depth of poverty between 0.25 percentage 
points and 0.67 percentage points, and the severity of poverty between 0.25 percentage points 
and 0.38 percentage points. Moreover, this fi nding is also in conformity with the fi nding of Aka 
(2006). Th e study shows that fi nancing of partial (reduction in import tariff s on industrial goods) 
unilateral trade liberalization through domestic resources could have a greater impact on poverty 
alleviation than foreign resources.
In the tenth simulation, we eliminate the trade-related export tariff  on industrial goods (fi nal 
goods as well as inputs). In the eleventh simulation, we eliminate the trade-related export tariff  on 
industrial goods that is compensated for by an increase in foreign capital infl ows by 0.33 percent, 
which are redistributed to households in the form of transfer payments in proportion to their 
share in the transfer payments. In the twelfth simulation, we eliminate the trade related export 
tariff  on industrial goods and increase the value-added tax by 50 percent and this tax revenue 
is redistributed to the households in the form of transfer payments in proportion to their share 
in total transfer payments. Table 7 indicates the eff ects of these simulations on macroeconomic 
variables.
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In these simulations, export tariff s on industrial goods are eliminated and this raises the 
domestic price of industrial exports to equal the world price of industrial exports. A higher 
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domestic price for industrial exports increases the profi tability of industrial goods. Th is leads to 
increased production of industrial goods, thereby causing exports of industrial goods to increase.
Increased production of industrial goods creates more demand for imported intermediate 
industrial goods resulting in increased imports of industrial goods. Since agricultural goods and 
services are used in the production of industrial goods (input-output linkages), it is likely that 
imports of agricultural goods and services (wholesale and retail trade services) will increase along 
with the increase in imports of industrial goods. Th e expansion of the industrial sector results into 
the contraction of the services sector. As a result, the production and export of services decline. 
Expansion of the industrial sector causes the demand for labour and capital to increase. On the 
other hand, the contraction of the services sector causes the demand for labour to increase and 
the demand for capital to decrease. At the same time, labour and capital move away from the 
agricultural sector, agricultural production declines, thereby causing exports of agricultural goods 
to decline. Due to this sectoral reallocation of labour and capital, returns to labour and capital 
increase. Th e incomes of all types of households increase because of changes in factor prices, 
reallocation of existing resources and infl ow of foreign direct investment, remittances received 
from abroad and transfer payments received from the government that arise due to foreign 
aid and additional tax revenue . Th e cut in export tariff s on industrial goods reduces the prices 
of composite goods in the industrial sector and increases the prices of composite goods in the 
agricultural and services sectors that increase the poverty lines by 2.71 percent, 2.80 percent, 
and 3.11 percent in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth simulations, respectively. Again, changes 
in household incomes and poverty lines determine the net eff ect on the incidence, depth, and 
severity of households’ poverty.
Table 8: Poverty Measures for the Base Year and Simulations for Export Tariff s on 
Industrial Goods
Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
Incidence of Poverty
(alpha=0) base 17.29% 19.28% 25.36% 21.04% 20.00%
Simulation 10 17.67% 19.46% 26.00% 21.37% 20.21%
(0.38%) (0.18%) (0.64%) (0.33%) (0.21%)
Simulation 11 17.47% 19.46% 25.58% 21.24% 20.00%
( 0.18%) (0.18%) (0.22%) (0.20%) (0.00%)
Simulation 12 16.59% 19.11% 25.16% 20.59% 19.36%
(-0.70%) (-0.17%) (-0.20%) (-0.45%) (-0.64%)
Depth of Poverty
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Agricultural Public Private Non-farm Non-
Households Sector Sector Self- Working
Employees Employees Employed
(alpha=1) base 7.15% 9.02% 9.85% 8.56% 7.99%
Simulation 10 7.28% 9.13% 10.03% 8.70% 8.12%
(0.13%) (0.11%) (0.18%) (0.14%) (0.13%)
Simulation 11 7.18% 9.07% 9.95% 8.63% 8.03%
(0.03%) (0.05%) (0.10%) (0.07%) (0.04%)
Simulation 12 6.88% 8.88% 9.72% 8.41% 7.73%
(-0.27%) (-0.14%) (-0.13%) (-0.15%) (-0.26%)
Severity of Poverty
(alpha=2) base 4.16% 5.30% 5.41% 4.96% 4.30%
Simulation 10 4.24% 5.42% 5.51% 5.05% 4.38%
(0.08%) (0.12%) (0.10%) (0.09%) (0.08%)
Simulation 11 4.18% 5.38% 5.47% 5.01% 4.33%
(0.02%) (0.08%) (0.06%) (0.05%) (0.03%)
Simulation 12 4.00% 5.25% 5.33% 4.88% 4.15%
(-0.16%) (-0.05%) (-0.08%) (-0.08%) (-0.15%)
Mean base (GH 
Cedis) 
276.57 253.41 220.65 236.01 239.84
Income Simulation 10 280.74 257.52 224.23 239.85 243.89
1.51% (1.62%) i.62% 1.63% 1.69%
Simulation 11 283.65 259.19 225.46 241.36 245.96
(2.56%) (2.28%) (2.18%) (2.27%) (2.55%)
Simulation 12 293.25 264.71 229.57 246.41 252.79
(6.03%) (4.46%) (4.04%) (4.41%) (5.40%)
Poverty base (GH 
Cedis) 
66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53 66.53
Line Simulation 10 68.33 68.33 68.33 68.33 68.33
(2.71%) (2.71%) (2.71%) (2.71%) (2.71%)
Simulation 11 68.39 68.39 68.39 68.39 68.39
(2.80%) (2.80%) (2.80%) (2.80%) (2.80%)
Simulation 12 68.59 68.59 68.59 68.59 68.59




Table 8 presents information on the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty for the base 
year and variations in these measures for the simulations relating to export tariff s on industrial 
goods. In these simulations, changes in the prices of composite goods increase the poverty lines 
,and incomes of all households increase. Th ese changes cause the incidence, depth, and severity 
of poverty for all categories of households to increase, with the exception of the incidence of 
poverty of non-working, in the tenth and eleventh simulations. In contrast, these changes cause 
the incidence, depth and severity of poverty of all categories of households to decrease in the 
twelfth simulation. Th e maximum increase in the incidence and depth of poverty is noticed for 
private sector employees, whereas the maximum increase in the severity of poverty is observed for 
public sector employees. Th e lowest increase in the depth of poverty is observed for public sector 
employees in the tenth simulation and agricultural households in the eleventh simulation. Th e 
lowest increase in the severity of poverty is noticed for agricultural households. Th e maximum 
reduction in the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty is noticed for agricultural households. 
Th e lowest reduction in the incidence and severity of poverty is observed for public sector 
employees and depth of poverty for private sector employees. Th e diff erence between the base 
and the tenth simulation captures the eff ect of elimination of export tariff s on industrial goods 
on poverty. Th e diff erence between the tenth simulation and the eleventh simulation captures 
the eff ect of foreign capital infl ows on poverty. Th e diff erence between the tenth simulation and 
the twelfth simulation captures the eff ect of value-added tax on poverty. Th ese eff ects vary across 
households.
Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of exported industrial goods alone is a poverty 
enhancing policy. Th e increase in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.18 percentage points to 
0.64 percentage points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.11 percentage points to 0.18 percentage 
points; and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.08 percentage points to 0.12 percentage points. 
Th e partial unilateral trade liberalization of exported industrial goods with increase in foreign 
capital infl ows is also a poverty-enhancing policy. Th e contribution of foreign capital infl ows to 
the increase in the incidence of poverty ranges from 0.00 percentage points to 0.42 percentage 
points; the depth of poverty ranges from 0.06 percentage points to 0.10 percentage points; 
and the severity of poverty ranges from 0.04 percentage points to 0.06 percentage points. Th is 
fi nding is not in conformity with the study by Bhasin and Obeng (2006). However, the partial 
unilateral trade liberalization of exported industrial goods with an increase in value-added tax 
is a poverty-alleviating policy. Th e contribution of VAT to the reduction in the incidence of 
poverty ranges from 0.35 percentage points to 1.08 percentage points; the depth of poverty 
ranges from 0.25 percentage points to 0.40 percentage points; and the severity of poverty ranges 
from 0.17 percentage points to 0.24 percentage points. Th is fi nding is diff erent from the fi ndings 
of Bhasin and Annim (2005). However, this fi nding is in conformity with Bussolo and Round 
(2003). Th e study contributes to the literature by showing that fi nancing of partial (reduction 
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in export tariff s on industrial goods) unilateral trade liberalization through domestic resources 
could have a greater impact on poverty alleviation than through foreign resources.
In all the simulations, the density functions for all categories of households shift to the right 
with higher mean incomes. However, the eff ect on the poverty line diff ers across these simulations. 
Th e poverty lines are reduced in simulations 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8, whereas the poverty lines increase in 
simulations 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Th is causes a reduction of the population below the poverty 
line in each household group in simulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12, with the exception 
of public sector employees and non-working in simulation 7. In contrast there is an increase 
in the population below the poverty line in simulations 10 and 11. Th e mean incomes of the 
private sector employees improve to a larger extent in simulations 1, 4, and 7, whereas the mean 
incomes of the non-working improve to a large extent in simulation 10 when trade liberalization 
in isolation is considered. On the other hand, the income distribution of agricultural households 
improves to a larger extent in simulations 2, 5, 8 and 11 when trade liberalization is combined 
with foreign capital infl ows as well as in simulations 3, 6, 9 and 12 when trade liberalization is 
combined with value-added tax. Th is fi nding is in conformity with Arbenser (2004) and Bhasin 
and Obeng (2006).
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
To analyze the impact of partial trade liberalization alone, combined with foreign capital infl ows, 
and value-added tax on the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty and income distributions 
of households, the chapter used a CGE framework. Th e chapter analyzed the impact of 12 
simulations on poverty and income distribution. Th e fi rst shock takes the form of elimination of 
trade-related import tariff s on agricultural goods. Th e second shock takes the form of elimination 
of trade-related import tariff s on agricultural goods accompanied by an increase in real foreign 
capital infl ows by 0.63 percent. Th e third shock takes the form of elimination of trade-related 
import tariff s on agricultural goods accompanied by an increase in value-added tax by 50 percent. 
Th e fourth shock involves the elimination of export tariff s on agricultural goods. Th e fi fth shock 
involves the elimination of export tariff s on agricultural goods accompanied by an increase in 
real foreign capital infl ows by 0.87 percent. Th e sixth shock involves the elimination of export 
tariff s on agricultural goods accompanied by an increase in value-added tax by 50 percent.Th e 
seventh shock takes the form of elimination of trade-related import tariff s on industrial goods. 
Th e eighth shock takes the form of elimination of trade related import tariff s on industrial goods 
accompanied by an increase in real foreign capital infl ows by 0.64 percent. Th e ninth shock 
takes the form of elimination of trade related import tariff s on industrial goods accompanied 
by an increase in value-added tax by 50 percent. Th e tenth shock involves the elimination of 
export tariff s on industrial goods. Th e eleventh shock involves the elimination of export tariff s 
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on industrial goods accompanied by an increase in real foreign capital infl ows by 0.33 percent. 
Th e twelfth shock involves the elimination of export tariff s on industrial goods accompanied by 
an increase in value-added tax by 50 percent%.
Th e chapter shows that elimination of trade-related import and export tariff s on agricultural 
goods and import tariff s on industrial goods in isolation combined with foreign capital infl ows 
and value-added tax reduces the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty of all categories of 
households, with the exception of the incidence of poverty of public sector employees and non-
working when import tariff s on industrial goods are eliminated in isolation. In particular, a 
regressive tax (VAT) as a revenue replacement makes poor people better off  because of the 
neoclassical assumptions and transfers of VAT revenue to households. On the other hand, 
elimination of trade-related export tariff s on industrial goods in isolation and combined with 
foreign capital infl ows increases the incidence, depth and severity of poverty of all categories 
of households, with the exception of the incidence of poverty of non-working. Moreover, the 
elimination of trade-related export tariff s on industrial goods combined with value-added 
tax reduces the incidence, depth and severity of poverty of all categories of households. Th e 
impact of trade related fi scal reforms on poverty diff ers across households. Th e most signifi cant 
benefi ciaries of the simulations related to the elimination of trade-related import tariff s on 
agricultural goods are the non-farm self-employed and the private sector employees. Th e most 
signifi cant benefi ciaries of the simulations related to the elimination of trade related export 
tariff s on agricultural goods and import tariff s on industrial goods are private sector employees, 
non-farm self employed and non-working. Th e most signifi cant benefi ciaries of the simulation 
related to the elimination of trade-related export tariff s on industrial goods are agricultural 
households.
Th e chapter shows that fi nancing of partial sector-wise unilateral trade liberalization through 
domestic resources could have a greater impact on poverty alleviation and improvement in 
the mean incomes of households than foreign resources. Th is is due to the fact that a fall in 
government revenue due to trade liberalization is compensated for by a budget-neutral increase 
in foreign capital infl ows that are redistributed to households in the form of transfer payments in 
proportion to their share in total transfer payments from the government to households. On the 
other hand, when trade liberalization is combined with an increase in VAT, a fall in government 
revenue due to trade liberalization is not compensated for by a budget-neutral increase in VAT 
but rather a 50 percent increase in VAT. Th e increase in the transfer payments to households 
in the case of VAT is higher than in the case of foreign capital infl ows. Th us the increase in the 
incomes of households is larger in the VAT case in comparison to the foreign capital infl ows 
case and that is why poverty falls more in case of VAT increase rather than an increase in foreign 
capital infl ows.
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Th e impact of trade-related fi scal reforms on income distribution diff ers across households. 
Th e mean incomes of private sector employees and non-working improve to a larger extent when 
trade liberalization in isolation is considered. On the other hand, the mean incomes of agricultural 
households improve to a larger extent when trade liberalization is combined with foreign capital 
infl ows and value-added tax. Th e government of Ghana should not eliminate export tariff s on 
industrial goods in isolation even when combined with foreign capital infl ows because these 
are not poverty-reducing policies. Th e government should try to fi nance its unilateral trade 
liberalization through domestic resources instead of through foreign resources in order to have 
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Appendix : Computable General Equilibrium Model for Ghana
I Sets defi nition
i € I =  {AGR, IND, SER}, Goods (AGR: Agriculture, IND: Industry, SER: Services).
j € J =  {AGR, IND, SER}, Production Sectors
h € H =  {AGRF, PUBE, PRIE, NFSE, NW}, Households (AGRF: Agricultural Household, 
 PUBE: Public Sector Employee, PRIE: Private Sector Employee, NFSE: Non-farm Self  




  Share of Value Added in Total Output
c
j  
Scale Coeffi  cient of Cobb-Douglas Function
aij
:  
Quantity of Good i used in the Production of Good j
α
 j
  Elasticity Parameter of Cobb-Douglas Function
Ö 
i
  Scale Coeffi  cient of CET Function
γ 
i
  Distributive Parameter of CET Function






  Scale Coeffi  cient of CES Function
δ 
i  









Firms Share in Total Capital Income
Ω
2  
Govt. Share in Total Capital Income
s
h  
Share of Household h in Labor Income
k
h  
Share of Household h in Total Capital Income
ty
h  
Tax Rate on Household h Income
dvr
h  
Dividend Rate for Household h
Ψ 
h  
Marginal Propensity to Save of h Household
Ψ 
f  
Marginal Propensity to Save of Firms
Ψ 
g  
Marginal Propensity to Save of Government
ty 
f  
Tax Rate on Firm Income
tm 
i  
Tax Rate on Import of Good i
te 
i  
Tax Rate on Export of Good i
tx 
i  
Value Added Tax Rate on Good i
β c 
ih  
Share of Good i in Household h Consumption
β f
 i
  Share of Good i in Firm consumption
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β g
 i




i, h  
Household Minimum Consumption of Good i
ф
 j  
Share of Sector j in Total Investment
μ 
i  




Production of Sector j  3
VA 
j  
Value Added of Sector j  3
PV
j  
Value Added Price of Sector j  3
LD 
j  
Labor Demand of Sector j  3
w
j  
Wage Rate of Sector j  3
w  Average Wage Rate  1
KD 
j  
Capital Demand of Sector j  3
r
j  
Rate of Return to Capital in Sector j  3
r  Average Rental Rate  1
DI
i, j
  Intermediate Demand for Good i in Sector j  9
DI
i  
Intermediate Demand for Good i  3
E 
i  
Export Supply of Good i  3
DS 
i  
Domestic Supply of Good i  3
PE 
i  
Domestic Export Price of Good i  3
PL 
i  
Producer Price of Domestic Good i  3
Q 
i  
Demand for Composite Good i  3
PC
i  
Price of Composite Good i  3
M
i  
Import Demand of Good i  3
DD
i  
Domestic Demand of Good i  3
PD
i  
Domestic Price of Good i  3
PM 
i  





Income of Household h  5
YDH 
h  
Disposable Income of Household h  5
DTH
h  
Direct Taxes on Household h Income  5
SH 
h 





Transfers from Firms to Household h  5
SH  Savings of Households  1
YF  Income of Firms  1
DTF  Direct Taxes on Firms Income  1
YDF  Disposable Income of Firms  1
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SF  Savings of Firms  1
TIM 
i  
Indirect Taxes on Imports of Good i  3
TIE
i  
Indirect Taxes on Exports of Good i  3
TIVA 
i  
Value added Taxes on Good i 3
P
i  
Price of Aggregate Output of Good i 3
YG  Government Income 1
SG  Savings of Government 1
CTH 
h  
Total Consumption of Household h 5
C 
i, h  
Consumption of Good i of Household h 15
CT 
i  
Total Consumption of Good i 3
CF
i  
Firm Consumption of Good i 3
GC
i  
Government Consumption of Good i 3
I  Total Investment 1
S  Total Savings 1
I 
j  
Investment of Sector j 3
P
INV  
Investment Price Index 1
PINDEX  Price Index  1
B  Balance of Payments 1
z  Poverty Line 1
Number of Endogenous Variables  147
IV Exogenous Variables Number
LS  Labor supply  1
KS  Capital Supply  1
e  Nominal Exchange Rate  1
PWE
i
  World Price of Exports of Good i  3
PWM
i
  World Price of Imports of Good i  3
CTGH 
h
  Current Transfers from Govt. to Household h  5
CTWH
 h
  Current Transfers from ROW to Household h  5
CTHF
h
  Current Transfers from Household h to Firms  5
CTHW
h
  Current Transfers from Household h to ROW  5
CTGF  Current Transfers from Govt. to Firms  1
CTWF  Current Transfers from ROW to Firms  1
FB  Foreign Borrowing  1
FKI  Foreign Capital Infl ows  1
Number of Exogenous Variables  33
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V Equations
Production and Trade  Number
1  XSj = VAj / Λϕ  3
2  VAj = cj LD j 
α j KD j 
1- α j  3
3  DIi, j = aij XS j  9
4  DIi = ∑DIi, j  3
 j
5  LD j = α j PVj VAj / wj  3
6  KD j = (1- α j ) PVj VAj /rj  3
7  XSi = Ö i [γi E i 
Ri +( 1- γ i) DSi 
Ri ]1/ Ri  3
8  E i = DS
 
i [ PE i / PL i ) {(1- γ i)/ (γ i )} ]
η
i  3
9  Q i =  λ i [  δ i Mi 
ρ





10  M i= DDi [(  PDi / PM i ) { δ i / ( 1- δ i)}] 
σ
i  3
Income, Taxes, Savings and Investment
YH 11 h= sh j 
Σ wj LD j  + kh j 
Σ r j KD j  + CTGH h + CTFHh +CTWHh  5
12  CTFHh = dvrh YF  5
13  DTHh = ty h YH h  5
14  YDH h= YH h (1 - ty h )  5
15  SH h= YDH h - ∑ PCi Cih - CTHFh - CTHWh  5
  i
16  SH =  
h
∑ SH h  1
17  YF =  Ω1 j 
∑ r j KD j + h
∑ CTHFh + CTGF + CTWF  1
18  DTF =  ty f YF  1
19  YDF = YF (1-  ty f )  1
20  SF = YDF - 
h
∑ CTFHh - i 
∑ PC i CF i,  1
21  TIM i =  tm i e PWMi Mi  3
22  TIEi =  te i PE i E i  3
23  TIVA i = tx i PCi Qi  3
24  YG =  Ω2 j 
∑ r j KD j  + i
∑ TIM i  + i
∑TIE i + i
∑ TIVA i +  h
∑ DTH h +DTF + FB  1
25  SG = YG - h
∑ CTGH h -CTGF -  i
∑ PC i GC i,  1
26  S = SH + SF + SG  + FKI  1
Demand for Commodities
27  CTH h= YDH h - SH h  5
 MIN MIN
28  PCi C i, h = PC i C i, h + β 
c j,h (CTH h - i
∑PC i C i, h )  15
29  z = ∑ PCi C 
MIN  1
              i                  i h
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30  CFi =
 β f i
 (1- Ψ f )
 YDF / PCi
  3
31  GCi =
 β g i
 (1- Ψ g )
 YG / PCi
  3
32  CT i = h
∑ C i,h + CFi + GCi  3
33  I i = [ ф i I ]/ PINV  3
34  I = 
i
∑ I i  1
Prices
35  PVi = [ Pi XSi - j 
∑ PCi DIi, ,j ]/ VA i  3
36  PM i = PWM i (1+ tm i )(1+ tx i ) e  3
37  PE i = (PWE i e)/ (1 + te i)  3
38  PCi = ( PD i DD i + PM i M i)/ Qi  3
39  PDi = (1+ tx i ) PLi  3
40  P i = (PL i DSi + PE i Ei) / XS i  3
41  wj = ( PVj VAj - rj KD j)/ LD j  3
42  w = 
j 
∑ wj /3 1
43  rj = ( PVj VAj - wj LD j)/ KD j  3
44  r = 
j 
∑ rj /3  1
45  PINV = i
Π [PCi / ф i ] 
ф i  1
46  PINDEX = 
i
∑ μ i PVi  1

Equilibrium Conditions and Macroeconomic Closure
47 Qi = DI i + CTi + I i  3
48 LS = 
j 
∑ LD j  1
49 KS = 
j 
∑ KD j  1
50  I = S  1
51  B = e 
i
∑PWMi M i- e i
∑PWEi E i + ∑ CTHWh - ∑CTWH h - CTWF
 - FB - FKI = 0  1
Number of Independent Equations  147
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Food Prices, Tax Reforms and Consumer Welfare 
in Ghana during the 1990s
Charles Ackah and Simon Appleton
1.  Introduction
Th e pattern of food consumption is an important indicator of household welfare. However, 
in spite of the general concerns expressed in many quarters, relatively little is known about 
the consumption patterns of households in Ghana and how households have adjusted to price 
changes in the 1990s, which to some extent, resulted from policy reforms. Th is chapter aims to 
fi ll some of the gaps in the literature by analyzing the food consumption behaviour of Ghanaian 
households using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model developed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980b) to obtain price and income elasticity estimates for six major food categories, 
which together comprise the basic subsistence staples for most poor households. Th e estimated 
price elasticities are then utilized to evaluate the welfare implications of the relative food price 
changes in terms of compensating variation. We then assess the extent to which welfare changes 
can be explained by agricultural trade policy reforms using counterfactual simulation analysis.
Typically, there are a number of factors that determine the extent to which households are 
impacted by food price shocks, including the magnitude of the relative price changes, the relative 
importance of diff erent food commodities in the consumption basket of diff erent households 
as well as the degree to which households are compensated for the price shocks by changes 
in income. Th is chapter concentrates on the partial equilibrium welfare eff ects of food price 
changes, given the food consumption choices of households in Ghana. In essence, we focus on 
changes in consumer welfare resulting from the variations in food price changes, assuming an 
absence of income eff ects. While it would be appropriate to estimate the overall welfare changes 
(i.e. including producer welfare or allowing for income responses), we do not pursue this line 
of enquiry in this chapter due to data limitations including adequate producer price data. Our 
analysis does not account for supply responses through production and labour adjustments. Th e 
results must therefore be interpreted with these caveats in mind. However, the data constraints 
notwithstanding, our simple partial equilibrium analysis provides useful insights into household 
food consumption behaviour and the distributional implications of the variation in food price 
changes for household welfare in Ghana during the 1990s – a decade of remarkable food 
price infl ation reminiscent of the economic crisis that precipitated the Structural Adjustment 





Th e remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature on demand system analysis and household welfare. Section 3 presents the econometric 
model and describes the methodology used to measure welfare changes facing Ghanaian 
households during the 1990s. Section 4 discusses the dataset and sources and Section 5 reports 
the elasticity estimates and the welfare analysis due to the price changes in the 1990s. Th is 
section also assesses the impact of simulated trade policy reform. Section 6 concludes with some 
policy implications of the fi ndings.
2.  Literature Review
In a number of studies, Deaton (1988, 1990 and 1997) propose a unique methodology to estimate 
demand elasticities using only a single cross-section of household budget survey data. His 
approach is based on the notion that prices for comparable goods can vary greatly across space in 
developing countries due to the fact that survey data are often collected in clusters of households 
in the same village. Deaton’s two-stage estimation procedure fi rst purges the unit value data of 
quality eff ects and then uses the cross-spatial variation in the ‘corrected’ unit values to identify 
own-price or cross-price elasticities. Th e main advantage of using unit values in demand analysis 
derives from the substantial cross-sectional variability, but it may give biased results (Deaton, 
1990, 1997). Many commentators have argued that unit values, unlike market prices, are error-
ridden and subject to sample selection problems as they are unavailable for non-purchasing 
households. Th e problem with unit value is that it is a function of expenditure and quantity, both 
of which are potentially measured with error in most household surveys (see Gibson and Rozelle 
2002; Kedir 2001, 2005; and Niimi 2005.1
Th e most standard application of Deaton’s approach follows the estimation of budget share 
and unit value equations such that for each household h  in the cluster c , the M -good system 
of equations are given as:




hc hc hc j jc c hc
j
w x z p f uα β δ γ
=
= + + + + +∑     (1)




hc hc hc j jc hc
j
v x z p uα β δ θ
=
= + + + +∑     (2)
where, hcw  is the budget share devoted to the good in question (good i), hcx is total household 
expenditure, hcv  is unit value, hcz  is a vector of household characteristics, jcp  is the (unobserved 
cluster) price, cf  is the cluster fi xed-eff ect, and the error terms of the two equations are 1hcu  and 
2hcu  respectively. Th e estimation procedure follows two stages. Based on the assumption of no 
price variation in the same cluster, the main task in the fi rst stage is to estimate total expenditure 
(or income) elasticities and the elasticity of unit values with respect to total expenditure (i.e., 
the quality eff ects) using the within-cluster variation in purchases and unit values. Th e second 
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stage then involves estimating the price responses using the between-cluster information in the 
data. While the fi rst-stage estimation is typically based on an OLS regression applied to the 
demeaned (at the cluster level) equations, an errors-in-variables regression is by necessity applied 
to the (corrected) budget shares and unit values.
Deaton (1997) provides an excellent empirical application of his estimation technique to 
examine the implications of tax reform in India and Pakistan. In Pakistan a reduction in the 
eff ective domestic subsidies to rice and wheat (due, in the case of rice, to export taxes) would be 
effi  ciency enhancing, but in both countries the burden falls relatively heavily on the poor, who 
have a high and relatively infl exible expenditure shares on these items.
Another example of this approach is Ravallion and van de Walle’s (1991) study of Indonesian 
rice reform. Th ey use detailed household survey data from the Indonesian National Socio-
Economic Survey (SUSENAS) to estimate household demand equations that conform to the 
nonlinear version of the AIDS model (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b) from which they 
derive the equivalent income function (as proposed by King, 1983). Assuming a hypothetical 
policy reform, Ravallion and van de Walle evaluate the partial equilibrium eff ects on poverty of 
changes in the price of Indonesia’s main food staple (rice) by means of dominance tests. Th ey 
show, inter alia, that the results depend partly on how the government passes the budget shock 
implied by rice price changes onto consumers and on what poverty line is used. Th e very poor are 
net consumers of rice and so suff er from the price rises, whereas farmers just below the standard 
poverty line are net producers and hence benefi t and show positive chances of escaping from 
poverty.
In their study of the eff ect of the Indonesian economic crisis on poor households, Levinsohn, 
Berry, and Friedman (1999) employed the 1996 National Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS) 
data for 61,965 households, along with price changes caused by the 1997-1998 Asian currency 
crisis to estimate the distributional impact on households. Using only single pre-crisis cross-
sectional consumption data, the authors estimate price elasticities for 22 composite goods - 21 
aggregate food goods and a residual non-food consumption category. Matching the pre-crisis 
budget shares with post-crisis price changes, the authors then calculate the welfare impact of 
the price increases based on compensating variation (CV) and then explore the results further 
with non-parametric methods.2 Th e main fi ndings were that middle-income households were 
the most severely aff ected by the crisis. For the sample as a whole, they fi nd that the CV has 
an inverted u-shape, with the poorest households (i.e. lowest expenditure decile) having an 
average CV of 73 percent of initial household expenditures, rising to 85 percent for those in 
the sixth, seventh, and eighth deciles, and falling to 77 percent for households in the top decile. 
Additionally, the consumer price impacts of the crisis were greater for urban than for rural areas, 
and greatest overall for the urban poor. From this perspective, it was the Indonesian households in 
the middle of the distribution that were most adversely impacted by the price changes. A further 
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investigation revealed that it was the urban poor who tended to be hurt the most-needing, on 
average, 109 percent of their pre-crisis income in order to reach pre-crisis utility levels. Th e rural 
poor, on the other hand, require the lowest amount, only 70 percent of their pre-crisis income.
3.  Empirical Methodology
3.1  Th e Demand Model
In this section, we discuss the estimation strategy used and some of the econometric issues 
encountered. We adopt the estimation of a linear approximate Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) for food demand using cross-sectional data. Th e AIDS model has been widely applied 
in many empirical studies of consumer behaviour using both cross-sectional and time series data. 
Th e model is adopted in this study because of its many attractive properties relative to other 
models for analyzing demand for food in developing countries (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b). 
An advantage of the AIDS model is that it is able to treat zero and non-zero consumption in 
the same way. Another desirable property of the AIDS model is that it is simple to estimate and 
free from the restrictive assumption of homotheticity, therefore allowing the model to capture 
any diff erences in the consumption bundles among diff erent income groups. Other advantages 
include its tractability and fl exibility in allowing us to overcome the problem of aggregation (see 
Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b).
Th e AIDS model with the addition of household demographic factors can be specifi ed for 
the  M -good system as




ihc i i ij jc hc ihc
j
xw p Z u
a p
α β γ δ
=
⎛ ⎞
= + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
    (3)
where  ihcw  is the share of the budget devoted to the ith commodity of household h  in cluster 
c ,  x  is the household’s food expenditure,  jcp  is the jth commodity price in cluster c  and Z  is 
a vector of household characteristics.  ,iα ,iβ ijγ  and  1δ  are parameters to be estimated, and  ihcu  
is the random error term with the standard properties. Th e aggregate price index, ( )a p , used to 
normalize food expenditure  x , is defi ned as
( ) 0
1 1 1
1ln ln ln ln
2
M M M
i i ij i j
i i i
a p p p pα α γ
= = =
= + +∑ ∑∑
    (4)
Th e Stone (1954) price index, which permits us to linearise the AIDS model as presented in 
equation (5) is used to approximate the price aggregator in equation (6) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980b). Th us, ( )ln a p  is substituted by the Stone price index defi ned as
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      (5)
Th e Stone price index is computed using the cluster mean expenditure shares, icw , and thus 
like all other price variables, is invariant within the same cluster.
Th e demand system is estimated for each of the seven food categories as listed in Table 2. 
While it would clearly be preferable to estimate the entire demand system, we do not have suitable 
price data for the important non-food items, e.g. housing, education and durable ownership. In 
the absence of such data (and in some cases, for simplicity) the usual practice, which is followed 
in this chapter, is to adopt weak separability as a working (and perhaps reasonable) assumption. 
By excluding non-food goods from the model, we are implicitly assuming that the utility of food 
is weakly separable from the quantities consumed of non-food. In other words, we assume that 
the demand for food does not depend on prices of non-food items given total food spending (or 
real income). We believe such a structure is plausible. However, we need to recognise that total 
food spending is necessarily endogenous. Hence, we allow for the endogeneity of all the food 
expenditures. Instruments include the logarithm of income (which should be correlated with 
food spending).
For the demand system to be theory-consistent, we impose the restrictions for implied 
by consumer demand theory, namely adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry. Adding-up is 
satisfi ed if 1ii w =∑  for all x  and p which requires 1iiα =∑ , 0ii β =∑  and 0ijiγ =∑ . We 
fulfi l the condition of adding-up by dropping one of the M  demand equations from the system 
and recovering the parameters of the omitted food equation from the estimates of the -1M  
equations. Th e homogeneity property is satisfi ed by treating the price of the ‘other foods’ as a 
numeraire and setting its price to unity. In our empirical estimation, we omit the price term for 
the other food category and express the other price variables relative to the omitted price. Note 
that the demand functions are homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. Th is means that 
an equal proportional change in prices and income will leave commodity demands unchanged. 
(Slutsky) symmetry requires that ij jiγ γ=  which could be met by employing the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) procedure to estimate the demand equations simultaneously.43
Beginning with a Stone approximation to ( )a p , we estimate the remaining parameters by linear 
regression, imposing symmetry. We then update the linearly homogeneous price index ( )a p  and 
repeat estimation until convergence. Th e income or expenditure, Marshallian (uncompensated) 
own-price and cross-price and the Hicksian (compensated) elasticities for equation (5) are 
computed at the sample means respectively as follows:
43 Consistent estimation of all parameters requires an iterative (maximum likelihood) method. Hence we employ Zellner’s 
Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR) procedure. Formal tests based on the likelihood ratio test for the system as 
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⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= = = − ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠    (8)
ij ij j iw eε ε
∗ =         (9)
where, iq  denotes quantity demanded of the ith commodity and all other variables are as 
previously defi ned.
3.2  Consumer Welfare Evaluation
Th is section describes the methodology used to determine welfare changes facing Ghanaian 
households during the 1990s. Since structural reforms are, in principle, designed to change prices, 
our interest is in linking observed food price changes to changes in household welfare, especially 
the partial equilibrium eff ects on welfare of changes in the prices of the main staple foods. 
Abstracting away from transmission mechanisms, we treat the policy-induced eff ect as captured 
by proportional changes in food prices. Th e welfare impact of food price changes on households 
can be measured in monetary terms by using the money metric indirect utility function. Using a 
set of reference prices, we can compute how well - or worse off  households were, moving from 
their initial utility level to the new or post-reform utility level in response to the changes in food 
prices. Following the usual practice in this literature (Deaton, 1989 and 1997; Friedman and 
Levinsohn, 2002; and Niimi, 2005), we characterize the welfare eff ects of food price changes as 
the compensating variation (CV).
Suppose ( ),c u p  denotes the expenditure function which defi nes the minimum expenditure 
required to achieve a specifi c utility level, u , at a given price vector p  facing the household (see 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). Assume that prices change from 0p  to 1p  as a result of the 
removal of export tariff s or input subsidies. Th e money measure of the resultant welfare eff ect is 
the diff erence between the minimum expenditure required to achieve the original utility level, 
at the new prices, and the initial total expenditure. In other words, CV is the amount of money 
the household would need to be given at the new set of (higher) prices in order to attain the 
pre-reform initial level of utility. Subscripts refer to before (0) and after (1) prices, in this study 
1991/92 and 1998/99 respectively. Hence, in terms of the expenditure (cost) function:
 ( ) ( )1 0 0 0, ,CV c p u c p u= −      (10)
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Th e CV can be approximated using a second order Taylor expansion of the minimum 
expenditure function as:
1 1 1
1ln ln ln ln
2i i i ij i ji i j
c w p w p pε ∗
= = =
Δ ≈ Δ + Δ Δ∑ ∑∑
    (11)
where, iw  is the budget share of commodity i  in the initial period (1991/92), ln ipΔ
approximates the proportionate change in the price of commodity i , and 
*
ijε is the compensated 
price elasticity of commodity i  with respect to the price change of good j . Clearly, equation 
(11) indicates that the impact of a price change upon a household is a function of both the 
magnitude of the price change as well as the relative importance of diff erent food items in the 
consumption basket. Th e fi rst-order eff ect is proportional to quantity consumed. Th e second-
order eff ect depends on the compensated price elasticity. To account for consumption responses, 
we estimate fi rst-and second-order impacts using the budget shares and the compensated 
demand elasticities.
4.  Data Description and Sources
Th e GLSS datasets for 1991/92 and 1998/99 are used to match household-level data on food 
consumption with cluster-level information on food prices. A total of 4,523 households were 
surveyed in 1991/92 while 5,998 households were surveyed in 1998/99. Th e 1991/92 survey was 
conducted in about 400 clusters with 15 households per urban cluster and 10 households per rural 
cluster. In the case of the 1998/99 survey, 300 clusters were covered, each cluster containing about 
20 households. Th ese surveys contain detailed consumption data on about 100 food items. For 
estimation purposes, expenditures (including both cash purchases and imputed own-consumption) 
on various food commodities were aggregated into fi ve composite categories: cereals, roots and 
tubers, fi sh, meat and alcohol. All remaining food items were aggregated into a miscellaneous 
category referred to as ‘other food’ giving a total of six food categories. Th e fi ve main aggregates 
which are the focus of this study represent about 61 percent and 68 percent of the food consumption 
basket of households in 1991/92 and 1998/99 respectively. Unlike most household surveys in 
developing countries, the GLSS also include a community price questionnaire which collects data 
on prevailing prices of a variety of mainly food commodities and some non-food items in the local 
markets. In principle, these prices should refl ect prices faced by households. In practice, there are 
some concerns about the reliability of such data as the prices may not refer to exactly the same type 
or quality of goods or that the prices quoted do not involve actual purchases (Deaton and Grosh, 
2000). Nonetheless, this is a preferred source of price data when information regarding quantities 
is not collected from households as is the case of the GLSS (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).
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4.1  Descriptive Statistics
Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Th e dependent variables in the demand analysis are the budget shares of the six food aggregates 
which are the shares of consumption expenditure of each food commodity in total food 
consumption expenditure. In addition to the price variables, the explanatory variables include 
total food expenditure and a set of demographic and household characteristics: (log) household 
size, age and squared age of the household head, regional and urban dummies.
Table 1 presents the mean budget shares for the overall sample while Tables 2 and 3 present 
the same information for households categorized into per capita household expenditure deciles.44 
Th e major components of food consumption in 1991/92 were: tubers (23.8 percent), fi sh (17.7 
percent) and cereals (13.6%). A similar pattern was registered for 1998/99: tubers (23.5 percent), 
fi sh (19.9 percent) and cereals (17.1 percent). In general, consumption baskets in Ghana were 
remarkably uniform across income groups. However, there were considerable diff erences in 
the composition of the consumption basket between the richest 10 percent and the poorest 
10 percent. As we would expect from Engel’s law, poorer households spend a greater share of 
their budget on food than rich households in both survey years (71 percent for those in the 
bottom decile compared with 56 percent in the top decile in 1991/92, for example). As Tables 
A3 and A4 in the Appendix show, food consumption patterns vary considerably for the various 
regions and geographical locations in Ghana. Tubers and fi sh are consistently consumed largely 
by rural households. Cereals, meat and alcohol are consumed more intensively in the north (i.e., 
Northern, Upper East and Upper West). Tubers and fi sh on the other hand are not favourites in 
the north.
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Dependent Variables (Expenditure Shares)
Commodity Group 1991/92 1998/99
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Cereals 0.136 0.126 0.171 0.115
 Rice 0.036 0.047 0.056 0.057
 Maize 0.044 0.077 0.053 0.080
 Sorghum 0.011 0.050 0.007 0.036
 Other cereal products
Tubers & Starchy Roots 0.238 0.171 0.235 0.164
44 Summary statistics for all explanatory variables (except prices) are reported in the Appendix.
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Commodity Group 1991/92 1998/99
 Cassava 0.084 0.099 0.090 0.104
 Yam 0.048 0.091 0.047 0.076
 Plantain 0.050 0.074 0.046 0.070
 Other Starchy Roots
Fish 0.177 0.118 0.199 0.118
Meat (Poultry) 0.020 0.045 0.027 0.047
Alcohol 0.041 0.078 0.044 0.071
Other Food 0.389 0.160 0.324 0.159
 Oils & fats 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.007
 Pulses 0.025 0.047 0.029 0.044
 Prepared Meals 0.098 0.133 n/a n/a
 Other miscellaneous foods
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 3 & 4.
Notes: n/a means data were not available.
Table 2: Expenditure Shares in Ghana, by Decile of Per Capita Consumption in 
1991/92
Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest
Commodity
Cereals 0.187 0.142 0.139 0.138 0.121 0.130 0.131 0.134 0.129 0.131
 Rice 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.043
 Maize 0.076 0.053 0.058 0.048 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.037 0.028
 Sorghum 0.037 0.023 0.016 0.018 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.003
Tubers 0.230 0.280 0.277 0.289 0.264 0.252 0.248 0.230 0.225 0.175
 Cassava 0.075 0.108 0.099 0.106 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.078 0.080 0.056
 Yam 0.048 0.057 0.052 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.041
 Plan 0.038 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.041
Fish 0.156 0.203 0.193 0.190 0.187 0.185 0.185 0.183 0.165 0.152
Meat 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.030
Alcohol 0.053 0.036 0.043 0.035 0.038 0.042 0.036 0.033 0.040 0.048
All Food 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.56
Source: Authors” calculations from GLSS 3.
Note: Deciles are by per-adult equivalent household expenditure.
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Table 3: Expenditure Shares in Ghana, by Decile of Per Capita Consumption in 
1998/99
Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest
Commodity
Cereals 0.273 0.207 0.176 0.168 0.169 0.159 0.156 0.154 0.154 0.153
 Rice 0.050 0.047 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.060 0.060 0.060
 Maize 0.113 0.082 0.075 0.059 0.059 0.055 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.026
 Sorghum 0.041 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
Tubers 0.138 0.216 0.266 0.268 0.261 0.275 0.262 0.249 0.235 0.195
 Cassava 0.048 0.090 0.114 0.118 0.112 0.113 0.105 0.088 0.081 0.058
 Yam 0.029 0.044 0.048 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.048 0.053 0.052 0.046
 Plan 0.008 0.023 0.037 0.046 0.044 0.058 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.051
Fish 0.177 0.196 0.215 0.213 0.219 0.223 0.212 0.207 0.193 0.168
Meat 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.029 0.037 0.046
Alcohol 0.057 0.046 0.035 0.041 0.033 0.029 0.036 0.039 0.045 0.061
All Food 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57
Source: Authors” calculations from GLSS 4.
Note: Deciles are by per-adult equivalent household expenditure.
Table 4 provides evidence on food price movements between 1991/92 and 1998/99. Th ere is 
evidence that food prices fell relative to non-food prices during the 1990s. Th ere are perceptible 
variations (across goods and location) in the degree of price changes observed. It is clear that 
there has been a signifi cant increase in food price infl ation, in both rural and urban areas, and 
across the country, with alcohol (178.4 percent), meat (173.4 percent) and fi sh (123.5 percent) 
registering the largest average increases. Th e prices of cereal and tubers, the two major staples 
in Ghana, increased by the lowest proportion of 3.1 percent and 7.9 percent respectively. Th is 
may be due partly to increased production and also imports, at least for rice. Th e real prices of all 
food commodities, except meat, increased the most in rural Ghana relative to urban locations. 
In fact, the real price of cereal fell by 18 percent in urban areas compared with an increase of 
about 14 percent in rural areas. It is the variation in these price changes that we seek to exploit 
in examining the distributional impact on household welfare of the food price changes.
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Table 4: Median Real Market Food Price Changes , 1991/92-1998/99(%)
Cereals Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol
Region
Western -17.5 22.9 129.2 177.7 161.4
Central 17.1 -1.7 134.0 208.4 197.7
Greater Accra 27.6 -2.7 124.1 196.3 113.9
Eastern 4.3 -6.7 132.5 166.5 165.1
Volta 10.7 4.7 101.8 180.4 167.6
Ashanti -46.8 8.3 137.5 172.7 171.1
Brong Ahafo 50.5 29.5 115.2 115.5 207.8
Northern 0.5 26.8 69.2 135.1 201.4
Upper West 28.6 -9.8 119.2 160.1 211.1
Upper East -5.1 -11.3 91.8 133.7 211.3
Locality
Rural 13.9 6.9 126.9 168.8 192.1
Urban -18.0 5.8 122.2 170.8 134.2
All Ghana 3.1 7.9 123.5 173.4 178.4
Source: Authors” calculations from GLSS 3 & 4
5.  Empirical Results
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix report the structural parameters together with their 
p-values from the demand system estimated using the SURE procedure based on the 1991/92 
and 1998/99 GLSS data respectively. Th e estimated coeffi  cients obtained by imposing the 
conventional homogeneity and symmetry demand restrictions are mostly signifi cant at the 5 
percent level or better, indicating that the expenditure shares for each commodity are responsive 
to prices and income and to most of the household and demographic variables included in the 
model. With the budget shares as dependent variables (not the quantities consumed), a positive 
and statistically signifi cant expenditure coeffi  cient implies that the budget share increases with 
total food spending, suggesting that the expenditure elasticity would be greater than one and the 
commodity is a luxury good (see Table A8 in the Appendix). Th is is the case for meat and alcohol 
in 1991/92 and for meat, alcohol and tubers in 1998/99. Household size is a strong determinant 
of all expenditure shares. Household size is strongly negatively correlated with budget shares for 
meat and alcohol in both 1991/92 and 1998/99, implying that budget shares for these goods are 
falling with household size. Regional dummies and urban locality are also good determinants 
of household spending patterns. Th e estimates suggest that households located in the three 
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northern regions have the largest budget shares for cereals, and the lowest shares for tubers and 
fi sh.45
5.1  Demand Elasticities
We now turn to the discussion of the estimated demand elasticities, which are needed to properly 
evaluate the welfare consequences of the reforms discussed earlier. Th e Marshallian (ordinary) 
elasticity matrices for 1991/92 and 1998/99 evaluated at the sample means are reported in Tables 
5 and 6 respectively, which include the cross-price elasticity estimates. Tables A6 and A7 in the 
Appendix contain the Hicksian (income-compensated) demand elasticity matrices for 1991/92 
and 1998/99 respectively. Th e expenditure (income) elasticities computed at the sample means 
using equation (8) are also presented in Table A8 in the Appendix.
As shown in Table 5, all the estimated Marshallian (uncompensated) own-price elasticities are 
negative. Consistent with consumer demand theory, there exists an inverse relationship between 
changes in own-price indexes and quantities demanded. In most cases the absolute value of 
the own-price elasticity is greater than unity, meaning that they are price elastic. Th e Hicksian 
(compensated) own-price elasticities reported in Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix corroborate 
the information in Tables 5 and 8. As expected, in all cases, the compensated elasticities are 
lower than the uncompensated ones. Even after the income-compensation, tubers and meat 
(in 1991/92) remain the only commodities with own-price elasticity exceeding unity. For the 
remainder of the foods, the absolute values of the own-price elasticities are smaller than unity, 
meaning that they are not price elastic.
Several of the cross-price elasticities are particularly interesting in respect of the nature of 
the substitutability and complementarity between the various commodity groups (see Tables A6 
and A7 in the Appendix). Th e compensated cross-price elasticities adjusted for real expenditure 
(income) changes appear to suggest, quite surprisingly, that cereal and fi sh, which constitute the 
core diet for the poorest households, were net substitutes in both years. Similarly, tubers and 
meat, consumed more intensively by the richest households, were net substitutes in 1998/99 but 
complements in 1991/92. Th e negative sign of the cross-price elasticities between cereals and 
tubers and between meat and fi sh suggests that these commodity groups are net complements.46 
Meat was a net complement to cereal in 1991/92 and fi sh was similarly a net complement to 
tubers in 1998/99. Alcohol was a net complement to all goods except meat in 1991/92. Th e 
45 Although there are no accessible estimates for Ghana to be used as points of reference, we believe that the estimates are plausible 
and are generally consistent with a priori expectations.
46 A possible explanation of this phenomenon may be due to the fact that cassava and maize, which constitute about 9 percent 
and 5 percent respectively of the budget share for the average Ghanaian, are jointly used for the preparation of the some 
important local dishes (e.g. banku in the south and tuozafi  in the north). It is also very common to fi nd a combination of some 
meat (e.g. beef, chicken wings) and fi sh in most Ghanaian household meals.
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nature of these commodities suggests that diets for poor and rich households are interrelated 
after all. Th is has implications for public policy in Ghana. Th e results seem to suggest that pro-
poor policies targeted at individual commodities without recognising these interdependencies 
can be fl awed. Elimination of protection in one market (say cereals) aimed to benefi t the poor 
will have limited welfare impact if signifi cant distortions persist in other markets (say meat).
For both 1991/92 and 1998/99 all goods had positive consumption expenditure elasticities, 
implying that no commodity was classifi ed as “inferior”; all were “normal goods” (see Table A8 
in the Appendix). Th e expenditure elasticities for all goods appear to change over the period, 
even if marginally. As expected, commodities that constitute the diet of poorer households have 
lower income elasticities. In 1991/92, cereals, tubers, fi sh and ‘other food’ were necessities ( 1ie < ) 
while meat and alcohol were found to be luxury ( 1ie > ). In 1998/99, cereals and fi sh remained 
necessities whereas the expenditure elasticity for tubers increased above unity. Recall that by the 
end of the 1990s cereals (27.3 percent) and fi sh (17.7 percent) alone constituted 45 percent of 
the food expenditures for the average poorest household.
Table 5: Marshallian (Ordinary) Demand Elasticity Matrix, 1991-92.
Commodity With Respect to the Price of
Cereal Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Cereals -1.027 -0.304 -0.170 -0.034 -0.092 -0.349
Tubers -0.066 -1.409 0.002 -0.031 -0.091 -0.198
Fish -0.151 -0.257 -0.874 -0.062 -0.070 -0.437
Meat -0.421 -0.156 -1.618 -2.014 0.452 0.691
Alcohol -0.227 -0.085 -0.288 0.055 -0.969 -0.702
Other Food -0.113 -0.204 -0.324 0.040 -0.083 -1.308
Source: Authors” calculations from GLSS 3.
Table 6: Marshallian (Ordinary) Demand Elasticity Matrix, 1998/1999
Commodity With Respect to the Price of
Cereals Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Cereal -1.102 -0.328 -0.127 0.010 -0.088 -0.295
Tubers -0.372 -1.037 -0.520 0.034 0.016 -0.370
Fish -0.067 -0.433 -0.988 -0.114 -0.026 -0.203
Meat -0.107 0.088 -0.935 -0.758 0.015 -0.718
Alcohol -0.422 0.136 -0.217 0.040 -1.004 -0.615
Other Food -0.175 -0.166 -0.190 -0.041 -0.071 -1.356
Source: Authors” calculations from GLSS 4.
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5.2  Price Changes and Consumer Welfare
Th e estimated elasticities can be used to assess the welfare consequences of the food price 
changes that occurred during the 1990s. Th e measurement of the ‘dynamic’ household welfare 
eff ect, one that jointly considers (static) fi rst-order eff ects in consumption as well as consumption 
responses, is the object of this sub-section. While the fi rst term in equation (13) – the fi rst-order 
approximation – may capture a large part of the impact of price changes on welfare, ignoring 
household behavioural responses in welfare analysis – the second order approximation - may lead 
to signifi cant biases and inappropriate inferences (see Banks et al., 1996; McCulloch, 2003; Niimi, 
2005; Nicita, 2004b; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002). Th e fi rst-order approximation of impact 
of price changes implicitly assumes that households are unable to change their consumption 
patterns when prices change (equivalent to assuming that all elasticities are zero). Given the 
substantial observed price changes, substitution eff ects can be non-trivial, and therefore, fi rst-
order approximations can be seriously biased (Banks et al., 1996). However, for purposes of 
comparison, we report results from both fi rst-order and second-order approximations.
We utilize the estimated Hicksian (compensated) elasticities for 1991/92 to measure the 
welfare impact of the food price changes observed between 1991/92 and 1998/99. Following 
some recent literature (see Niimi, 2005; Nicita, 2004b; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Minot 
and Goletti, 2000), we estimate the change in consumer welfare, measured as compensating 
variation (CV). Th e CV measures the total transfer required to compensate all households for 
the price changes they experienced between 1991/92 and 1998/99, as a percentage of their 
initial total expenditure. In doing this, we also recognise the importance of determining how 
diff erent population groups are aff ected in diff erent ways by these reforms. Th us, to illustrate 
which groups of households were relatively disadvantaged by the price changes, we disaggregate 
the CV measure by income group, locality and region. Table 7 presents the welfare measure as 
a share of total household expenditure in 1991/92. For comparison purposes, we also present 
estimates from a fi rst-order approximation to the price changes, which disregards substitution 
eff ects in consumption. Th e fi rst column presents the fi rst-order eff ects computed using equation 
(11) for the various categories of households while the second column displays the full eff ects.
Table 7: Compensating Variation Implied by the Price Changes





 Rural 37.9 21.5
 Urban 29.0 17.7
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 1st quartile 35.4 22.1
 2nd quartile 35.2 20.4
 3rd quartile 34.3 19.6
 4th quartile 34.3 18.7
Poverty status
 Non-poor 34.6 19.4
 Poor 35.2 21.5
Poverty status Rural Rural
 Non-poor 39.3 21.7
 Poor 36.6 21.4
Poverty status Urban Urban
 Non-poor 29.2 16.7
 Poor 28.1 22.1
Ghana 34.8 20.2
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 3 & 4.
Note: Compensating variation is measured as a proportion of 1991/92 total household expenditures.
Th e results suggest that all household groups suff ered welfare losses arising from the food price 
increases during the 1990s. Consistent with our a priori expectations, it is clear that the fi rst order eff ect 
overstates, albeit marginally, the welfare losses for all groups of households. On average, Ghanaian 
households need to be reimbursed to the tune of about 20.2 percent of their 1991/92 total household 
expenditures for the food price changes they faced during the 1990s. Th e results, however, reveal some 
heterogeneity in the impact of price variations on households. Th e results indicate that the burden of 
higher consumer prices fell largely on the poor and on rural households.47 Th e distributional impacts 
of the price changes were quite similar for the rural poor and non-poor. However, within urban 
localities it is the poor who suff ered disproportionately, requiring a compensation of about 22 percent 
of their 1991/92 household expenditures. It is probable that a combination of the relatively lower 
compensated own-price elasticities (see Table A9 in the Appendix), which means that households 
are unable to substitute away from high-priced goods, and the higher budget shares (see Table 2), 
contributed to relatively higher welfare losses for poor households. For rural households, it appears 
that the relatively higher price increases (see Table 4), coupled with lower compensating price 
elasticities and higher budget shares (see Table A9 in the Appendix) accentuated the welfare losses.
47 Poor households are defi ned as those whose per adult equivalent expenditure is below the lower poverty line of 700,000 
cedis per year (in the constant prices of Accra in January 1999).
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What can we infer from the results? As has already been noted, the linkage between policy 
reform and price changes is complex, especially when it involves the removal of quantitative 
restrictions. Th ere could be a number of reasons that may account for welfare losses following 
the sharp food price changes such as exchange rate devaluation (depreciation), the abolition of 
fertilizer (and other input) subsidies or adverse weather conditions, which results in domestic 
production shortfalls. For example, while tariff  liberalisation is expected to reduce the domestic 
price of imports, exchange rate devaluation (depreciation) would generally achieve the opposite. 
In essence, while it is diffi  cult to attribute the price change and ,by implication, the welfare losses), 
to any particular policy per se, the results provide new insights into household consumption 
patterns and how household welfare was impacted by exogenous food price changes in the 
1990s.48 However, since our interest is in the eff ect of trade policy, the next sub-section adopts 
counterfactual experiments in an attempt to isolate the potential trade policy eff ects from those 
arising from other factors.
5.3  Trade Liberalisation and Consumer Welfare
In this sub-section, we use simulation techniques to analyse how trade liberalisation, defi ned 
here as tariff  reductions, could have altered the eff ect of the actual food price changes that 
took place in the 1990s. Our motivation derives from the hypothesis that tariff  reductions were 
possibly not dramatic enough to off set the price increases which, to some extent, resulted from 
other policy reforms. Alternatively, one could argue that tariff  reductions notwithstanding, other 
factors could have prevented price transmission from the border to local prices. Lacking suitable 
data to estimate a tariff  pass-through model, our approach is to follow the largest strand of the 
literature by using simulation analysis to explore the eff ect on welfare of a hypothetical trade 
policy reform (see for example, Porto, 2003; Minot and Goletti, 2000; Ravallion and van de Walle 
1991). Having already estimated price elasticities of demand and using a partial equilibrium 
framework, we explore the potential distributional eff ects of further import tariff  liberalisation 
on household welfare. For analytical convenience and due to data constraints, we assume that 
tariff  reductions are fully transmitted to domestic prices. Further, for the model to be tractable, 
we abstract away from any potential general equilibrium eff ects on incomes, customs revenue 
and balance of payments, to mention just a few.
For the purpose of the simulations, a policy change is described as the change in the price of 
a good resulting from the tariff  reform. We focus on a scenario in which all tariff s are cut by 50 
48 We know from Table A12 that for all foods except poultry, the import tariff fell or was unchanged during the 1990s, which 
directly implies that consumer prices for such foods would have fallen, ceteris paribus, ruling out tariff reform as the culprit 
for the price increases and the subsequent welfare losses.
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percent. For a small open economy the domestic price Dip  for traded good i  is related to the 
international price Wip  through the following equation
    ( )1D Wi i ip p t= +       (12)
where it  represents the ad valorem tariff  rate applied to the import of good i . Following Porto 
(2003), we write the change in the (logarithmic) price of the i th good as
( )ln ln 1Di id p d t= +        (13)
Using data on pre-reform tariff s and prices, we use (15) to compute the price changes that 
would result from the tariff  reform. Th e tariff s that apply to each of the six composite goods (and 
their components) are listed in Table A12 in the Appendix. Equation (15) is estimated using the 
MFN tariff  rates that prevailed in 1993 as the benchmark. Th e average tariff  on food imports in 
1993 ranges between 20 percent (for cereal, fi sh and meat) and 25 percent (for tubers and alcohol). 
Applying (15) to the hypothetical reform of 50 percent tariff  reductions results in the prices of 
cereal, fi sh and meat declining by 8.7 percent and the prices of tubers and alcohol falling by 10.5 
percent. Th ese price changes are employed in re-estimating equation (13). Table 10 presents the 
simulation results of the eff ects of the 50 percent across-the-board tariff  reductions.
Th e negative CV estimates indicate that all households would gain from further tariff 
reductions, suggesting that the tariff  liberalisation in the 1990s was probably not large enough. 
Implementing the 50 percent across-the-board tariff  cuts and thus reducing domestic prices 
by 8.7 percent to 10.5 percent could have off set the adverse eff ects of the price movements 
experienced in the 1990s. On average, the government would need to take away from each 
household about 6 percent of their 1991/92 total household expenditures to reduce its welfare 
to pre-reform levels. Th e experiment further suggests that poor consumers, especially in the 
rural areas, would be the major benefi ciaries of further tariff  liberalization. Th is means that tariff  
liberalisation would tend to benefi t the poor (6.4 percent) over the rich (5.7 percent) and thereby 
potentially reduce inequality. Rural households also stand to gain substantially (6.5 percent), 
compared to their urban counterparts (5 percent). Th ese fi ndings indicate that trade policy may 
not have been responsible for the welfare losses observed in the previous analysis. Th e role of 
other factors and policies, such as the removal of fertilizer subsidies, exchange rate depreciation 
and domestic supply constraints could be decisive.
Tables 8 and 9 provide information on what happened to real incomes of households across 
the income distribution categories and in diff erent sectors during the 1990s. We are interested 
in knowing whether real incomes increased enough to compensate households for the food price 
shocks and the implied welfare losses documented in Table 9. Table 9 shows a marginal increase 
in average real income by 2.5 percent between 1991/92 and 1998/99. However, across the income 
distribution categories and locality, the evidence indicates that it is not uniformly the case that 
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all households experienced real income increase. Consistent with our a priori expectations, 
urban households in Ghana, especially the poorest (32.8 percent), had their real incomes falling 
substantially (10.7 percent) compared with an increase in real incomes for rural households 
(12.5 percent). In fact, it is non-poor rural households who saw the greatest improvement in 
income at 21 percent. Th ese results show that even after allowing for real income increases, poor 
households, particularly in urban localities, were clearly disadvantaged by the rising consumer 
food prices.
Table 8: Compensating Variation due to Tariff  Reform
Household Category First-order Effects (%) Full Effects (CV) 
(%)
Locality
 Rural  -6.3  -6.5
 Urban  -4.8  -5.0
Income group
 1st quartile  -6.3  -6.5
 2nd quartile  -6.1  -6.2
 3rd quartile  -5.7  -5.9
 4th quartile  -5.2  -5.4
Poverty status
 Non-poor  -5.5  -5.7
 Poor  -6.2  -6.4
Poverty status  Rural  Rural
 Non-poor  -6.2  -6.4
 Poor  -6.5  -6.6
Poverty status  Urban  Urban
 Non-poor  -4.8  -4.9
 Poor  -5.2  -5.3
Ghana  -5.8  -6.0
Source: Authors‘ calculations from GLSS 3 & 4 
Note: Compensating variation is measured as a proportion of 1991/92 total household expenditures.
Table 9: Household Income and Changes in the 1990s
Household Category 1991/92 1998/99 Changes (%)
Locality
 Rural 2,024,815 2,277,439 12.5
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Household Category 1991/92 1998/99 Changes (%)
 Urban 3,029,128 2,704,301 -10.7
Income group
 1st quartile 1,680,675 1,458,722 -13.2
 2nd quartile 2,300,523 2,211,556 -3.9
 3rd quartile 2,472,098 2,877,610 16.4
 4th quartile 3,046,975 3,188,210 4.6
Poverty status
 Non-poor 2,712,510 2,831,827 4.4
 Poor 1,865,052 1,573,762 -15.6
Poverty status Rural Rural
 Non-poor 2,276,180 2,753,458 21
 Poor 1,784,633 1,583,733 -11.3
Poverty status Urban Urban
 Non-poor 3,202,658 2,927,371 -8.6
 Poor 2,275,599 1,529,843 -32.8
Ghana 2,374,914 2,433,936 2.5
Source: Author’s calculations from GLSS 3 & 4.
Note: Amounts are stated in Cedis per annum in the constant prices of Accra in January 1999.
6.  Conclusion
In this study we had three main objectives: (1) to estimate for the fi rst time a complete food 
demand system using recent household survey data for Ghana; (2) to measure the (consumer) 
welfare impact on households of food price changes in the 1990s; and (3) to assess the extent 
to which changes can be explained by trade and agricultural policy reforms. Using the linear 
approximate version of the AIDS model, we have calculated expenditure, own-price and cross-
price demand elasticities for six food aggregates important for providing the calorifi c needs 
of most Ghanaian households. Th e results indicate that demand for most food commodities 
in Ghana is price sensitive. Th e estimated price and expenditure elasticities are plausible and 
consistent with economic theory: all own-price elasticities were negative and statistically 
signifi cant. Similarly, estimated expenditure elasticities were positive and statistically signifi cant 
for all food groups as is expected. Th e demand estimates presented in this chapter provide the 
fi rst detailed information about the characteristics of food demand in Ghana.
With regard to our second and third objectives, we employed the estimated price elasticities 
to evaluate the welfare consequences of the relative food price changes in terms of compensating 
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variation. Results suggest that Ghanaian household consumption did respond to relative price 
and real income changes, which to some extent resulted from policy reforms. We fi nd that the 
remarkable increases in food prices resulted in severe erosion of real income and purchasing power 
for the urban poor in particular. Although the food price changes have had diff erential eff ects 
on the population, the general experience has been that, for the vast majority of households, the 
price changes have brought severe hardship through higher food prices. Th e results indicate that 
the burden of higher consumer food prices fell largely on urban poor households.
While it is diffi  cult to attribute the food price changes, and by implication the welfare losses, 
to any particular policy per se, our counterfactual experiment indicates that trade liberalisation 
may not (for consumers) have been responsible for the welfare losses. Th e role of other factors 
and policies, such as the removal of fertilizer subsidies and exchange rate depreciation, could be 
decisive. Th e simulation exercise suggests that further tariff  liberalisation would tend to off set 
the welfare losses of higher food prices for all household groups, although it is the poor and rural 
consumers that stand to gain the most. In sum, the results suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that 
although trade liberalisation may have a positive impact on welfare, at least from a consumption 
perspective, other factors may off set this, at least in the case of Ghana.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary Statistics - Explanatory Variables (except prices)
1992-93 1998-99
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Expenditure Variable (Cedis)
 Total Food Spending 330,690 228,862 2,271,279 1,637,836
Demographic variables
Age of Head 44.3 15.3 45.8 15.4
Age ofHhead Squared 2195.9 1525.7 2336.9 1563.6
Log of Household Size 1.271 0.724 1.245 0.697
Geographical Variables
Dummy Variables for -
 Urban Locality 0.349 0.477 0.367 0.482
 Central Region 0.114 0.318 0.117 0.321
 Greater Accra Rregion 0.140 0.347 0.143 0.350
 Eastern Region 0.146 0.353 0.107 0.309
 Volta Region 0.090 0.287 0.137 0.344
 Ashanti Region 0.162 0.369 0.177 0.381
 Brong Ahafo Region 0.100 0.301 0.090 0.286
 Northern Region 0.075 0.263 0.060 0.238
 Upper West Region 0.024 0.154 0.020 0.140
 Upper East Region 0.042 0.201 0.043 0.204






Table A2: Parameter Estimates for the AIDS Model, 1991/92












Intercept 0.224 0.000 0.186 0.028 0.755 0.000 -0.033 0.477 -0.187 0.000
Total Food Expenditure -0.017 0.002 0.019 0.040 -0.083 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.000
Relative Prices (in logs)
Cereals 0.010 0.002 -0.006 0.129 -0.003 0.311 0.000 0.961 -0.005 0.061
Tubers, roots & plantain -0.006 0.129 -0.013 0.128 0.004 0.466 -0.007 0.012 -0.002 0.693
Fish -0.003 0.311 0.004 0.466 0.007 0.545 0.005 0.396 0.020 0.000
Meat 0.000 0.961 -0.007 0.012 0.005 0.396 -0.014 0.100 0.001 0.749
Alcohol -0.005 0.061 -0.002 0.693 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.749 -0.001 0.872
Demographic & geographic
Age of Head -0.001 0.211 0.000 0.717 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.003 0.000
Age of Hhead Squared 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.000
Log of Household Size 0.014 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.032 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.023 0.000
Urban Dummy 0.029 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.004 0.417 -0.008 0.001 -0.025 0.000
Central 0.034 0.000 -0.052 0.000 0.043 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.022 0.000
Greater Accra 0.067 0.000 -0.128 0.000 -0.004 0.690 -0.011 0.006 -0.024 0.000
Eastern 0.018 0.007 -0.006 0.578 0.007 0.323 -0.007 0.020 -0.017 0.002
Volta 0.096 0.000 -0.092 0.000 -0.027 0.002 -0.006 0.084 -0.002 0.682
Ashanti 0.033 0.000 -0.017 0.138 -0.030 0.000 -0.008 0.014 -0.025 0.000
Brong Ahafo 0.009 0.251 0.015 0.208 -0.038 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.006 0.292
Northern 0.147 0.000 -0.185 0.000 -0.096 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.012 0.138
Upper West 0.224 0.000 -0.295 0.000 -0.164 0.000 0.004 0.522 0.098 0.000
Upper East 0.333 0.000 -0.293 0.000 -0.168 0.000 0.012 0.028 -0.005 0.560
 R-squared 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.05 0.11















Table A3: Parameter Estimates for the AIDS Model, 1998/99












Intercept 0.363 0.000 0.116 0.037 0.711 0.000 -0.097 0.001 -0.056 0.084
Total Food Expenditure -0.027 0.000 0.010 0.050 -0.043 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.004
Relative Prices (in logs)
Cereals 0.005 0.103 -0.005 0.067 -0.008 0.001 0.011 0.000 -0.007 0.000
Tubers, roots & plantain -0.005 0.067 -0.012 0.007 0.000 0.906 -0.004 0.020 0.008 0.000
Fish -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.906 -0.018 0.000 -0.001 0.466 0.004 0.040
Meat 0.011 0.000 -0.004 0.020 -0.001 0.466 0.006 0.015 0.000 0.804
Alcohol -0.007 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.040 0.000 0.804 0.000 0.930
Demographic & geographic
Age of Head 0.000 0.692 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.157 0.001 0.056
Age of Head Squared 0.000 0.778 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.012
Log of Household Size 0.028 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.021 0.000 -0.003 0.008 -0.015 0.000
Urban Dummy 0.023 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.001 0.897 0.000 0.938 -0.008 0.006
Central 0.006 0.378 -0.031 0.001 0.011 0.102 0.000 0.889 0.003 0.474
Greater Accra 0.031 0.000 -0.081 0.000 -0.010 0.094 0.006 0.034 0.024 0.000
Eastern 0.052 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.009 0.139 0.004 0.127 0.023 0.000
Volta -0.003 0.563 0.005 0.496 -0.014 0.020 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.011
Ashanti 0.007 0.241 0.010 0.216 -0.016 0.004 0.011 0.000 -0.007 0.059
Brong Ahafo 0.009 0.186 0.050 0.000 -0.041 0.000 0.003 0.311 -0.001 0.820
Northern 0.154 0.000 -0.158 0.000 -0.135 0.000 0.010 0.008 0.021 0.000
Upper West 0.263 0.000 -0.215 0.000 -0.216 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.152 0.000
Upper East 0.193 0.000 -0.272 0.000 -0.166 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.065 0.000
R-squared 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.05 0.13
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 4.
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Table A4: Expenditure Shares in Ghana, by Region in 1991/92
Cereals Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Region
Western 0.08 0.29 0.23 0.02 0.05 0.22
Central 0.10 0.26 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.25
Greater Accra 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.43
Eastern 0.09 0.30 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.22
Volta 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.23
Ashanti 0.10 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.31
Brong Ahafo 0.08 0.34 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.26
Northern 0.26 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.36
Upper West 0.30 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.31
Upper East 0.41 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.29
Locality
Rural 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.23
Urban 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.38
All Ghana 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.29
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 3
Table A5: Expenditure Shares in Ghana, by Region in 1998/99
Cereals Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Region
Western 0.15 0.29 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.25
Central 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.01 0.03 0.28
Greater Accra 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.41
Eastern 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.25
Volta 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.24
Ashanti 0.14 0.28 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.29
Brong Ahafo 0.13 0.33 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.25
Northern 0.29 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.38
Upper West 0.43 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.21
Upper East 0.32 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.40
Locality
Rural 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.02 0.04 0.25
Urban 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.37
All Ghana 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.30
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 4.
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Table A6: Hicksian (Compensated) Demand Elasticity Matrix, 1991-92
Commodity With Respect to the Price of
Cereals Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Cereals -0.908 -0.073 0.005 -0.014 -0.053 0.031
Tubers 0.025 -1.094 0.098 -0.005 -0.045 -0.049
Fish 0.001 -0.111 -0.776 -0.037 -0.008 -0.138
Meat -0.109 0.387 -1.104 -1.973 0.545 1.744
Alcohol -0.067 0.189 -0.015 0.082 -0.904 -0.195
Other Food 0.009 0.033 -0.144 0.061 -0.043 -0.920
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 3.
Table A7: Hicksian (Compensated) Demand Elasticity Matrix, 1998/1999
Commodity With respect to the Price of
Cereal Tubers Fish Meat Alcohol Other Food
Cereals -0.951 -0.125 0.046 0.034 -0.050 -0.009
Tubers -0.114 -0.729 -0.245 0.075 0.082 0.121
Fish 0.045 -0.262 -0.838 -0.096 0.003 0.016
Meat 0.202 0.496 -0.592 -0.711 0.093 -0.161
Alcohol -0.229 0.408 0.012 0.071 -0.955 -0.244
Other Food -0.005 0.068 0.009 -0.014 -0.028 -1.031
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 4.
Table A8: Expenditure (Income) Elasticity of Demand: 1998/99
Commodity 1991-92 1998-99
Cereals 0.966 0.876




Other Food 0.987 0.999
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 3 & 4.
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Table A9: Demand Elasticities -1991/92, by Income Group and Locality
 Commodity Poor Non-poor Urban Rural All Households
Expenditure Elasticities
Cereals 0.966 0.966 0.971 0.962 0.966
Tubers, roots & plantain 1.433 0.310 0.235 1.356 0.723
Fish 0.944 0.686 0.381 1.045 0.781
Meat 3.097 2.242 2.803 2.393 2.556
Alcohol 1.818 1.009 0.727 1.689 1.306
Other Food 0.986 0.987 0.990 0.985 0.987
Uncompensated Own-price Elasticities
Cereals -1.036 -1.022 -1.047 -1.014 -1.027
Tubers, roots & plantain -1.089 -1.595 -1.782 -1.163 -1.409
Fish -1.090 -0.749 -0.416 -1.177 -0.874
Meat -2.349 -1.819 -2.174 -1.908 -2.014
Alcohol -0.787 -1.074 -1.164 -0.840 -0.969
Other food -1.273 -1.328 -1.417 -1.235 -1.308
Compensated Own-price Elasticities
Cereals -0.908 -0.907 -0.921 -0.899 -0.908
Tubers, roots & plantain -0.773 -1.280 -1.522 -0.811 -1.094
Fish -0.960 -0.670 -0.348 -1.059 -0.776
Meat -2.316 -1.773 -2.133 -1.867 -1.973
Alcohol -0.726 -1.007 -1.111 -0.767 -0.904
Other Food -0.914 -0.923 -0.938 -0.908 -0.920
Source: Author’s calculations using GLSS 3.
Table A10: Demand Elasticities -1998/99, by Income Group and Locality
 Commodity Poor Non-poor Urban Rural All Households
Expenditure Elasticities
Cereals 0.896 0.867 0.877 0.874 0.876
Tubers, Roots & Plantain 1.541 1.396 1.606 1.337 1.439
Fish 0.740 0.681 0.698 0.699 0.699
Meat 1.817 1.709 1.706 1.764 1.742
Alcohol 1.161 1.140 1.149 1.145 1.146
Other food 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Uncompensated Own-price Elasticities
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 Commodity Poor Non-poor Urban Rural All Households
Cereals -1.148 -1.082 -1.099 -1.103 -1.102
Tubers, roots & plantain -0.975 -1.064 -0.875 -1.137 -1.037
Fish -1.032 -0.969 -0.965 -1.002 -0.988
Meat -0.716 -0.776 -0.781 -0.744 -0.758
Alcohol -1.001 -1.005 -1.002 -1.005 -1.004
Other Food -1.337 -1.365 -1.423 -1.316 -1.356
Compensated Own-price Elasticities
Cereals -0.960 -0.947 -0.951 -0.951 -0.951
Tubers, roots & plantain -0.686 -0.747 -0.621 -0.795 -0.729
Fish -0.869 -0.825 -0.836 -0.839 -0.838
Meat -0.681 -0.724 -0.727 -0.702 -0.711
Alcohol -0.951 -0.957 -0.954 -0.955 -0.955
Other food -1.033 -1.030 -1.024 -1.035 -1.031
Source: Authors’ alculations using GLSS 4.
Table A11: Consumer Price Indices, 1991/92 – 1998/99 (September 1997=100)
Month Food Non-Food Combined
GLSS 3 (1991/92)
Sep-91 21.2 18.0 18.9
Oct-91 21.0 18.1 19.0
Nov-91 21.0 18.2 19.0
Dec-91 21.0 18.2 19.1
Jan-92 21.1 18.3 19.1
Feb-92 21.7 18.5 19.5
Mar-92 22.7 18.7 19.9
Apr-92 23.4 19.1 20.4
May-92 24.2 19.2 20.7
Jun-92 24.4 19.3 20.8
Jul-92 24.5 19.7 21.1
Aug-92 24.4 19.9 21.3
Sep-92 24.0 19.9 21.1
Average 22.7 18.9 20.0
GLSS 4 (1998/99)
Apr-98 124.4 108.3 115.9
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Month Food Non-Food Combined
May-98 129.0 110.2 119.0
Jun-98 128.7 111.8 119.7
Jul-98 125.9 111.2 118.2
Aug-98 125.4 112.0 118.4
Sep-98 121.9 113.2 117.4
Oct-98 118.0 113.7 115.8
Nov-98 117.9 113.5 115.6
Dec-98 119.8 114.2 116.9
Jan-99 122.7 115.1 118.7
Feb-99 125.2 118.8 121.9
Mar-99 127.8 121.6 124.6
Average 123.9 113.6 118.5
% change in CPI between
1991/92 and 1998/99
415.8 471.3 461.5
Source: Statistical Service, Statistical Newsletter (various issues)
Table A12: Tariff s on Agricultural Food Imports
Commodity 1993 2000 % change
Meat
Goat  20  20  0
Poultry  20  40  100
Pork  20  20  0
Beef  20  20  0
Mutton  20  20  0
Fish
Herrings  20  0  -100
Cod  20  0  -100
Sardines (not tin)  20  0  -100
Haddock  20  0  -100
Mackerel  20  0  -100
Lobsters, shrimps & prawns  25  20  -20
Tubers & starchy roots (cassava)  25  20  -20
Cereals
Rice (paddy or rough)  20  20  0
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Commodity 1993 2000 % change
Sorghum  20  0  -100
Wheat  20  20  0
Millet  20  20  0
Other Cereals  20  20  0
Alcohol
Beers  25  20  -20
Sparkling Wine  25  20  -20
Whiskies & Rum  25  20  -20
Gin & Brandy  25  20  -20
Vodka.  25  20  -20
Other spirits  25  20  -20
Source: Authors’ calculations using HS 6-digit level tariff  data from UNCTAD TRAINS Database.
(Endnotes)
1 See Deaton (1997); (Deaton and Grimard (1992); Friedman and Levinsohn (2002); Kedir (2001, 2005); and Nicita (2004a, b) 
for applications of how unit values have been used in place of market prices.
2 The compensating variation is derived from a second-order Taylor expansion of the minimum expenditure function.
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Th e Eff ect of Import Liberalization on Import 
Tariff   Yield in Ghana
William Gabriel Brafu-Insaidoo and Camara Kwasi Obeng
1. Introduction
Trade liberalization has formed a very important component of economic reform programs in 
Ghana since 1983. In terms of sequencing, Ghana did not go through the normal intermediary 
stage of translating quantitative restrictions into equivalent tariff s before gradually reducing the 
tariff s. Most quantitative restrictions, including import licensing, were eliminated at the same 
time as went ahead to reduce the level and range of tariff s.
Th e reason for import trade liberalization as part of this economic reforms was to reduce 
the the government spread between the offi  cial and parallel exchange rates, and to provide 
foreign exchange to ease import suppression with the aim of increasing output, particularly in 
the export sector. In this regard, the long term goal was to replace quantitative restrictions with 
price instruments.
However, the impact of the liberalization on trade tax revenue has been a subject of debate in 
recent times. Th ere are concerns about existing ambiguity in both theory and empirical evidence 
on the relationship between trade liberalization and trade tax revenue in the global context. In 
theory, liberalization in the form of lower tariff  rates and the simplifi cation of rates causes direct 
trade tax revenue loss on one hand, but can also amount to an increase in volume of imports, and 
hence the tax base and revenue. Th e net eff ect depends on a host of factors, including the initial 
trade regime and the extent of increase in demand for imports. Empirical studies confi rm this 
ambiguous relationship suggested in theory (see Tanzi, 1989; Ebrill et al., 1999; Glenday, 2000; 
Khattry et al., 2002; Agbeyegbe et al., 2003; Economic Commission for Africa, 2004; Suliman, 
2005).
Oduro (2000) asserts that trade liberalization has been fi scally incompatible in Ghana for the 
1990s even though Jebuni et al., (1994) indicate that trade liberalization is fi scally compatible 
for the second half of the 1980s. Such studies only rely on descriptive analysis of changes in tax 
revenues. Th ey do not apply testable models in investigating the exact impact trade liberalization 
has on trade tax revenues in Ghana.
To validate Oduro’s assertion, this chapter used regression analysis, applied to testable models, 
in examining such relationships from observed data. Th e empirical purpose of this study was to 
quantitatively determine the impact of import liberalization on import tariff  revenue in Ghana. 
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fi rst step involved an estimation of the import tariff  yield in Ghana and an examination of the 
dynamics of the yield under conditions of import liberalization. Th e model was then extended to 
examine the quantitative eff ect of import liberalization on tariff  revenue in Ghana.
Th e organization of the study is as follows: In the next section a brief discussion of trends in 
trade liberalization in Ghana is made. Th is is followed by an explanation of what the authors 
mean by import trade liberalization and a presentation of the approach to study in Section 3. 
Findings from the analysis are then reported in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the fi ndings 
and provides conclusions and policy implications of the study.
2. Trade Liberalization in Ghana
Until the inception of the Economic Recovery Programme in 1983, Ghana had operated 
alternating intermittent episodes of a fairly liberal trade regime. Th e fi rst was between 1950 and 
1961 as a member of the sterling zone, with virtually no restrictions on payments to and from 
member countries but imposed restrictions on payments to non-member countries. Interruption 
of the liberalization process was basically the result of fi scal indiscipline and depletion of the 
country’s foreign exchange reserves. Th e country’s second experience of a liberal import regime 
was between 1967 and 1971. Under this regime, the domestic currency was devalued by about 43 
percent and import duties on some selected items were reduced. Again, the process of liberalization 
was interrupted with a resort to control measures in 1972 following the deterioration of the 
country’s balance of payments position and depletion of its foreign exchange reserves due to 
fi scal indiscipline and huge import bills ( Jebuni, Oduro and Tutu, 1994).
Th e current episode of trade liberalization has been an integral part of the structural 
adjustment programmes which began in 1983 and can be categorized into three phases: the 
period of attempted liberalization or transition to import liberalization; the period of import 
liberalization; and the period of liberalized trade regime (Oduro, 2000; Brafu-Insaidoo and 
Obeng, 2008).
Th e period of attempted liberalization or transition to import liberalization covers the 
years 1983–1986. Th is period is characterized by the introduction of a system of bonuses and 
surcharges, and their later replacement by frequent nominal devaluations. Import tariff  rates 
were adjusted downward, but the range of rates with the import licensing system and import 
programming were maintained. Aside from these, the period witnessed a decline in export tax 
rates that was greater than the decline in import tariff s. Th e period of import liberalization 
per se ran from 1986 to 1989. Th is period was characterized by the introduction of a formal 
dual exchange rate system, which was later unifi ed into a single exchange rate system based 
on auctioning and a further liberalization of the exchange rate. Other features of this phase of 
the liberalization process include a redefi ning of the import licensing categories, a reduction of 
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the import tax schedule and a reduction in the sales taxes on imported goods by 10 percentage 
points. Th e foreign exchange retention scheme was liberalized in 1987, while the cocoa export 
tax rate (made up of the ratio of cocoa duties to cocoa export earnings) was reduced.
A liberalized trade regime has been in place since 1989. Th is period has been characterized 
by a replacement of retail auctioning with wholesale auctioning in the foreign exchange market 
in 1990, abolition of the import licensing system, decline in import tax rates on raw materials 
and capital goods, and reduction in sales tax on imported basic consumer goods. Over this same 
period, protective duty rates were introduced for specifi c goods in 1990 and 1994, and the export 
retention scheme was phased out.
Th e most favoured nation (MFN) tariff s apply on most imports, except those from the 
Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) member countries, which have 
attracted duty-free rates since 1996.
Under the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme established in 1990, Ghana initially 
provided preferential tariff  reductions of 20 percent on imports of a few goods from some 
countries that had been granted community status. Products from member states that qualifi ed 
for preferential treatment attracted rates of 8, 16 and 20 percent while similar items from other 
countries attracted duty rates of 10, 20 and 25 percent respectively.
However, since 1996 most imports from member countries have attracted duty free rates. 
Ghana provides duty-free preferences on a range of unprocessed agricultural products and 
several industrial products imported from enterprises sited within member countries, and that 
are eligible to receive such preferential treatment. Eligibility is based on whether the imports 
meet the ECOWAS rules of origin and have obtained at least, 60 percent of their raw materials 
from within the Community.
3. Concepts and Methods
Before discussing the approaches used in our analysis, our initial eff ort is to discuss the defi nition and 
concept of trade liberalization broadly, as well as those specifi cally considered in our analysis.
3.1 Concepts and Defi nitions
Th e defi nition of trade liberalization is fraught with ambiguity (Edwards, 1989). On a wider 
scale, the benchmark defi nition of trade liberalization indicates a change from the use of 
quantitative restrictions to the use of price instruments. Th is defi nition lends support to the 
assertion that quantitative restrictions must be replaced with equivalent tariff s (Krueger, 1986). 
Jebuni et al. (1994) regard this defi nition as second-best liberalization. A second defi nition of 
trade liberalization is frequently regarded as a move toward neutrality in relative prices. In this 
instance, trade liberalization is considered as the provision or increase in fi nancial incentives for 
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exports equivalent to some given proportion of custom duty on imports. An extensive defi nition 
of trade liberalization demands the elimination of quantitative restrictions and reduction in 
import tariff  rates. Th is represents a move towards free trade.
Ghana’s liberalization process could be described as one of a move toward free trade. Unlike 
in many developing countries, Ghana did not go through the intermediary stage of translating 
its quantitative restrictions into equivalent tariff s before steadily but progressively reducing the 
tariff s. Most quantitative restrictions, including import licensing, were eliminated at the same 
time as it went ahead to reduce the level and range of tariff s.
Trade liberalization basically consists of the liberalization of quantitative import restrictions, tariff  
liberalization, and the reduction or elimination of taxes on exports. Often, trade liberalization has been 
accompanied by exchange rate devaluation and liberalization and has in most cases been regarded as an 
integral component of the liberalization process. Th e liberalization of quantitative import restrictions 
consists of the relaxation or removal of the restrictions. Tariff  liberalization involves reducing the 
average tariff  rate, a unifi cation of the range of import tax rates towards a single rate and the phasing 
out of tariff s. Th e focus of our estimation exercise is on the impact of import liberalization on tariff  
revenue from imports. Consequently, our measures of trade liberalization exclude changes in export 
taxes, but involve a brief consideration of the relative importance of exchange rate variations.
3.2 Buoyancy and Elasticity
Our analysis begins with evaluating the import tariff  yield in Ghana. Th is is meant to determine 
the effi  ciency of the trade tax administration system and to fi nd out whether revenue leakage 
remains a major problem for import tax after trade liberalization.
Two measures are usually used for this exercise. Th ese are the buoyancy and elasticity of a 
given tax system. Th e buoyancy measures growth in duty revenue as a result of growth in income, 
refl ecting the combined eff ects of tax base expansion and discretionary changes in tax rates, base 
defi nition and changes in collection and enforcement of the law. Elasticity, on the other hand, 
measures control for discretionary tax measures, implying that changes in duty revenues are 
attributed to automatic or natural growth of the economy (Osoro, 1993).
Generally, the buoyancy of a tax is obtained assuming the following functional form:
TR = αYβε     (1)
Th is can be re-written in double log as follows:
Log TR
t




      (2)
where TR and Y are real import tariff  revenue and income or GDP in aggregate level respectively, 
α and ε represent a constant and error term respectively. Th e parameter β then becomes the 
direct measure of buoyancy. It follows from equation 1 that, (∂TR/∂Y)(Y/TR) = β.
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Th e buoyancy of a tax system, which generally, refers to the responsiveness of tax revenue to 
a change in income, is defi ned as:
Ετ,y = (∂TR/∂Y)*(Y/TR) = [(∂TR/∂B)*(B/TR)][( ∂B/∂Y)*(Y/B)] (3)
where TR is tax revenue, Y is income (GDP) and ∂ denotes partial derivatives. Th e right hand 
side of equation 3 represents a decomposed version of the tariff  buoyancy, interpreted as elasticity 
of tariff  revenue with respect to tax base (imports in this case) and the elasticity of the base with 
respect to income (GDP). Overall, tax base-to-income elasticities can be determined by how 
the economic structure changes with economic growth. Th e tax-to-base elasticities, on the other 
hand, show the revenue growth that is within the control of customs administration or can be 
attributed to effi  ciency in customs administration.
To fi nd out the responsiveness of tariff  revenue to change in the tax base, we assume the 
following functional form:
TR = aΒβv     (4)
Th is can be re-written in double log form as follows:
Log TR
t




   (5)
where TR and Β are import tariff  revenue and the tax base (imports M, in this case) respectively, 
a and v represent a constant and error term respectively. Th e parameter b then becomes the direct 
measure of the responsiveness of import tax revenue to change in the tax base. It follows from 
equation 4 that, (∂TR/∂B)(B/TR) = b.
In determining elasticities, two main techniques are usually used for cleansing the revenue 
series of discretionary eff ects. One is that of proportional adjustment which involves use of 
historical time series-tax data adjusted for discretionary tax measures, as in Mansfi eld (1972), 
Osoro (1993 and Muriithi and Moyi (2003). Th e other is the use of unadjusted historical time- 
series tax data with time trends or dummy variables incorporated as proxies for discretionary tax 
measures, as in Singer (1968) and Artus (1974).
Lack of suffi  cient data made us opt for the dummy method, usually referred to as the Singer 
approach. Th us, we introduce dummy variables to control for discretionary tax measures and a 
lagged base variable into equation 5 as follows:
Log TR
t















where the dummy variable D takes on the value of one for discretionary tax measures and zero 
otherwise. Th e summation accounts for the multiple discretionary changes over the sample period. 
More specifi cally, three dummies are introduced. A liberalization dummy D
1983
 is introduced as 
a dummy for tariff  reforms undertaken to accommodate import liberalization initiated in 1983 
measures. A second dummy D
slope
, which is an interactive term is a slope dummy introduced to 
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capture any shift in the slope of the tariff  revenue function as a result of the liberalization. D
slope
 
is defi ned as TR*D
1983
, where TR denotes tariff  revenue. Th e third dummy D
tar
 is introduced to 
capture the impact of customs administration reforms in Ghana. Tax reforms in Ghana started 
with the establishment of the National Revenue Secretariat with an oversight responsibility of 
supervising the operations of revenue collection agencies, as well as the granting of autonomy 
to the agencies including customs administration in 1985. Th e regression exercise also examined 
the eff ect of the changes in the simple average offi  cial tariff  rate otr on tariff  revenue.
Data Sources and Defi nition of Variables
Annual data collected from various sources were used for the study. Th ese include the International 
Monetary Fund database, the World Bank database, United Nations’ Commodity Trade Statistics, 
Ghana Statistical Service, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, and the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning.
For this chapter, the following variable defi nitions applied. Real import tax or duty revenue 
was calculated by defl ating nominal import duty revenues with the consumer price index. Th e 
values of real imports were obtained by defl ating nominal imports with import price indices. Real 
GDP is nominal GDP defl ated by GDP defl ator. Th e average import duty rate variable used in 
the estimation exercises is the average of offi  cial duty rates for imports. Th e real exchange rate 
was computed by defl ating nominal exchange rate by consumer price index. Th e study period is 
from 1965 to 2008.
4. Estimation Results
Th is section presents the fi ndings from estimating import tariff  buoyancy and elasticity and 
analyses the impact of import liberalization on import tariff  revenue in Ghana. Th e direct and 
indirect eff ect of import tariff  liberalization is also inferred from estimating a function for 
aggregate imports.
4.1 Import Tax Revenue Productivity – Buoyancy and Elasticity
Estimates of import tariff  buoyancy and elasticity have been derived using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative procedure which corrects for the problem of multicollinearity and auto-correlation.
A Report of the estimates on tariff  buoyancy is presented in Table 1 below. Th e estimates 
indicate that activities towards the generation of revenue from taxing imports in the economy 
have been more fruitful during the liberalization period (post-1983) compared to the pre-
reforms (pre-1983) period. By contrast however, Table 3 indicates that import tariff  has become 
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less elastic over the period of import liberalization compared to the pre-reforms (pre-1983) 
period. Th is could be attributed to leakages in the form of duty evasion and exemptions, and 
ineffi  ciencies in customs administration and the collection system.
Table 1: Estimates of Import Tariff  Buoyancy in Ghana




Difference in coeffi cients 2.200
Source: Computed by authors, using Stata 9.0
In particular, there has been widespread use of discretionary exemptions, often administered 
under poorly specifi ed authority. It is estimated that about 14 percent of total imports in 1998 
alone passed through bonded warehouses, including many duty-free goods. Bonded goods are 
estimated to be the single largest category of exempt imports, accounting for 35 percent of total 
exempt imports. Th is common use of bonded warehouses tends to contribute to duty evasion. 
Duty evasion also arises from under-invoicing of imports and outright smuggling, often with 
the connivance of corrupt customs offi  cials.
Table 2: Th e Decomposed Tariff  Buoyancies Over the Reform and Pre-reform period
Period Coeffi cient DW
A. Base-to-Income Elasticity
1965 – 2008*** 3.146 1.276
1965 – 1982 0.173 1.002
1983 – 2008*** 4.449 1.771
Difference in Coeffi cients 4.276
B. Tax-to-Base Elasticity
1965-2008***  0.395 1.985
1965-1982***  0.771 1.540
1983-2008*** 0.713 1.803
Difference in Coeffi cients -0.058
Source: Computed by author, using Stata 9.0
Estimates of the decomposed tariff  buoyancies in Table 2 above indicate high growth of 
taxable imports over the liberalization period compared to the pre-liberalization (pre-1983) 
period. Th is supports earlier analysis that imports have grown substantially over the period of 
195
The Effect of Import Liberalization on Import Tariff  Yield in Ghana 
import liberalization following economic reforms initiated in 1983. However, the liberalization 
period has also witnessed comparatively slow growth in tariff  revenue. Th is observation implies 
that the administration of collection of duties has remained weak, despite earlier eff orts made 
to strengthen it. Th e estimates of the tax-to-base elasticity indicate that elasticity fell marginally 
from 0.771 during the pre-reforms period (pre-1983 period) to 0.713 during the liberalization 
period (post-1983). Th is suggests the need to further strengthen and improve duty collection 
administration in Ghana.
Table 3: Estimates of Overall Elasticity of Tariff  Revenue
Period Coeffi cient DW
1966-2008*** 0.237 1.926
1965-82*  0.527 1.792
1983-2008* 0.154 2.202
Difference in coeffi cients -0.373
Source: Computed by authors, using Stata 9.0
A comparison of duty buoyancy and elasticity presented in Table 4 indicates that duty 
buoyancy outweighed duty elasticity when considering the entire study period, a suggestion that 
discretionary tax measures (DTMs) have improved tariff  revenue mobilization over the entire 
period. A comparison of regimes, however, indicates that the contribution of DTMs in improving 
tariff  revenue mobilization has been positive during the period of import liberalization. Measures 
such as comprehensive reforms to customs duties (which includes reduction of the level and 
range of rates) and customs collection administration have improved effi  ciency in the import tax 
system over the liberalized period.
Table 4: Comparison of Import Tax Buoyancy and Elasticity
Period Buoyancy Elasticity Difference
1965-2008***  0.703 0.237 0.466
1965-1982*  0.330 0.527 -0.297
1983-2008* 2.530 0.154 2.375
Source: Computed by authors, using Stata 9.0
Table 5 also confi rms the positive impact of the liberalization in enhancing tariff  revenue in 
Ghana. Th is is refl ected in the statistically-signifi cant and positively signed coeffi  cients for the 
liberalization and interactive dummies in the estimation results. Th e signifi cance of the interactive 
slope dummy in explaining tariff  revenue suggests that the slope of the tariff  revenue function 
has shifted upward. Th is is an indication of the fact that other events such as reforms to the tax 
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collection system have contributed signifi cantly to improving revenue generation from taxing 
imports. Although the coeffi  cient for the reduction in the average offi  cial duty rate is correctly 
signed, its infl uence on improving tariff  revenue is marginal. Th is suggests that reduction in 
average offi  cial duty rates has contributed only marginally to the improvement in import duty 
revenue.
Table 5: Estimates of overall Elasticity of Tariff  Revenue (1965-2008)
logTR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
logM 0.234 0.098 2.38 0.023
logy_1 -0.529 0.657 -0.81 0.426
Dslope 0.891 0.193 4.61 0.000
Dtar 0.001 0.106 0.02 0.990
D
1983
 0.454 0.100 2.40 0.017
otr -0.147 0.145 -1.01 0.319
D-W (original) 0.715 D-W (transformed) 1.858
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 11.0
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Ghana has been hailed by the international community as one of the countries that have pursued 
deep economic reforms since 1983. As part of the programme, eff orts were made to reform 
the external trade sector, with import liberalization as an important component. Among the 
instruments used were reductions in the level of tariff s, simplifi cation of rates into more uniform 
rates, the removal or relaxation of quantitative restrictions and equilibrating role of a liberal 
exchange rate regime.
However, experiences with tax revenues from international trade, particularly over the
1980s and 1990s, raised concerns over whether import trade liberalization confl icts with the 
revenue generation objectives of economic reforms in Ghana. Th is has been important by virtue 
of the fact that fi scal discipline in the earlier part of adjustment was relaxed and the government 
was no longer discreet with its spending.
An attempt has been made in this study to address one of the prevailing issues by adopting 
a sturdy approach to quantitatively determine the exact impact import liberalization has on 
import tax revenue in Ghana.
A summary of the research fi ndings from the analysis are as follows: fi rst, activities towards 
the generation of revenue from taxing imports in the economy have been fruitful during the 
liberalization period (post-1983) as compared to the pre-reforms (pre-1983) period. Nevertheless, 
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tariff  revenue has become less responsive to growth in imports during the liberalization (post-
1983) period. In addition, the results refl ect continued ineffi  ciencies in customs administration 
and collection system, and leakages in the form duty evasion and widespread exemptions. 
Furthermore, discretionary tax measures including tax administration reforms have improved 
tariff  revenues, particularly during the liberalization (post-1983) period. Other events in addition 
to import tariff  liberalization have improved tariff  revenue in Ghana. Lastly, and in broad terms, 
import liberalization is fi scally-compatible in Ghana although the impact of the average offi  cial 
tariff  rate reductions has been marginal.
In conclusion, this study invalidates Oduro’s assertion that trade liberalization has been in 
confl ict with the revenue objective of economic reforms.Consequently, the study provides useful 
insight for public policy. First, the continued ineffi  ciencies in import tax administration in the 
country suggests the need for further strengthening of customs administration and improving 
on duty collection mechanisms in the country. Th is would enhance the capacity of the country 
to generate more revenue from taxing imports. Secondly, public policy should focus on the 
identifi cation of the major sources of duty revenue leakage. Th e pervasive use of exemptions 
creates a gap in the tax base, especially through abuses of the exemptions off ered. Consequently, 
a further review of the rationale for the duty exemption program and reduction in range of items 
exempt from duty payments in Ghana will be required. In addition, sustaining complementary 
measures such as the replacement of import tariff  with the Value-Added Tax and maintaining a 
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Appendix: Import Duty Revenue Productivity
Table A1: Import Tax Buoyancy (1965-2008)
logTR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
log y 0.703 0.052 13.50 0.000
D-W (original) 0.176 D-W (transformed) 1.559
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
Note: Th e estimates are obtained after applying the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process to correct for the problem of autocorrelation 
and multi-collinearity.
Table A2: Base-to-Income Elasticity (1965 – 2008)
Log M Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Log Y 3.146 0.883 3.56 0.001
D-W (original) 0.229 D-W (transformed) 1.365
Table A3: Tax-to-Base Elasticity (1965-2008)
Log TR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
log M 0.395 0.111 3.57 0.001
D-W (original) 0.414 D-W (transformed) 1.987
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 8.0
Table A4: Estimates of Overall Elasticity of Tariff  Revenue (1965-2008)
Log TR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Log M 0.237 0.097 2.45 0.003
Log y_1 -0.399 0.618 -0.65 0.523
Dslope 0.933 0.186 5.02 0.000
Dtar -0.032 0.099 -0.32 0.749
D
1983
 0.401 0.110 2.10 0.017
D-W (original) 0.712 D-W (transformed) 1.926
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 8.0
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Table A5: Import Tax Buoyancy (1965-1982)
Log TR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Log y 0.771 0.030 25.89 0.000
D-W (original) 0.666 D-W (transformed) 1.540
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
Note: Th e estimates are obtained after applying the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process to correct for the problem of autocorrelation 
and multi-collinearity.
Table A6: Base-to-Income Elasticity (1966 – 1982)
logM Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
logY 0.173 0.425 0.41 0.690
D-W (original) 0.236068 D-W (transformed) 1.001621
Table A7: Tax-to-Base Elasticity (1966-1982)
logTR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Constant (dropped)
logM 0.614 0.224 2.74 0.015
D-W (original) 0.725932 D-W (transformed) 1.815719
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
Table A8: Estimates of Overall Elasticity of Tariff  Revenue (1965-1982)
logTR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Constant (dropped)
logM 0.527 0.207 2.55 0.023
log y_1 -0.941 1.253 -0.75 0.466
D-W (original) 0.895 D-W (transformed) 1.792
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
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Table A9: Import Tax Buoyancy (1983-2008)
logTR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Constant (dropped)
Log y 2.530 0.943 2.68 0.013
D-W (original) 0.243 D-W (transformed) 1.750
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
Note: Th e estimates are obtained after applying the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process to correct for the problem of autocorrelation 
and multicollinearity.
Table A10: Base-to-Income Elasticity (1983 – 2008)
Log M Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Constant (dropped)
Log y 4.449 1.136 3.91 0.001
D-W (original) 0.275 D-W (transformed) 1.892
Table A11: Tax-to-Base Elasticity (1983 - 2008)
Log TR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Constant (dropped)
Log M 0.714 0.017 41.36 0.000
D-W (original) 0.958 D-W (transformed) 1.803
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 9.0
Table A12: Estimates of Overall Elasticity of Tariff  Revenue (1983-2008)
Log TR Coeffi cient Standard Error t P>{t}
Log M 0.154 0.143 1.08 0.292
Log y_1 1.345 0.996 1.35 0.191
Dtar 0.187 0.106 1.76 0.093
D-W (original) 0.762 D-W (transformed) 2.209
Source: Computed using Intercooled Stata 8.0
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1. Introduction
Trade and agricultural liberalisation were the main focus of Ghana’s economic reform programme 
as discussed in Aryeetey et al. (2000). Like the vast majority of African countries, Ghana had 
extremely restrictive and distortionary agricultural policies from independence until the 1980s, 
motivated by the desire to protect domestic producers in order to (1) increase food production, 
(2) provide raw materials and inputs to the other sectors of the economy, and (3) to ensure food 
security and adequate nutrition by improving the availability of food for consumers (Brooks 
et al. 2006). Such policies included price controls, input and credit subsidies, obligatory credit 
allocations, and heavy state involvement in production, distribution and marketing.
Th e reforms from 1983 onwards involved the removal of price distortions on crops, eliminating 
subsidies for agricultural inputs including fertilizer, and reducing the role of parastatals (Sarris 
and Shams, 1991; Nyanteng and Seini, 2000). Yet, reforms were introduced gradually, and only 
gained momentum with the Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project initiated in 1987. Th is 
joint Ghana government/World Bank project aimed at improving the institutional capacity of 
the country’s agricultural policy bodies mainly through privatisation. A number of successes 
were recorded in the area of agricultural research, extension and irrigation (Brooks et al. 2006).
In the cash crop sector, the parastatal monopoly in cocoa marketing has not been eliminated 
(World Bank, 1995; IMF, 2000) although reforms have ensured that cocoa farmers receive a 
higher share of world market prices (Kanbur, 1994). In fact, an upward trend in cocoa output since 
2002 has been attributed in part to improved agronomic practices as well as price incentives.
In agricultural production, trade policies often encourage shifting staple foods production 
for domestic consumption to products for export. In Ghana, while men are often viewed as 
being responsible for producing cash crops, women are allotted the responsibility for producing 
subsistence food crops for home consumption. Consequently, agricultural development 
programmes and market liberalization have been often criticized for focusing on men’s crops 
rather than women’s crops. Consideration of gender accessibility of land and the type of crops 
grown by small producers as well as large producers are important in poverty assessment in rural 
agricultural locations. Failure to consider these issues, especially the gender concerns into trade 
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We use data from the most recent household survey conducted in 2005/06 to examine the role 
of cocoa production in improving household welfare by (1) examining diff erences in cocoa supply 
responses between female- and male-headed rural households, (2) assessing the independent 
eff ects of participation in cocoa on household income, (3) isolating the impact of participating in 
cocoa on food security, and (4) analyzing the impact of cocoa income on household consumption 
patterns. Th e rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Th e next section briefl y reviews the literature 
on gender roles in Ghanaian agriculture and the eff ects of agricultural liberalization from a 
gender perspective. In Section 3, we present a latent welfare framework for analyzing the nexus 
between cash cropping and household welfare, while in Section 4 we present an overview of the 
data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports and discusses the econometric results. Section 6 
concludes and draws some implications for policy.
2. Gender and Agriculture
It has long been recognized that the organisation of agricultural production has important 
implications for gender relations and vice versa in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context. Often, 
it is claimed that cash crops fall under the domain of men, while food crops are controlled by 
women. Th e following review of the empirical evidence on gender roles in Ghanaian agriculture, 
with special focus on female farmers, demonstrates that while there is some justifi cation in the 
characteriation of cash crops as ‘male’ it oversimplifi es Ghanaian rural reality and the changing 
political economy. Th is is particularly true in the cocoa-producing regions of the country.
In pre-colonial traditional, subsistence-agriculture-based Ghana, men and women farmed 
together on the same plot of land, producing exclusively for home consumption. Specifi c 
agricultural tasks were confi ned to certain age and gender groups. While men were responsible 
for the production of food crops, women had to do the weeding and assisted during harvest. 
Most domestic tasks, including cooking, fetching water, gathering fi rewood and taking care of 
the many children were also taken care of by women.
While these domestic tasks remained in the female domain until today, the advent of cash 
crops, principally cocoa, and, more generally, the increasing importance of market exchange 
in agriculture, signifi cantly impacted on gender roles in agriculture. It was primarily men who 
became cash crop producers initially, while women’s responsibility shifted towards the production 
of food crops for home consumption and the main traditional food crop, yam, was replaced by the 
less labour-intensive maize and cassava. As the proceeds from cocoa production accrued to men, 
women soon started to sell part of their production to ensure cash income for themselves. In fact, 
most authors claim that the rise of the market economy went along with the establishment of 
separate male and female agricultural income accounts.
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Th e review so far draws a picture of rural households with “men and women tending to 
have separate income and expenditure streams” with “conventional divisions of responsibility 
for household expenditure” (Baden et al, 1994). Yet, the assumption of separate income and 
expenditure streams seems to be exaggerated. Most importantly, the household survey datasets 
used in this study suggest that the majority of male-headed rural households do not run more 
than one farm and if they do, other farms are in most cases controlled by the (male) household 
head. If reported control over a farm were to imply exclusive access to agricultural income, 
women in those households would not have any access to agricultural income. Th is seems fairly 
unrealistic and, more likely, household members bargain over access to income and the related 
allocation of expenditures between male or female private goods as well as over expenditure on 
household public goods.
To sum up the discussion on gender roles in agriculture, the evidence presented suggests that 
a model of households with complex bargaining processes on expenditure as well as production 
(and certainly further non-economic ones) seems more adequate to describe the reality of 
decision making in rural Ghana than a simple neoclassical household model. Apparently, income 
is often not being pooled, and males and females sometimes even appear to manage their own 
farms independently. Certainly, understanding the resource allocation processes within rural 
households seems an important prerequisite to understanding the impact of agricultural reforms 
and the increasing importance of cash crops.
Th e gendered consequences of agricultural and trade reforms have been addressed in a number 
of policy documents and reports (Baden, 1993; Baden et al, 1994; Brown and Kerr, 1997; World 
Bank, 1999). Th ese assessments have either focused on women as a vulnerable group or on 
gender-linked constraints in responding to changing price incentives (Baden et al, 1994). While 
the former have stressed the increased workload of women without adequate compensation, 
the latter have highlighted women’s limited access to productive resources in the process of 
reallocating resources, especially land, from non-tradable to tradable sectors. Intra-household 
issues have received relatively little attention in this literature.
For Ghana, the prevailing view on the eff ects of the reforms from a female farmer’s perspective 
is summarized by Baden et al (1994): “In agriculture, the benefi ts of adjustment have largely 
accrued to medium and larger farmers in the cocoa sector, of whom few are women. Th ere is 
limited evidence as yet of women own-account producers switching to cocoa production under 
the infl uence of adjustment; the benefi ts of female producers under adjustment may be largely 
confi ned to those women already in the cocoa sector”.
Generally, access to resources, including land, labour, capital and complementary agricultural 
inputs, is an essential condition to respond to improved incentives. For Ghana, the issue of 
female access to land has received quite some attention in the literature (Quisumbing et al, 
2001; Goldstein and Udry, 1999 and 2005). Inheritance rules are very complex, in particular 
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among the matrilineal Akan. Eventually, the transfer of land rights depends, among other 
factors, on an individual’s land use history (e.g. planting of cocoa trees), her or his contribution 
to land improvements, and the status within the family (Goldstein and Udry, 2005). Structural 
adjustment seems to have caused a shift towards more individualized land rights (Baden et 
al., 1994; Quisumbing et al, 2001). Th ere are confl icting views on whether these developments 
favour men (Mickell, 1986) or whether they increasingly allow women to gain access to land 
(Quisumbing et al, 2001).
Investigating the adoption of modern maize varieties and chemical fertilizer, Doss and 
Morris (2001) fi nd important gender diff erences that they attribute to diff erential access to 
complementary inputs, in particular land, labour, and extension services. In other words, once 
one controls for resource access, gender per se does not play a role in explaining adoption 
patterns. Furthermore, Doss and Morris (2001) fi nd that female-managed plots within the same 
household are not disadvantaged compared to male plots, a fi nding that cannot be confi rmed by 
Quisumbing et al (2001).
In sum, this review presents strong evidence of discrimination against females in terms of 
access to productive resources. What is common to most gender policy documents is their focus 
on female farmers. Despite this focus, relatively little is known on the supply response of female 
vis-à-vis their male counterparts. Finally, the policy-oriented studies pay little attention to intra-
household issues.
3. Empirical Methodology
Th is section assesses the determinants of cocoa adoption and the eff ects of adoption on household 
welfare and gender resource allocation. Th e analysis of the eff ects of cocoa adoption has two main 
purposes: fi rst, to evaluate the impact of export crop production on household welfare (using 
total expenditures and food spending per adult equivalent and as proxies); and secondly, to assess 
the eff ects of the nature of the income stream on the composition of consumption expenditures. 
Of specifi c interest are questions such as, “What happens to welfare and the composition of 
expenditures once households earn more income from export crops?” and, “Does more income 
from export crops bias household spending towards ‘male goods’ than ‘female goods’?”
3.1. Determinants of cocoa adoption and its impact on household welfare
Farm households that are eligible to grow cocoa are likely to engage in cocoa production when the 
expected returns exceed those from engaging the household’s factor endowments in subsistence 
food crops. With perfect foresight, cocoa adoption would always be welfare-enhancing: that is, 
a household would only engage its resources in the production of cocoa if the marginal returns 
206
Chapter  10
from cocoa are more than the returns from food crop production. A smallholder farmer elects 
to grow cocoa if the expected welfare after growing cocoa is at least as great as the expected 
welfare under the alternative of growing food crops. However, because realized returns from 
cocoa production can vary greatly from expected returns, the ex post impact of cocoa adoption 
on welfare may be positive or negative. In this paper, we use two broad categories of measures of 
welfare: income (proxied by total household expenditure per equivalent adult) and food security 
(proxied by total food consumption per equivalent adult).
A suitable measure of the impact of cocoa adoption should compare outcomes in farm 
households that received income from cocoa production to what those outcomes would have 
been had the same households not participated in cocoa production. Th e construction of this 
unobserved counterfactual has long been the focus of impact evaluation. Measuring impact as 
the diff erence in mean outcomes between all households receiving income from cocoa and those 
not receiving cocoa income may give a biased estimate of the treatment. Th is bias would arise if 
there are unobserved characteristics that aff ect the probability of adoption that are also correlated 
with household welfare.
Let D  be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household receives income from cocoa 
production and 0 otherwise. In the treatment literature, D  is an indicator of receipt of the 
“treatment.” Th e potential outcomes are then defi ned as ( )i iW D  for each household i , where 
1,...,i N=  and N denotes the total population. Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the 
treatment eff ect for a household can be written as
 (1) (0)i i iW Wτ = −       (1)
Th e fundamental evaluation problem arises because only one of the potential outcomes is 
observed for each household i . Since the counterfactual outcome is unobserved by the micro-
econometrician, estimating the individual treatment eff ect iτ  is not straightforward. For most 
evaluation studies, the focus lies on constructing an estimate of the (population) average treatment 
eff ect on the treated (ATT) and therefore we will focus on this parameter, too.49 In this specifi c 
case, we will concentrate on constructing an estimate of the average impact of cocoa income on 
those households that receive it. It can be defi ned as
  [ ] [ ]( | 1) (1) | 1 (0) | 1ATT E D E W D E W Dτ τ= = = = − =    (2)
Th e expected value of ATT is defi ned as the diff erence between the expected outcome values 
with and without treatment for those who actually participated in the treatment. Since this 
parameter focuses directly on actual treatment participants, it could be used to measure the 
realized gross gain from participation (Heckman et al 1999).
Th e true parameter ATTτ  is only identifi ed if
49 See Becker and Ichino (2002); Gilligan and Hoddinott (2006); Becker and Caliendo (2007); and Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008).
207
Cash Cropping, Gender and Household Welfare: Evidence from Ghana
[ ] [ ](0) | 0 0E W E W D− = =      (3)
Estimation based on the matching involves matching treated and untreated households 
based on their observable characteristics X , and comparing how the outcome diff ers depending 
on treatment. Exact matching involves comparing individuals for whom the values of X  are 
identical. Th is estimator is rarely an option in practice. With continuous variables in X , and/or 
many explanatory variables, we resort to inexact matching - instead of requiring the households 
across which we compare outcomes to have identical values of X , we now require them to have 
similar values of X .
Propensity score matching has become a popular approach to estimate causal treatment 
eff ects and will be employed in this paper for estimating the counterfactual outcome for cocoa 
participants. Th e estimator constructs a plausible comparison group by matching households 
with treatment to similar households without treatment using a set of control variables.50 Let 
( ) Pr( 1 | )P X D X= =  be the probability of a household participating a treatment (cocoa) given 
its observed covariates X . We use propensity score matching to construct a statistical comparison 
group by matching observations on cocoa income recipients to observations on non-recipients 
with similar values of ( )P X .
3.2. Th e eff ects of cocoa income on gender resource allocation
In this section, we attempt to examine the infl uence of cocoa income, which is often considered 
to be male-controlled, on intra-household resource allocation. Th e income pooling assumption 
of the neoclassical household model can be empirically tested by detecting an infl uence of 
individually earned income on expenditure patterns. If such an infl uence can be found, income 
is not being pooled. As it is diffi  cult to identify individually earned income in poor agricultural 
economies, the income pooling test typically relies on anthropological evidence that assigns 
income from certain crops to male or female individuals (Haddad and Hoddinott, 1995; Dufl o 
and Udry, 2004). Given that households bargain over expenditure allocation, the eff ect of income 
from a presumably male or female crop on the allocation can be considered to refl ect the extent 
of control over this income source.
A number of factors determine how scarce resources are allocated by households to food 
consumption versus other consumer goods. To test the extent to which the source of income along 
with other factors impinges on the budget share allocated to diff erent expenditure categories, a 
model is specifi ed for estimation of Engel curves that includes the share of income earned from 
cocoa (cocoash) as an explanatory variable together with the level of total income. Also, household 
50 For details on propensity score matching, the interested reader is referred to Gilligan and Hoddinott (2006); Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983); Becker and Ichino (2002); and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
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size is controlled for to account for potential scale eff ects. Th e hypotheses to be tested are that 
income earned under men’s control is spent relatively less on “necessary (female) goods” such as 
food, than general household income. Th e expectation is that reatively more income from cocoa 
is relatively spent on “luxury (male) goods” such as alcohol and tobacco. Total expenditure is used 
as a proxy for expected permanent income in this analysis.
Th e Engel curve specifi cation follows Deaton (1989) and Deaton et al. (1989) to examine the 






i ii i ij i
j
x n z ix n n
p q n cocoash uw α β η γ δ λ
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+∑   (4)
where total household expenditure is expressed as x and the number of people in the same 
household as n. w
i
 is the expenditure share on good i, which is linearly related to the logarithm of 
the household per capita expenditure (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Th e vector z comprises 
additional information expected to infl uence the overall expenditure pattern, in particular the 
sex of the household head, the age of the head, and information on the educational level of the 
household head. Th e primary variable of interest on the right-hand side of the equation is the 
household’s income share from cocoa. Following the literature, we hypothesize that household 
members have diff erent preferences with regard to consumption of some categories of goods. 
With egoistic preferences, relative bargaining power determines the allocation of expenditure. 
If cocoa income is controlled by men it proxies for male bargaining power. We then expect the 
share of cocoa income in total income to have an impact on household consumption choices in 
favour of male consumption goods, suggesting that incomes are not being pooled.
4. Data and Some Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), conducted by the Ghana 
Statistical Service in collaboration with the World Bank. We use the 2005/06 round, which is 
the most recent of the fi ve rounds of surveys conducted since 1987. Th e 2005/06 (GLSS5) survey 
covered a sample of 8,686 households containing 36,481 household members, giving an average 
household size of 4.2.51 Th e survey follows a two-stage sampling process. At the fi rst stage of the 
selection process, a predetermined number of enumeration areas (EAs) was randomly selected 
with probability proportional to estimated size from which a fi xed number of households was 
systematically selected from each selected EA to give the total of households. Both rounds 
collected information on households and community characteristics and reproductive histories 
of one randomly selected woman of childbearing age in each household. Our working sample 
consists of all rural households residing within the six cocoa growing regions in Ghana.
51 For more information on the GLSS, including more details on the sample design, strata weights, and fi eldwork, see GSS 
(2000) and Coulombe and McKay (2003).
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To explore the impact of participation in cocoa on welfare, the following variables are 
considered: dummy variables are included for two ecological zones and six regions in which 
cocoa is cultivated: the forest zone and savannah zone (a third zone, the coastal zone, serves as the 
reference). Th e purpose of the zonal dummy variables is to control for agro-climatic diff erences 
that could aff ect the profi tability of cocoa production. Several characteristics of the household 
are included as controls. Th e key variable of interest is the gender dummy for the household 
head. Th is allows us to examine the behaviour of female-headed and male-headed households. 
Th e household head’s age is also included, as is the educational level expressed as dummies for 
whether the head’s highest educational qualifi cation is primary, junior secondary or secondary 
(no formal education serves as the reference). Th e size of land owned by the household, measured 
in hectares, is included because wealthier rural households (i.e. those with more land) are more 
likely to adopt high-value crops such as cocoa. Access to credit may also aff ect the adoption 
decision, so a dummy was created to indicate whether the household has access to formal credit. 
Another dummy was created to indicate the type of land ownership as a simple measure of 
the security of the land – whether the household possesses a title deed to the land. Household 
size is included as a simple measure of labour availability. We also include a set of fi ve regional 
dummies – Central, Volta, Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo (a sixth region, Western, serves 
as the reference). Th e regional dummies are included to purge the regression of regional eff ects 
that may confound the eff ects of the other covariates, which might or might not be conducive 
to higher cocoa adoption.
Table 1(a) provides some general trends in cocoa farming from a gendered perspective. In 
the group of female-headed households, 13 percent grew cocoa in 2006 compared to 25 percent 
of male-headed households. When the sample is restricted to farm households only, the share 
of cocoa-growing households among the female-headed households, increases to 26 percent 
while the share of cocoa-growing households among the male-headed households increases 
to 37 percent. Th e average share of household income earned from cocoa farming stood at 36 
percent for female-headed households, compared with 41 percent for the male counterparts. 
Much stronger are the diff erences in terms of cocoa output and yield: male-headed households 
on average produce about double the amount of cocoa produced by female-headed ones. Th e 
main reason for the huge diff erence in cocoa output is due in part to the much smaller farm 
size of female-headed households. In 2006, female-headed households held farms that average 
about half the size of male-headed farms. Th is diff erence applies similarly for value of the land 
held by the two groups. Not only do female-headed households own less land; those women 
who own some land do actually own less valuable lands, than to their male counterparts. Th e 
value of the land owned by female-headed households is only about a third that of the male-
headed households. Table 1(b) confi rms that these gender diff erences in inputs and outputs 
persist in every region in the country – in each of the six cocoa growing regions, female-headed 
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households own smaller and less valuable lands and their output is smaller than that of their 
male counterparts.






Cocoa farming-household (% of all hhs) 0.25 0.13 0.22
Cocoa farming-household (% of farm hhs) 0.37 0.26 0.34
Land size (hectares) 6.00 3.28 5.55
Value of farm land (Ghana cedis) 7,780 2,840 6,970
Household size 6.64 4.59 6.30
Farm labour (persons) 3.50 2.90 3.41
Area harvested (hectares) 1.81 0.93 1.66
Cocoa harvested (kg) 1,553 930 1,452
Cocoa yield (kg/ha) 286 146 264
Total household income (Ghana cedis) 1,540 1,000 1,450
Revenue from all crops (Ghana cedis) 997 545 924
Revenue from cocoa (Ghana cedis) 574 314 531
Share of household total income from cocoa 0.41 0.35 0.40
Education of household head (years) 6.84 3.60 6.31
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: Figures are mean values.
Table 1(b): Characteristics of rural cocoa-farming households, by region





 Male 8.7 5.9 4.1 2.8 6.2 4.4 6.0
 Female 3.8 4.6 1.0 1.4 3.5 2.7 3.3
Area harvested (ha)
 Male 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.2 1.4 3.6 1.8
 Female 1.2 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.5 0.9
Farm value (Ghana cedis)
 Male 17,400 2,770 3,510 3,240 4,230 7,030 7,780
 Female 4,450 1,520 674 1,340 2,340 5,240 2,840
Cocoa harvested (kg)
 Male 2,600 2,786 205 515 401 689 1,553
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Table 1(b): Characteristics of rural cocoa-farming households, by region




 Female 584 3,234 76 129 366 286 930
Cocoa yield (kg/ha)
 Male 491 231 134 288 184 222 286
 Female 242 135 107 91 99 176 146
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes Figures are mean values.
5. Empirical Results
 Determinants of participation in cocoa
Table 2 presents results from a probit regression of factors that infl uence the likelihood that a 
farm household will grow cocoa. Several aspects of the results are noteworthy. First, the gender 
variable has signifi cant explanatory power - this result is consistent with our a priori expectation, 
considering that men and women farmers are known to adopt export crops at diff erent rates. 
Secondly, many of the other explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically 
signifi cant: regressors that increase the probability that a household will grow cocoa are the 
amount and security of land controlled by the household and the age of the household head. 
In addition, residing in the forest and savannah zones, compared with the coastal zone, and 
the Central Region, compared with the Western Region, are positively associated with the 
probability of adoption. Two factors decrease the likelihood that a household will choose to grow 
cocoa: female-headed household dummy and the educational qualifi cation of the household 
head (measured by years of schooling).
Table 2: Probit Estimates of Propensity Score for Adoption of Cocoa
Determinants: Estimated coeffi cient Standard error
Female-headed household -0.532*** 0.0714
Years of schooling - Head -0.151** 0.0066
Age - Head 0.0430*** 0.0112
Age squared - Head -0.00025** 0.00011
Household size 0.0134 0.0117
Land size per capita 0.0204*** 0.00742
Titled land dummy 0.571*** 0.0719
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Determinants: Estimated coeffi cient Standard error
Access to credit -0.00242 0.111
Central region 0.425*** 0.118
Volta region -1.559*** 0.13
Eastern region -0.801*** 0.101
Ashanti region -1.057*** 0.0906
Brong Ahafo region -0.859*** 0.11
Forest zone 1.898*** 0.115
Savannah zone 0.850*** 0.16
Constant -2.785*** 0.292
No. of Observations  2,837
Pseudo R-squared  0.27
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Robust standards errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at 10%; ** signifi cant at 5%; *** signifi cant at 1%.
Overall, the analysis of the cocoa participation decision suggests a fair amount of discrimination 
against female farmers. Diff erential access to land plays an important role in explaining these 
results. Wealth is often positively associated with the adoption of high-value crops, because 
wealthier farmers are better able to bear risk and, therefore, are more likely to venture into export 
markets. In rural Ghana, land ownership provides a good measure of wealth. Clearly, there is 
some sort of association between land ownership and gender: female-headed households tend to 
own smaller plots than male-headed households. Similarly, households headed by women tend 
to cultivate plots that are less valuable than those of households headed by men (Table 1a and b). 
Th e determinants of land ownership were explored using a tobit approach. Controlling for the 
age, education, household size and the ecological zone, we fi nd that female-headed households 
on average have signifi cantly less access to land (Table 3). In other words, households headed by 
women need to gain more land if they are to participate more in export crop farming.
Table 3: Determinants of Household Land Ownership (Tobit Estimates)
Determinants Estimated coeffi cient Standard error Signifi cance level
Female-headed household -0.897 0.216 ***
Years of schooling - Head 0.072 0.020 ***
Age - Head 0.078 0.006 ***
Household size -0.009 0.035
Forest zone 0.421 0.258
Savannah zone -0.109 0.392
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Determinants Estimated coeffi cient Standard error Signifi cance level
Central region -0.094 0.323
Volta region -2.123 0.349 ***
Eastern region -1.923 0.303 ***
Ashanti region -1.254 0.295 ***
Brong Ahafo region -0.810 0.369 **
Constant -4.448 0.476 ***
Log likelihood = -5774.22
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Dependent variable is land per capita. ** denotes signifi cant at 5%; *** denotes signifi cant at 1%.
5.2 Eff ects of cocoa income on welfare
Th e logic underlying cash crop liberalization is that it would increase household income 
which, in turn, would allow households to shore up food spending and welfare. Th erefore, we 
investigate the contribution of cocoa income to household welfare. Table 4 reports the eff ects 
of cocoa income on total expenditure and food spending per adult equivalent in cocoa-growing 
households. Results show that all else being equal, as cocoa income increases, the welfare of the 
household also improves. In addition, welfare seems to rise with the level of education of the 
head of the household, land ownership and access to credit while it falls with the family size.
Table 4: Eff ects of Cocoa Income on Household Welfare and Food Security
Explanatory Variables: Real per capita expenditure (log) Real per capita food spending 
(log)
Female-headed household 0.0367 -0.00194
(0.0226) (0.0248)
Years of schooling - Head 0.0138*** 0.00135
(0.0021) (0.0024)
Age - Head 0.00523 0.00521
(0.0035) (0.0039)
Age squared -5.07E-05 -4.82E-05
(3.43E-05) (3.76E-05)
Household size -0.111*** -0.126***
(0.0038) (0.0042)




Explanatory Variables: Real per capita expenditure (log) Real per capita food spending 
(log)
Titled land dummy 0.143*** 0.109***
(0.024) (0.0264)
Access to credit 0.255*** 0.164***
(0.0363) (0.0399)
Cocoa income share 0.0828** 0.111**
(0.0396) (0.0434)
Central Region -0.0899** -0.123***
(0.035) (0.0384)
Volta Region -0.160*** -0.206***
(0.0379) (0.0416)
Eastern Region 0.0214 0.0337
(0.0324) (0.0355)
Ashanti Region -0.127*** -0.259***
(0.0325) (0.0357)
Brong Ahafo Region -0.120*** -0.106**
(0.039) (0.0429)
Forest zone -0.0522* -0.0924***
(0.0273) (0.03)







Notes: Robust standards errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at 10%; ** signifi cant at 5%; *** signifi cant at 1%.
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5.3 Average impacts of participation in cocoa on welfare
Although the preceding results are informative, the coeffi  cient of the cocoa income share can be 
estimated by OLS without bias only if households that who receive cocoa income are a random 
sample of all farm households. Th is bias would arise if there are unobserved characteristics that 
aff ect the probability of adoption that are also correlated with household welfare. A suitable 
measure of the impact of cocoa adoption should compare outcomes in farm households that 
received income from cocoa production to what those outcomes would have been had the same 
households not participated in cocoa production. Table 5 reports results of the propensity score 
estimates of the average impact of participation in cocoa on welfare. A detailed interpretation 
of the propensity score estimates is not undertaken in this paper. However, the results of the 
treatment eff ects (ATT) show that participation in cocoa exerts positive and signifi cant impacts 
on household income and food security. Using estimated propensity scores from the model, we 
generated samples of matched cocoa participants and non-participants using the kernel matching 
algorithm. Th e results show a signifi cant eff ect of participation on both average total consumption 
per adult equivalent and on average food consumption per adult equivalent in 2006.
Table 5: Treatment Eff ects
Real per capita expenditure 
(log)
Real per capita food 
spending (log)
Mean impact
Average outcome, cocoa participants 14.2 13.7
Average outcome, non-cocoa participants 14.1 13.6
Difference in average outcomes, ATT 0.1 0.1
(2.69) (2.48)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics on ATT are in parentheses.
5.4. Th e eff ects of cocoa income on gender resource allocation
We estimate Engel curves for three goods that can be thought of as representing either 
private male or female goods or household public goods that females might have a preference 
for. Alcohol and tobacco are primarily consumed by males, while clothing can be considered a 
female good. Household public goods that have been shown in the literature to be preferred by 
females include food. As most of the expenditure categories in the data are left-censored, we 
estimate the Engel curves using a Tobit model (with robust standard errors). Th e results for two 
diff erent samples are reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: Determinants of Budget Shares to Food, Alcohol and Clothing
 Explanatory variables: Food Alcohol and To-
bacco
Clothing
Expenditure per capita (log) -0.0245*** -0.0762*** 0.00578***
(0.00417) (0.0226) (0.00169)
Expenditure per capita squared (log) 0.00205*** 0.00455*** -0.00040***
(0.0002) (0.00122) (0.0000)
Cocoa income share -0.00493* -0.0118 -0.000426
(0.00299) (0.0297) (0.00115)
Female-headed household 0.00426*** -0.0725*** -0.00108*
(0.00165) (0.0255) (0.00065)
No. of children (<15 years) 0.00228*** -0.00294 -0.00014
(0.00084) (0.0096) (0.00030)
Primary -Head -0.00460** 0.014 0.00108
(0.00215) (0.0178) (0.00082)
Junior secondary - Head -0.00265 -0.0186 0.00200***
(0.00172) (0.0167) (0.00067)
Senior secondary - Head -0.0105*** -0.570 0.00247**
(0.00295) (0.0000) (0.00104)
Household size 0.00114* -0.0019 -0.00011
(0.00059) (0.00665) (0.00021)
Central Region 0.00586** 0.0199 0.0011
(0.00253) (0.0225) (0.00098)
Volta Region 0.0044 -0.0092 -0.00067
(0.0027) (0.0234) (0.00103)
Eastern Region 0.00619*** 0.00676 0.00112
(0.00235) (0.0228) (0.00091)
Ashanti Region 0.00212 -0.0223 -0.00042
(0.00237) (0.0239) (0.00090)
Brong Ahafo Region 0.00229 -0.016 -0.0011
(0.00272) (0.0251) (0.00104)
Constant 0.0123 0.114 -0.0262***
(0.0216) (0.095) (0.00804)
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.30 0.07
No. of Observations 3,170 3,170 3,170
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Robust standards errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at 10%; ** signifi cant at 5%; *** signifi cant at 1%.
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Food expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures increase signifi cantly, but not rapidly, 
with increased income. Th e dummy variable for female-headed households is statistically 
signifi cant. Th us, ceteris paribus, gender seems to have a distinct eff ect on shifting expenditure 
patterns in favour of food. On the contrary, having a woman as head of the household 
signifi cantly reduces the budget shares to alcohol and tobacco and clothing. Th e cocoa income 
share signifi cantly decreases the food budget share beyond the total income eff ect. Th e eff ect is, 
however, not highly statistically signifi cant. Similarly, the cocoa income share negatively correlates 
with the budget shares of alcohol and tobacco and clothing but the eff ects are not statistically 
signifi cant. Th us, the cocoa income share does not seem to systematically aff ect gender resource 
allocation. Overall, while we fi nd the female-headed dummy to bias household expenditure 
patterns towards female-preferred and household public goods such as food, cocoa income per se 
does not seem to be used primarily for male consumption purposes.
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Th is paper has examined ways in which participation in cash cropping diff ers among women 
and men, and the ensuing implications for household welfare and food security among farm 
households in Ghana. We have done so by fi rst analyzing the determinants of participation in 
cocoa by female-headed vis-à-vis male-headed households. Th e study also points to traces of 
discrimination of females in terms of access to productive resources and assets. More specifi cally, 
we fi nd that female-headed households are considerably less likely to engage in cocoa farming 
activities, primarily due to their limited access to land. Th is implies that getting the incentives 
right can have much higher payoff s for women when they are provided with the means to 
respond to these incentives. From a policy perspective, our results thus underline the scope for 
and the importance of policy interventions aimed at female empowerment.
Th e paper also examined the impacts of cocoa adoption on farm household income and 
food security status using a propensity score matching model to account for selection bias that 
normally occurs when unobservable factors infl uence both participation and outcomes such as 
household income and food security status. Results of the propensity score matching show that 
cocoa participation exerts a positive and statistically signifi cant eff ect on household income 
and food security status. Th ese fi ndings are generally consistent with the widely held view that 
income from commercial farming is crucial to food security and poverty alleviation in rural areas 
of developing countries.
Finally, to shed some light on gender resource allocation, we then examined whether cocoa 
income is controlled by males and whether this in turn causes gender inequalities to be reinforced 
by the promotion of cash cropping in rural areas. We investigated whether higher cocoa incomes 
infl uence household resource allocation by estimating Engel curves for a number of more or 
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less gender-specifi c goods including the share of cocoa income as an explanatory variable. Th e 
conjecture of cocoa income being controlled by males cannot be confi rmed for the Ghanaian case. 
Put somewhat more cautiously, we fi nd that cocoa income is not being spent primarily on male 
consumption goods. As in Ackah and Lay (2009), the analysis of intra-household allocations 
suggests that one has to be careful with generalizations with regard to control over (increased) 
proceeds from cash crops. At least for cocoa production in Ghana, it does not seem to be true 
that cash crop production is a male domain and that reforms that lead to its expansion would 
therefore disproportionately favour males.
Our fi ndings make two contributions to the related literature. We generate direct evidence 
that commercial farming matters for poverty reduction: farmers who are able to adopt high-
yield export crops such as cocoa are on average better off  than farmers more oriented towards 
subsistence activities. Further, we provide some evidence of gender bias in access to the most 
productive resource needed for participation in cash cropping in Ghana – land. Th e analysis 
reveals traces of discrimination against women in accessing larger and higher quality plots of 
land.
On the whole, these results from Ghana suggest that cash cropping decisions depend primarily 
on access to resources, rather than on gender per se. Th is conclusion should not be interpreted 
to mean that cash crop adoption is gender-neutral. If participation in cash cropping depends 
on access to land, labour, or other resources, and if men tend to have better access to these 
resources than women, then cash crop liberalization will not benefi t men and women equally. 
Our analysis suggests that improvements in female access to land are cardinal to female-headed 
cocoa-farming households responding as well to the market incentives in export crop adoption as 
their male counterparts. Th e challenge for policymakers may thus be to increase women’s access 
to the key resources. Given that women normally face entry barriers to participation in cash crop 
production, policy measures could target them by lowering the entry barriers. In particular, land 
reforms must have the objective of allowing increased acquisition of land by women.
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Household Welfare Eff ects in Ghana
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1. Introduction
Th e pace of globalization has generated conditions that allow developments in one country 
to easily aff ect another. Such is the case for food prices. Tradable food commodities do have 
cross-border connectivity, such that happenings in one end infl uence the outcomes in another. 
Analytically, the signifi cant role that exchange rates and tariff  regimes play when assessing price 
transmission mechanisms across borders cannot be overemphasized. Th is is because tariff s and 
exchange rates are the main variables that determine the extent to which prices will change in 
the domestic market. Furthermore, the effi  ciency in the level of friction between two markets is 
determined mainly by tariff s and exchange rates. An increase in tariff s on imported commodities 
will cause domestic prices of those commodities to also increase, ceteris paribus. At two extremes, 
one may assume that a full transmission of price shocks can indicate the presence of a frictionless 
and well-functioning market, while at the other extreme, a total absence of transmission may 
make the very existence of a market questionable. Th erefore, the degree of price transmission 
can provide at least a broad assessment of the extent to which markets are functioning and 
price signals are passing through consistently between diff erent markets, say international and 
domestic markets (Conforti, 2004).
Th e eff ects of commodity price shocks on developing countries receive considerable emphasis 
whenever there are major international commodity price booms or slumps, such as the global 
food price increases during the mid-1970s and the more recent price hike that started around 
2007. Using the recent period of rising food prices, this paper attempts to provide an assessment 
of the short- run impacts of higher global food prices on welfare in Ghana. It does this by 
fi rst establishing how much and how fast domestic prices change in response to changes in 
international prices. We are particularly interested in computing the pass-through elasticities. 
Th e second major objective of the paper is to attempt to measure the impact of international 
and domestic price shocks on household welfare in Ghana in the short run. Th e rest of the paper 
is organized into six sections. Th e next section presents a brief review of the literature on price 
transmission and household welfare. Section 3 presents the data sources and some descriptive 





from the analyses are presented and discussed for each commodity. Th e sixth and fi nal section 
draws conclusions and makes recommendations for policy.
2. Literature Review
Th e most contentious issue in most developing countries over the past two decades is the 
implementation of market reforms as the major channel for price transmission between local 
and international agricultural markets (see Rashid, 2004; Bediane and Shively, 1997). A 
critical factor considered in trade liberalization studies is the signifi cance of transport cost in 
determining the price diff erences at two diff erent market locations. Th e diff erences in prices are 
best demonstrated by the special arbitrage condition, which is explained by Listorti (2008) that the 
diff erence between prices in two diff erent markets will not exceed the cost of transport. Actually, 
the special arbitrage condition forms the basis for the Law of One Price (LOP), which also states 
that prices of similar commodities in two diff erent markets will be the same if and only if it is 
less transport cost. It further explains that prices will be the same for similar commodities in 
diff erent markets if prices are expressed in the same currency (see Dolado et al, 1999). However, 
there can be a co-movement of prices at diff erent locations due to factors other than commercial 
integration factors such as seasonality. Th is explains the concept of spatial market integration 
which is more restrictive than the LOP. Th is also implies that even if the LOP is satisfi ed with a 
high and volatile transport cost, it may not be enough for prices to co-move. Th us, LOP can still 
hold if the price transmission ratio is less than one (see Listorti, 2008).
Undoubtedly, the concept underlying the LOP remains a very vital ingredient in market 
effi  ciency and its integration as well as in international trade as a whole, particularly in the 
agricultural sector. However standard literature remains skeptical about the LOP. Miljkovic 
(1999) concludes that relative to other economic laws, several empirical tests have violated the 
LOP mainly due to factors such as market power, the pass-through of exchange rate on output 
prices as well as border and domestic policies such as increases in tariff s (see Conforti, 2004). 
Th erefore the role of exchange rates and tariff s in determining price transmission signals from 
the international market to domestic markets is cardinal in national policy formulation as well as 
examining price stability in developing economies. Th is is one of the reasons why a small shock 
in commodity price changes receives major attention in developing economies such as that of 
Ghana where a fl oating exchange rate regime operates.
Th e increased level of integration of national and international markets means that a change 
in world prices will aff ect domestic food prices, whether or not the country exports or imports 
food staples. Th e changes in domestic food prices, whether resulting from trade policy such 
as changes in tariff s or changes in international food prices, could aff ect household welfare 
and hence incomes of the poor. Th ese eff ects are transmitted through changes in the price of 
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tradable products demanded and supplied by the poor – the price transmission eff ects (Winters, 
McCulloch and McKay, 2004). Th us, trade liberalization aff ects the poor by changing the prices 
at which they buy as consumers and sell as producers (Matusz and Tarr, 1999). In this way, trade 
liberalization reduces poverty by lowering prices of imported goods and keeping prices of import 
substitutes low, and thus increasing real incomes of the poor.
In the case of rising domestic food prices due to high world food prices, the exact impact 
on household welfare and poverty depends on how households are able to take advantage of 
the potential opportunities arising from high food prices, or how they cope with the threat of 
increasing prices and the degree of transmission of world prices to domestic prices. One major 
direct eff ect of higher food prices52 on developing countries is that as high international prices of 
food push up local prices, food becomes less aff ordable for consumers but provides an incentive 
for local farmers to increase their production of foodstuff s. In both cases, real incomes and 
welfare of the population, including the poor, are aff ected (Plan, 2008). Th us, standard literature 
indicates that the fi rst-order approximation of the change in welfare for households, also referred 
to as ‘before response’ eff ect of higher food prices depends on the status of households either as 
net food consumers or net producers. While higher food prices will benefi t net food producers, 
net food buyers will suff er.
Higher food prices will hurt the poor and worsen poverty if the majority of poor households 
are net food buyers (Byerlee, Myers and Jayne, 2006; Christiaensen and Demery, 2007; Ivanic 
and Martin, 2008 and Hoekman and Olarreaga, 2007). Many studies such as Jaumotte et al 
(2008) and Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008) posit that developing countries will benefi t 
from agricultural trade liberalization as it reduces inequalities by facilitating higher exports of 
agricultural commodities which in turn creates jobs and increases the income of poo people. 
Th e availability of cheaper imports associated with reduction in tariff s also reduces inequality 
in developing countries. Th us, agricultural trade liberalization is viewed as pro-poor in low-
income developing countries and hence justifi ed in terms of social welfare and treasury costs 
(Bakhshoodeh and Akbari, 2002).
Simler (2010) uses more recent price data to estimate the impact of higher food prices on 
consumption poverty in Uganda. Th e paper fi nds that poor households in Uganda tend to be 
net buyers of food staples, and therefore suff er welfare losses when food prices increase. Th is is 
most pronounced in urban areas, but holds true for most rural households as well. Th e diversity 
of staple foods has not been an eff ective buff er because of price increases across a range of staple 
foods. Th e paper estimates that both the incidence and depth of poverty increased—at least in 
the short run as a result of higher food prices in 2008, increasing by 2.6 and 2.2 percentage points, 
52 The other effect which is indirect is the higher cost of imported food which ultimately leads to trade defi cits that depress the 




respectively. Th e increase in poverty was highest in the northern region, which was already the 
poorest in Uganda. Th ese studies utilized domestic prices with the assumption that international 
prices are fully transmitted to domestic prices. If changes in world prices are not fully transmitted 
or over-transmitted to domestic prices, then those studies may arrive at skeptical conclusion 
about the impact on welfare.
Th e paper computes a simple measure of short-term change in welfare following an increase in 
tradable staple food prices and relates it to a range of household characteristics in a cross-section 
of developing countries. Th e results of the paper indicate that poorer households and those with 
the least means to cope are the most likely to be adversely aff ected by an increase in the price 
of basic tradable staple food commodities in all countries considered. Households in the lower 
expenditure quintiles, households with little land and education, and larger households are all 
found to be systematically associated with larger estimated percentage losses from rising food 
prices. Th e poor households that gain from the increase in prices appear to be linked to having 
access to the key resources needed to turn farming into a profi table activity with reasonable levels 
of productivity: land in suffi  cient quantity, and modern inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.
3. Empirical Approach
Price transmission elasticity shows the extent to which changes in world prices are transmitted 
onto domestic markets. Th ompson and Bohl (1999) argue that price transmission elasticity can 
indeed be interpreted as a measure of the degree of market insulation, or the extent to which 
border policies are transmitted onto the domestic market. Price transmission is aff ected by trade 
liberalization and by trade policies. Tariff s are mostly the policy variables that can be used by 
countries to insulate the domestic market from cheap imports of competing products. It is 
therefore imperative to check the extent to which tariff s on food prices from the international 
market aff ect prices on the domestic market. Exchange rate is another variable that infl uences 
prices of imported food commodities on the domestic market. An appreciating exchange rate 
regime will cause prices of imported food commodities to decline on the domestic market and 
rise when the exchange rate depreciates. Th us exchange rate as an explanatory variable will be 
crucial in this study.
Generally speaking, increased trade liberalization will contribute to greater price transmission 
elasticity. Th e existence of a stable relationship between two prices has been assumed as a necessary 
condition for integrated markets (see Ardeni, 1989). In a system with n prices, the number of 
co-integrating vectors can be taken as an index of the degree of integration of the markets. We 
employ time-series econometric techniques to investigate these relationships. In particular the 
use of co-integration analysis allows us to explore the long-run elasticities. In this study, we 
consider domestic prices for imported commodity i at time t (PD
i
) as a function of international 
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price of commodity i at time t (PW
i
), exchange rate (E) and Tariff  (T) imposed on commodity 
at a particular time. We outline a pass-through model which quantifi es the extent to which the 
international prices aff ect domestic market prices from 1990 to 2008. Th e pass-through model 
is as follows:
PD =  α  +  β PW 321 )1()( βββμ TEPWPD ii +=       (1)







are all equal to 1.
Taking the logarithm of Equation 1
εε ββββ μα +++++ ++ = )1ln(lnln)ln(ln ln 321 TEPWPW PD=ln PD  (2)
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 lnPW, lnE and ln(1+T) are the log of domestic prices, international prices, 






 and μ are the coeffi  cients of the international prices, 
exchange rate, tariff  and the constant term respectively.ε  is the error term. Th e commodities that 
are considered in this paper are rice, maize, and groundnut.
One could think of β
1 
as capturing the ‘price eff ect’ of the pass-through. By price eff ect, we 
mean the eff ect which is due only to international prices and cannot be infl uenced by policy. Th e 




. In other words these policy variables 
also impact on the domestic prices of these commodities and can reinforce or counteract the price 
eff ects depending on what policy relation these variables are. Th e pass-through is labeled “full” or 
“complete” if β =1, “incomplete” if β <1 and more than complete if β>1 (see Nicita, 2009).
Time series data in levels are usually non-stationary and can result in spurious results if not 
used appropriately. It is therefore imperative that the stationarity or otherwise of the series 
is tested before they are employed in regression analysis (see Gujarati, 2006). We employ 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to establish the order of integration of the series. Th e 
autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) model of Inder (1993) is used to test for co- integration. 
Th is procedure involves estimating a general dynamic equation or ADL model of the form
++++++= −−−− 112211 lnln....lnln)ln(ln tptpttt PWPDPDPDPD δβββμ
+++++++ −−−−− xtxttqtqt EEEPWPW ln....lnlnln...ln 221122 λλλδδ





represent domestic and international prices at time t respectively. 
β , δ , λ  and η  are the coeffi  cients of domestic prices, world prices, exchange rate and tariff  
respectively; μ  a constant term. Th e implied long-run solution is obtained by noting that in the 
long run
ptttt PDPDPDPDPD −−− ==== ln.........lnlnlnln 21 ,     (4)
qtttt PWPWPWPWPW −−− ===== ln......lnlnlnln 21 ,     (5)
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xtttt EEEEE −−− ==== ln.....lnlnlnln 21       (6)
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From equation 3 the domestic price can be expressed as
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Th e coeffi  cients of the prices in equation 9 can be read as the long-run degree of pass-through 
of price changes on the international market to the domestic market. Th e interpretation is that 
changes in international prices do impact on domestic prices if the pass-through coeffi  cient is 
signifi cant. A re-parametisation of equation (9) is the Error Correction Model (see Davidson et 
al. 1978 and Lloyd et al. 2001). In this study, the short-run pass-through eff ects are measured 
using the ECM.
Eff ects of international food price changes on household welfare
Changes in international prices of tradable goods are important in determining the level 
of household welfare. In determining the eff ect of international price changes on household 
welfare, we quantify the welfare impact of a change in international prices using the following 
household indirect utility function linking welfare in household h  with prices and household 
monetary incomes:
)( hhhh PYuU =       (10)
where hY and represent the money income of household h  and prices respectively. 
Following Singh et al (1986), for households involved in agricultural or any other entrepreneurial 
activities, Y
h
 can be defi ned as the sum of earnings and profi ts
  ( ) ( )s d d sh i i i j j j
i j
Y P Q Q w V V= − − −∑ ∑
   
   (11)
where P
i 
is commodity prices, siQ commodities sold in the market, and 
d
iQ  the household’s 
consumption; djV are the inputs demanded by the household, 
s
jV  is the household’s inputs 
supply (including labour) and jw  represents the input prices. Now, assuming homogeneity of 
domestic and foreign-owned tradable food commodities, domestic prices of food items can be 
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defi ned as the function of tariff , exchange rate and international price (see Nicita, 2004). Under 
these simplifi ed assumptions we model a simple econometric specifi cation linking changes 
in international prices, tariff s and exchange rate to domestic prices. By so doing, we combine 
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Combining equations 10 and 12 and taking the fi rst diff erential resulted in the fi rst-order 










where ϕ  is the marginal utility of money income. Most empirical literature on welfare impacts 
of food price changes assumes full pass-through of changes in international prices to domestic 
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where dPW
i
 represents the change in international prices of the commodities in question.
 However, it is possible that changes in international prices may be partially or over-transmitted 
to domestic prices. Th is makes the assumption of full transmission very problematic, particularly 
when at least two factors (the non-competitive behavior of intermediaries and poor physical 
connectivity) which can dilute the impact of rising international food prices on the domestic 
prices in Africa are taken into consideration (Benson, 2008). In this paper, we depart from the 
existing studies that assume full pass-through and utilize the pass-through elasticities computed 
from equation 9 to measure the actual impact of international price changes on household 
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where δ
 
is the pass-through elasticity of changes in international prices. Measuring welfare 
changes using equation (15) is relatively straightforward. Nevertheless, given that it assumes that 
agents’ behaviour is constant, the results will only be meaningful for marginal changes in prices 
and/or for measuring short-run eff ects. Th erefore, in order to determine whether households are 
net producers (sellers) or net consumers (buyers) as a result of changes in international prices, 
the Net Benefi t Ratio (NBR) was employed (see Deaton, 1989). Th us, in terms of budget shares, 
the fi rst-order “before response.” welfare impacts of international price changes is derived by 
modifying the NBR as







 are the food production ratios and food consumption ratios respectively. 
ΔW
h
 is the welfare eff ect of price changes expressed as a proportion of the baseline income.
4. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Th e analysis in this study is done for rice, maize, and groundnuts. Th e main variables of interest 
here are domestic prices, world prices, exchange rates and tariff s. Household expenditure data 
on the three commodities is obtained from the Ghana Living Standards Survey data (GLSS 5). 
Th e basis for selecting these commodities is that the Food and Agricultural Sector Development 
Policy (FASDEP), which is the main agricultural sector policy document for Ghana, gives 
cardinal focus to these food commodities though the policy has made room for all other food 
crops that show good prospects for the future. International monthly prices of rice, maize and 
groundnuts for 1990 to 2008 were obtained from FAOSTATS. Data on domestic prices for the 
same period were obtained from the Statistical, Research and Information Directorate (SRID) 
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). In addition, monthly exchange rate fi gures 
and tariff  rates for the same period were obtained from the Bank of Ghana and Ghana Customs 
Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) respectively.
4.1 Trends in prices of rice on the international and domestic markets
Figure 1 shows that international prices for imported rice remained fairly stable from 1990 to 
1994 but rose steadily from 1996 to 2008. Th e rise in international prices was very sharp between 
2007 and 2008. Th is sharp rise may be attributed to the global food crisis that was experienced 
during that period. With the global food crisis easing, the prices on the international market 
dropped signifi cantly during the latter parts of 2008, but started rising again before the close of 
2008. Th e domestic price of imported rice also rose steadily from 1994 to 2007. Th e rise became 
more pronounced from the last quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008. On the domestic 
front, the sharp rise may also be attributed to the global food and oil crises that hit the country 
at that time.
Despite the importance of rice as a staple, domestic supply is inadequate, making Ghana a 
net importer of rice. Total rice imported into Ghana exceeded production levels by 20 percent 
in the 1990s (Codjoe, 2007). As of 2002, the self- suffi  ciency ratio of rice was fl uctuating within 
the range of 26 precent to 65 percent, with an average production level of 178,000 metric tons 
per annum, a fi gure far below the country’s potential production capacity. Th ough Ghana has 
the potential to produce an average of 6.5 mt/ha, the current yield is about 2 mt/ha (FASDEP, 
2002).
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It is intriguing to note that while imported rice is heavily subsidized by governments of their 
countries of origin, the policies of successive Ghanaian governments since the mid-1970s have 
consistently focused on removal of input subsidies, removal of support or guaranteed producer 
prices, trade liberalization and food aid. Th e eff ects of these policies are the surges in rice imports, 
particularly since 2001. Th is situation is also making local production unattractive especially 
when the two markets are uneven in terms of support for production and marketing. In addition, 
consumer preferences are also seen to be shifting from the more nutritious local rice to the 
imported milled white polished rice. Also, it is increasingly becoming a cliché that imported rice 
is gradually becoming a staple food for Ghanaians compared to the locally produced rice, mainly 
because of the taste, aroma and attractiveness of the imported rice variety.
Figure 1: Monthly Price Trends of Rice for the International and Domestic Markets
Source: FAOSTATS and Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ghana
4.2 Price trends for maize on the international and domestic markets
Maize is the basis of several local dishes and the main feedstuff  for poultry as well as other 
livestock in Ghana. It is cultivated by 1.75 million (64 percent) of the 2.74 million households 
operating farms in Ghana (FASDEP, 2002). Compared to domestic prices, international prices 
of maize remained fairly stable from 1990 to 2008. Th e increase in 2008 was purely due to 
the food price hikes on the international market. Prices of maize on the domestic front have 
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been on the rise and highly volatile. Very sharp increases occurred in 2005, 2006 and 2008. 
Th ese periods were the periods when demand for maize in the poultry industry was very high 
due to the support government provided to the poultry industry at that time. Furthermore, an 
increase in tariff s on imported chicken was also an incentive for poultry farmers to produce more 
chicken for the local market since importers were fi nding it diffi  cult to import larger quantities 
of chicken from the international market. As a result, demand for maize shot up causing prices 
to also increase on the domestic market during those periods. Maize imports constituted 0.9 
percent and 1.0 percent of production levels in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively (Codjoe, 2007). 
Th e author further indicates that a metric tonnes of maize imported onto the domestic market 
decreases its production locally by 6 metric tonness.
On the other hand, exports of maize have been on the rise in recent times, with export volumes 
increasing from 367 metric tonness in 2007 to 1,097 metric tonnes in 2008; a 200 percentage 
point increase within these periods (ISSER, 2008). However, one cannot be complacent as a 
result of the potential and adverse eff ects of maize importation. If Cudjoe’s fi ndings are anything 
to go by, then a 100 metric tonnes of maize imported into Ghana will cause production levels to 
decline by 600 metric tonnes (a 600 percent decline) in the long run. Th is implies that Ghana 
can easily increase its import bill for maize within a short period of time if this scenario occurs 
(Figure 2).
Figure 2: Monthly Price Trends of Maize for the International and the Domestic 
Markets
Source: FAOSTATS and Ministry of Food and Agriculture
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4.3 Trends in monthly prices of groundnut
Both domestic and international prices of groundnut have not been stable for the entire period of 
the study. Th e most interesting part is that it is only groundnut that has prices on the international 
market higher than that on the local market. Th e possible reason is that international trade for 
groundnut has been growing steadily since 1970 due to the growing demand for groundnut in 
the confectionary industry. Th ough some few fi rms in Ghana import groundnut, the price of 
groundnut on the local front seems to be on the lower side compared to that of the international 
prices. Th is may be due the fact that Ghana is self suffi  cient in groundnut consumption. Groundnut 
is mostly consumed as a complement to other foodstuff s present on the local market. Figure 3 
gives a clear illustration on the trends in the prices of groundnuts from 1990 to 2008.
Figure 3: Monthly price trends of groundnut for international and domestic markets
Source: FAOSTATS and Ministry of Food and Agriculture
4.4 Production and trade of the major staples
Maize is the most produced and consumed commodity among the three commodities considered 
in the study. Its production and consumption levels are 1,171 and 925 thousand tonnes respectively 
(Table 1). Th is implies that Ghana produces more maize than it consumes. However, Ghana still 
remains a net importer of maize. Maize imports recorded an average of 57,000 tonnes and the 
level of exports was only 1,000 tonnes. Th e level of rice consumption, on the other hand, far 
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outweighs the level of production in Ghana. Ghana produces an average of 191 thousand tonnes 
of rice, as against a consumption level of 453, 000 tonnes. Th is attests to the fact that Ghana is 
a net importer of rice. In addition, Ghana imports 482,000 tonnes of rice a year and does not 
export any at all. Among the three commodities, groundnuts are the least consumed. A total 
of 120,000 tonnes of groundnuts consumed every year as against a production level of 294,000 
tonnes. Ghana does not import groundnuts but exports 7,000 tonnes a year. Th is is so because 
groundnut is always not the major constituent of Ghanaian dishes relative to rice and maize.
Table 1: Production and Trade of Major Food Staples in Ghana in 2007 (000 tonnes)
Food item Production Consumption Imports Exports
Rice 191 453 482 0
Maize 1,171 925 57 1
Groundnut 294 120 0 7
Source: FAOSTATS
4.5 Importance of the major staples in the Ghanaian diet
In terms of importance, maize can be assumed to be the most important commodity among the 
three commodities considered in this study. Th e quantity of maize consumed per capita is 41.1kg 
per year. In terms of daily calories, maize produces 357 kcal per person. Th is is far more than a 
per capita of 192 kcal per day for rice. Furthermore, the per capita quantity of rice consumed 
per year is 20.1kg. Th is shows that, the international price pass-through for maize will have an 
impact on more households than that of rice. Groundnuts are the least important commodity. 
Th is may be attributed to the fact that relative to rice and maize, groundnuts are not a major 
constituent of household diets in Ghana (Table 2).
Table 2: Importance of the major staple food in diet of Ghana in 2007
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4.6 Household expenditure on food during the 2007/2008 food crisis
Overall, expenditure on rice, maize and groundnuts accounts for approximately 23 percent of 
total household expenditure on food. Clearly, household expenditure on maize was the highest 
(13%) compared to rice (8 percent) and groundnuts (2.2 percent). Th is is associated more with 
rural households than with urban households. Rural households spend 16 percent of their total 
food expenditure on maize whereas urban households spend only 7.4 percent on maize. Th is 
is also due to the fact that most rural households produce maize for domestic consumption as 
opposed to rice and groundnuts. Another interesting aspect of the story is that Greater Accra and 
Ashanti regions where poverty is on the lower side compared to the other regions spend a little 
more on rice than on maize (see GSS, 2007). Th is also confi rms the point that richer households 
gravitate towards the consumption of rice relative to maize and groundnuts. In the Greater 
Accra Region, households spend on average 6.3 percent of their total expenditure on food on 
rice, followed by maize 5.8 percent. Similarly, the average expenditure on rice for households in 
the Ashanti Region was 8.6 percent and expenditure on maize was 7.8 percent.
Table 3: Household Total Food Expenditure Shares (%) in 2005/2006
Rice Maize Groundnuts All 3 foods
National 0.0797 0.1275 0.0220 0.2292
Locality
Urban 0.0756 0.0767 0.0100 0.1624
Rural 0.0825 0.1620 0.0302 0.2746
Region
Western 0.1007 0.0740 0.0089 0.1836
Central 0.0859 0.1373 0.0068 0.2301
Greater Accra 0.0631 0.0589 0.0045 0.1265
Volta 0.0678 0.2006 0.0240 0.2924
Eastern 0.0685 0.1452 0.0107 0.2243
Ashanti 0.0857 0.0783 0.0141 0.1781
Brong Ahafo 0.0730 0.1116 0.0139 0.1985
Northern 0.0836 0.2822 0.0800 0.4458
Upper East 0.1122 0.1766 0.1019 0.3907
Upper West 0.0815 0.2363 0.0703 0.388
Socio-Economic Group
Public 0.0806 0.0771 0.0115 0.1691
Wage-priv-formal 0.0706 0.0706 0.0096 0.1508
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Rice Maize Groundnuts All 3 foods
Wage-priv-informal 0.0783 0.091 0.0104 0.1796
Self-agro-export 0.0829 0.1167 0.0124 0.2119
Self-agro-crop 0.0845 0.1815 0.0361 0.3022
Self-bus 0.0759 0.0986 0.0156 0.1901
Non-working 0.0664 0.0668 0.0065 0.1398
Gender –Head
Male 0.0804 0.1369 0.0252 0.2424
Female 0.0777 0.0994 0.0125 0.1896
Source: Authors’ own computation
5. Empirical Results
Th e series for our analysis are subjected to unit root tests to determine whether they are stationary 
or otherwise. We employed the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) to test for the stationarity 
or otherwise of the series. Th e test statistics show that all the variables are integrated in order I 
(see Appendix 1).
5.1 Long-run elasticities
In testing for the long-run relationships between the variables of interest, we estimate two 
diff erent models to explain the determinants of domestic prices of the diff erent crops. In the fi rst 
model (Model A) we include the world prices and exchange rate as our explanatory variables. In 
the second model (Model B), we include world prices, exchange rate and tariff  as our explanatory 
variables. Generally, the results show that tariff s have not been important in explaining the 
long-run movements in domestic prices for the three crops. For all the three crops we do fi nd 
cointegration for the model in which domestic prices are explained by international prices and 
exchange rate (Model A). It is only in the case of maize that we fi nd cointegration in both 
Model A and Model B.
We note from the results of the long-run estimates (Table 4) that for all the three crops, the 
international price is important in explaining domestic prices. Indeed, for rice and maize, the 
long-run elasticity of the international price is about unity, suggesting complete pass-through. 
However, the same cannot be said of groundnuts for which we fi nd a long-run elasticity of between 
0.7 and 0.8 for Models B and A respectively. Th is is not surprising as imports of groundnuts tend 
to absorb only a relatively small proportion of the total demand in Ghana. We also note from the 
results that it is only in the case of maize that we fi nd a robust and signifi cant eff ect of exchange 
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rate on domestic prices in the long-run. For rice, and in the model for which we fi nd evidence 
of long-run co-movements, the exchange rate variable is not signifi cant. Interestingly, in the 
estimated ECM (shown in the Appendix) we fi nd that the exchange rate has a contemporaneous 
and positive eff ect on domestic prices. In other words, for rice we fi nd that the exchange rate has 
an instantaneous eff ect on domestic prices. However in the long run, it is international prices 
which tend to drive domestic prices.
In the case of maize, both the exchange rate and world prices are signifi cant in explaining 
long-run movements in domestic prices. As with the model for rice, there seems to be a complete 
pass-through of international prices to domestic prices. Th e elasticities of world prices seem to be 
higher than that of exchange rate, both with respect to domestic prices. For maize, we note that 
exchange rates are not important in driving domestic prices in the short run (from the estimated 
ECMs shown in the Appendix). We suspect that very little imported maize may be going into 
direct consumption. Rather, it may be going into the brewery or poultry industry. Th erefore , 
domestic prices are going to be dominated by factors which infl uence supply constraints. In that 
case exchange rates will not feed in directly. However, these supply-side factors are important 
enough for maize so that the exchange rate eff ects persist in the long run (through fertilizer, 
pesticides, etc.).
What these results are suggesting is that policy variables are important in explaining domestic 
price changes for some food items in Ghana. We would argue that a policy variable such as 
exchange rate may be important in explaining short-run movements in rice of which Ghana is a 
net importer. Another important observation from the results is that tariff s do not seem to have 
much of an infl uence in explaining movements in domestic prices of food in Ghana – neither 
in the short-run nor in the long run. Th is result, therefore, challenges the reasoning behind 
government’s policy of reducing import duties of selected food products in the wake of the 2007 
food crisis. However, it is also important to mention here that tariff s have limited variability over 
the period of the study and so one should discuss this result in the light of this limitation. We 
also fi nd that elasticities in the groundnuts models are much lower than the estimates in the rice 
and maize models. We argue that this may be because the net imports of groundnuts are much 
lower than those of maize and rice. As a result, exchange rate depreciations and/or tariff  increases 
will hurt domestic consumers of groundnuts less (if at all) than they do for maize and rice.
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Table 4: Long Run Estimates and Co-Integration Test
RICE MAIZE GROUNDNUT
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B
Constant -7.4725*** -7.3198*** 1.8841** 2.2057*** 0.27 -0.0883
LNPW$ 0.9953*** 0.9957*** 1.0149*** 1.0588*** 0.7754** 0.6698***
LNEXCH 0.8326 0.7925*** 0.8996*** 0.8929*** 0.2248 0.2909
LNTARR 0.0349*** 0.0643 0.0661
ECM test for cointergration -3.4862** -3.4556 -3.81** -3.925** -3.6258** -3.6312
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error. *; *** and ** show rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Th e ECM Test is the Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998) test for co-integration.
5.2 Patterns of food consumption and production
Tables 5 to 8 provide summary data on rice and maize consumption in Ghana. We observe 
considerable heterogeneity in the weight of the two staples in the overall consumption basket 
of the population. Th e average annual household consumption of rice in the population as a 
whole is roughly 758,000 cedis (about $505 at the current exchange rate). On average, rice 
accounts for approximately 10 percent of total food consumption expenditure for a household. 
As a nation, rice is consumed by about 71 percent of households but it is the preferred choice of 
the richer households – about 84 percent of households in the richest income quintile consume 
rice, compared with only about half of the households in the poorest quintile. On a geographical 
basis, we see that rice consumption is rather less frequent in the three northern regions and the 
rural savannah in particular. However, in terms of budget shares, these poorer regions spend 
more on rice as a share of total food spending. For maize, consumption is higher, at 1,300,000 
cedis per year (about $867 at the current exchange rate). About two thirds of maize consumption 
is from auto-consumption. Th e consumption patterns for maize and rice are quite similar. About 
73 percent of the population consumes maize, but again there are important regional diff erences. 
Like rice, maize is also heavily patronized by the relatively better off  households. In terms of 
consumption shares, among the population as a whole, maize accounts for approximately an 
average of 25 percent of total food consumption expenditure in Ghana. Again, the consumption 
share of maize is much higher for the very poor and poor than for other income groups. Th e 
poor tend to consume on average much more maize than rice. Th us, on the consumption side 
an increase in the price of maize would likely hurt the poor more than an increase in the price 
of rice, because for the poorest 40 percent of the population, the share of their consumption 
allocated to maize is substantially (more than thrice) higher than that allocated to rice.
We now turn to the production side to assess who earns income from rice and maize production 
and their weights in household total incomes. Table 5 shows that very few households (4 percent 
237
The Transmission of  World Commodity Prices to Domestic Markets: Household Welfare Effects in Ghana 
of the population) derive incomes from rice production. Rice production is concentrated in the 
savannah ecological zone, in the three northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West), 
among male-headed households and among the poorer households. Th e average income from 
rice sales in the population as a whole is just 61,000 cedis (about $41 at the current exchange 
rate) per year, accounting for less than 1 percent of total household income. Table 6 presents 
the same information for maize. Th e share of maize-producing households in the population 
is much higher, at about 28 percent. Unlike rice production that is concentrated in the rural 
savannah zone, maize production is more evenly spread among the rural coastal, rural forest, and 
rural Savannah areas. Average income from maize production is more than fi ve times that of rice 
production, 320,000 cedis compared with 61,000 cedis.




Average consumption for all house-
holds




Urban 81.6 920,000 2,700 922,700 7.6
Rural 74.1 530,000 140,000 670,000 10.6
Locality
Accra (GAMA) 73.1 930,000 0.0 930,000 6.8
Urban Coastal 87.1 1,100,000 1,900 1,101,900 8.6
Urban Forest 88.1 940,000 0.0 940,000 8.0
Urban Savannah 76.4 670,000 17,000 687,000 7.2
Rural Coastal 79.4 570,000 130,000 700,000 6.9
Rural Forest 87.3 670,000 13,000 683,000 8.9
Rural Savannah 55.9 330,000 300,000 630,000 14.3
Region
Western 90.0 990,000 3,200 993,200 10.2
Central 86.5 770,000 1,700 771,700 8.6
Greater Accra 74.2 870,000 0.0 870,000 6.3
Volta 81.8 500,000 10,000 510,000 7.0
Eastern 82.2 700,000 110,000 810,000 7.4
Ashanti 88.5 780,000 15,000 795,000 8.7
Brong Ahafo 76.1 510,000 100,000 610,000 10.1
Northern 56.7 410,000 200,000 610,000 11.5






Average consumption for all house-
holds
Budget share (% of 
total food spending)
Purchase Auto Total
Upper West 34.5 210,000 170,000 380,000 12.2
Sex of head
Male 75.0 680000 110000 790000 9.8
Female 83.2 660,000 16000 676000 8.2
Poverty Quintile
Poorest 55.3 260,000 140,000 400,000 11.7
2 77.0 470,000 110,000 580,000 10.2
3 83.1 670,000 70,000 740,000 9.4
4 85.5 870,000 120,000 990,000 8.9
Richest 84.0 1,100,000 5,200 1,105,200 7.2
National 71.7 670,000 88,000 758,000 9.5
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2005-06 GLSS.
Table 6: Maize Consumption for Diff erent Household Groups, 2006
% of households 
consuming maize
Average consumption for all house-
holds




Urban 84.1 580,000 270,000 840,000 9.2
Rural 69.0 420,000 1,200,000 1,600,000 34.2
Locality
Accra (GAMA) 85.6 540,000 19,000 550,000 4.6
Urban Coastal 84.8 700,000 150,000 850,000 9.5
Urban Forest 84.5 440,000 280,000 710,000 6.6
Urban Savannah 78.9 920,000 900,000 1,800,000 26.0
Rural Coastal 83.4 540,000 1,100,000 1,600,000 22.2
Rural Forest 77.2 340,000 670,000 1,000,000 16.0
Rural Savannah 52.4 460,000 1,800,000 2,300,000 61.8
Region
Western 80.8 440,000 220,000 660,000 7.9
Central 82.8 530,000 700,000 1,200,000 16.6
Greater Accra 86.4 560,000 110,000 670,000 6.0
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% of households 
consuming maize
Average consumption for all house-
holds
Budget share (% of 
total food spending)
Purchase Auto Total
Volta 75.8 660,000 1,300,000 1,900,000 34.5
Eastern 80.9 500,000 970,000 1,500,000 18.4
Ashanti 83.1 310,000 420,000 730,000 10.2
Brong Ahafo 70.3 340,000 650,000 990,000 21.5
Northern 43.9 550,000 2,300,000 2,900,000 73.2
Upper East 63.7 570,000 950,000 1,500,000 37.4
Upper West 56.5 470,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 67.6
Sex of head
Male 72.1 490,000 940,000 1,400,000 28.0
Female 83.1 450,000 470,000 920,000 14.5
Poverty Quintile
Poorest 55.0 290,000 1,000,000 1,300,000 47.5
2 72.2 410,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 30.6
3 78.8 530,000 870,000 1,400,000 22.0
4 82.9 570,000 760,000 1,300,000 15.6
Richest 84.6 590,000 430,000 1,000,000 8.7
National 73.4 480,000 830,000 1,300,000 24.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2005-06 GLSS.
Table 7: Rice Incomes for Diff erent Household Groups, 2006




Income share (% of 
total HH income)
Residence area
Urban 0.9 31,000 0.3
Rural 6.5 80,000 0.9
Locality
Accra (GAMA) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Urban Coastal 0.4 31,000 0.1
Urban Forest 0.3 11,000 0.2
Urban Savannah 5.3 150,000 1.4
Rural Coastal 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rural Forest 1.6 26,000 0.2
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Income share (% of 
total HH income)
Rural Savannah 15.5 180,000 2.0
Region
Western 1.1 29,000 0.1
Central 0.2 4,200 0.0
Greater Accra 0.0 0.0 0.0
Volta 2.7 16,000 0.3
Eastern 0.9 30,000 0.3
Ashanti 1.0 14,000 0.2
Brong Ahafo 6.0 180,000 1.2
Northern 12.3 220,000 1.7
Upper East 29.1 140,000 4.0
Upper West 10.7 47,000 0.8
Sex of head
Male 5.5 79,000 0.8
Female 0.9 2,900 0.1
Poverty Quintile
Poorest 10.2 76,000 1.7
2 5.6 110,000 0.7
3 3.4 64,000 0.5
4 2.1 40,000 0.3
Richest 0.8 17,000 0.1
National 4.0 61,000 0.6
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2005-06 GLSS.
Table 8: Maize Incomes for Diff erent Household Groups, 2006
% of HHs receiving 
income from maize
Average Income for 
all HHs
Income share (% of 
total HH income)
Residence area
Urban 9.4 120,000 1.1
Rural 38.3 450,000 5.1
Locality
Accra (GAMA) 0.2 6,400 0.1
Urban Coastal 6.8 44,000 0.6
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% of HHs receiving 
income from maize
Average Income for 
all HHs
Income share (% of 
total HH income)
Urban Forest 15.7 210,000 1.8
Urban Savannah 14.9 230,000 2.1
Rural Coastal 38.9 390,000 4.9
Rural Forest 38.4 420,000 5.1
Rural Savannah 37.8 500,000 5.1
Region
Western 20.5 190,000 1.6
Central 33.2 270,000 2.9
Greater Accra 3.5 32,000 0.5
Volta 31.8 290,000 4.4
Eastern 29.4 310,000 3.7
Ashanti 32.3 440,000 5.6
Brong Ahafo 39.5 570,000 5.6
Northern 42.7 520,000 5.4
Upper East 16.3 130,000 1.9
Upper West 17.7 510,000 2.7
Sex of head
Male 30.1 380,000 4.1
Female 18.4 140,000 2.0
Poverty Quintile
Poorest 31.5 330,000 5.1
2 34.4 380,000 4.6
3 31.6 380,000 4.1
4 23.9 280,000 2.4
Richest 15.4 250,000 1.7
National 27.3 320,000 3.6
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2005-06 GLSS.
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5.3 Impact of international food prices on poverty
In Table 9 we present the short-run impact of changes in international food prices on poverty. 
Th e simulation results are presented individually for the three crops and then for the aggregate 
crops in the study. Th e measures of poverty are then compared to the base line poverty measures 
stipulated by the Ghana Statistical Service and the World Bank. At the national level, the global 
food price increases for the three commodities were estimated to increase household poverty by 
0.9 percent, forcing approximately 20,0000 persons below the national poverty line. In addition, 
poverty increased in both rural and urban localities of Ghana, when the estimates were compared 
with the national average.
At the national level, the commodity that showed the highest impact on poverty as a result 
of increases of its prices on the international market is rice (followed by maize). Considering 
the GSS base poverty line, rice alone contributed to poverty increases among rice consumers by 
2.3 percent. Th is may be due to Ghana’ being a net importer of rice. Maize recorded a marginal 
increase in poverty by 0.1 percent. On a regional basis, the Upper West Region was the least 
aff ected region in terms of poverty increase as a result of increase in international food prices. 
In addition, across all the 10 regions, rice impacted most in increasing poverty as a result of the 
increases in global food crisis.
Male-headed households were less aff ected than female headed households. Male-headed 
households were pushed into poverty by 2.2 percent whereas female-headed households were 
pushed into poverty by 2.2 percentage points. In addition, rice aff ected both male- and female- 
headed households than the other two food commodities. Male- and female-headed households 
were actually pushed into poverty for consuming rice by 2.2 and 2.5 percentage points 
respectively. However, male-headed households were taken out of poverty for consuming maize 
and groundnuts during the global food crisis, by 0.2 and 0.001 percentage points respectively. 
On the other hand, maize pushed female-headed households into poverty by 1.2 percentage 
points. Female-headed households maintained a neutral position for consuming groundnuts. 
With the foregoing, it can be deduced that the impact of poverty on female-headed households 
was higher than on male-headed households during the international food price hikes.
In terms of the socioeconomic status of households, crop farmers (self-agro-crop) gained 
marginally from the international food price increases. Th is may be attributed to the fact that 
they are net producers. However, exporters of the food commodities were pushed into poverty 
by 4.2 percentage points. Th is may be due to their exposure to the international market as well 
as the fact that they are net consumers.
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Table 9: Impact of Increases in International Food Prices on Poverty
Base Rice Maize G’nut All 3
National 0.2855 0.308 0.2868 0.2854 0.2943
Locality
 Urban 0.1074 0.1178 0.1153 0.1084 0.1187
 Rural 0.3932 0.4229 0.3905 0.3923 0.4004
Region
 Western 0.1857 0.2295 0.1894 0.1857 0.2156
 Central 0.1994 0.2302 0.2061 0.1994 0.2283
 Greater Accra 0.1179 0.1237 0.1231 0.1179 0.1244
 Volta 0.3171 0.3472 0.3188 0.3133 0.3370
 Eastern 0.1473 0.1686 0.1362 0.1473 0.1537
 Ashanti 0.2051 0.238 0.1975 0.2059 0.2132
 Brong Ahafo 0.2968 0.3076 0.303 0.2968 0.295
 Northern 0.5215 0.5421 0.5357 0.5219 0.508
 Upper East 0.7050 0.7137 0.7130 0.7048 0.7183
 Upper West 0.8789 0.8798 0.8685 0.8783 0.8740
Gender-Head
 Male 0.3145 0.3363 0.3126 0.3144 0.3193
 Female 0.1896 0.2145 0.2017 0.1896 0.2117
Socio-Economic Group
 Public 0.0782 0.0863 0.0799 0.0802 0.0858
 Wage-private-formal 0.1015 0.1108 0.0979 0.1015 0.1083
 Wage-private-informal 0.1707 0.2064 0.1906 0.1707 0.2029
 Self-agro-export 0.2412 0.2829 0.2559 0.2412 0.2829
 Self-agro-crop 0.4573 0.4843 0.4522 0.4568 0.4533
 Self-business 0.1668 0.1818 0.1709 0.1666 0.1824
 Non-working 0.1304 0.1401 0.1366 0.1304 0.1379
Source: Authors’ own computation
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Th is study has attempted to shed some light on the important linkages between higher world 
food prices, domestic prices and poverty in Ghana. Using a simple stylized methodology of 
calculating the fi rst-order welfare changes of households covered in the most recent Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS5), we were able to provide some detailed assessment of the impact of 
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higher food prices on national welfare and poverty in Ghana. While the methodology employed 
in the paper is simple, it provides a fairly good approximation of the poverty impacts of changes 
in food prices. Th e globalised nature of the world implies that what happens in one part of the 
world has implications for other parts of the world. Th is is indeed true for food prices. Th e degree 
of openness determines the degree of price transmission from the world to a given economy. 
Food price changes aff ect the welfare of households and the nature of the eff ect is a function 
of whether households are net buyers or sellers. In this study, therefore, we tried to investigate 
the nature of price transmission from world markets to domestic markets for three main food 
crops namely, rice, maize, and groundnuts. We also went further to investigate what the welfare 
implications are for households in terms of these price changes. We fi nd a long-run relationship 
between domestic prices, world prices and exchange rates. 
 We fi nd that the eff ect of world prices on domestic prices is signifi cant and positive. In the 
long-run there is complete pass-through for rice and maize. For groundnuts however, the degree 
of pass-through is much lower. Th e welfare simulations demonstrate that a substantial number 
of households in Ghana are vulnerable to food price shocks and have likely suff ered signifi cant 
welfare losses from rising food prices. Th e paper has been able to show that the average impact 
of the past and recent food price increases may have resulted in an increase in both the incidence 
and depth of poverty in Ghana.
At the national level, the commodity that showed the highest impact on poverty as a result 
of increases of its prices on the international market is rice (followed by maize). Considering 
the GSS base poverty line, rice alone contributed to poverty increases among rice consumers by 
2.3 percent. Th is may be due to Ghana being a net importer of rice. Maize recorded a marginal 
increase in poverty by 0.1 percent. On regional basis, the Upper West Region was the least 
aff ected region in terms of poverty increase as a result of increase in international food prices. In 
addition, across all the 10 regions, rice had the most impact in terms of increasing poverty as a 
result of the increases in global food crisis.
Male-headed households were less aff ected than female-headed households. Male headed 
households were pushed into poverty by 2.2 percent whereas female headed-households were 
pushed into poverty by 2.2 percentage points. In addition, rice aff ected both male and female 
headed households than the other two food commodities. Male- and female-headed households 
were actually pushed into poverty for consuming rice by 2.2 and 2.5 percentage points 
respectively. However, male-headed households were taken out of poverty for consuming maize 
and groundnuts during the global food crisis, by 0.2 and 0.001 percentage points respectively. 
On the other hand, maize pushed female-headed households into poverty by 1.2 percentage 
points. Female-headed households maintained a neutral position for consuming groundnuts. 
With the foregoing, it can be deduced that the impact of poverty on female-headed households 
was higher than on male-headed households during the international food price hikes.
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In terms of the socioeconomic status of householsd, crop farmers (self-agro-crop) gained 
marginally from the international food price increases. Th is may be attributed to the fact that 
they are net producers. However, exporters of the food commodities were pushed into poverty by 
4.2 percentage points. Th is may be due to their exposure to the international market as well as the 
fact that they are net consumers. Th e increased level of integration of national and international 
markets means that a change in world prices will aff ect domestic food prices, whether or not the 
country exports or imports food staples. While it is possible that higher prices of staple foods 
could lower poverty by raising the incomes of some poor farmers, this eff ect was, in the case 
of Ghana, off set by adverse impacts on poor net-buyer households. Although the food price 
increases have had diff erential eff ects on the population, the general experience has been that, for 
the vast majority of urban and female-headed households, the higher food prices brought severe 
hardship. Th e commodity with the greatest poverty impact is rice.
A key policy implication of the study results is that since the poor include both net consumers 
and net sellers of food commodities, a change in price in either direction will inevitably hurt 
some of the poor and benefi t some of the poor at the same time. With respect to the net impact 
on national poverty (i.e., on summary measures such as the headcount ratio and the poverty gap 
ratio), our fi ndings for Ghana are consistent with available evidence that suggests that among 
the poorest households, the decline in living standards of net consumers caused by higher food 
prices far outweighs the benefi ts accruing to net sellers. It is, therefore, imperative for developing 
country governments and their development partners to be seen to be making eff orts to improve 
smallholder agricultural productivity in the rural areas, even if the farmers produce for home 
consumption mainly. Suffi  cient attention should be given to maintaining or even improving the 
levels of social protection and poverty reduction expenditures.
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Table 1: ADF Unit Root on the Series
Variable ADF Lag Length Inference
LNEXCH -1.848* 12 I(1)
(-1.616)
LNTARR -1.732* 12 I(1)
(-1.616)
RICE
LNPD -1.904* 12 I(1)
(-1.616)
PNPW$ -2.463* 12 I(1)
(-1.616)
Maize
LNPD -2.681* 12 I(1)
(-2.575)
PNPW$ -1.964* 12 I(1)
(-1.616)
Groundnuts
LNPD -2.222** 12 I(1)
(-1.942)
PNPW$ -3.896** 12 I(1)
(-2.575)
Sorghum
LNPD -2.101** 12 I(1)
(-1.942)
PNPW$ -2.381** 12 I(1)
(-1.942)
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